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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the origin, intellectual development and use of a
semantic variant of the idea of logical space found implicitly in Kant and explicitly in
early Wittgenstein and van Fraassen. It elucidates the idea of logical space as the idea of
images or pictures representative of reality organized into a logico-mathematical structure
circumscribing a form of all possible worlds. Its main claim is that application of these
images or pictures to reality is through a certain conception of self.
The first chapter presents a novel interpretation of Kant’s semantic theory of
schemata in the Critique of Pure Reason, showing that a structure of the imagination
induced by the transcendental self informs an implicit idea of logical space. The second
chapter offers an intellectual history of the idea through developments in the organization
of images introduced by Helmholtz and Hertz.

The third chapter reveals early

Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space to be his notion of the self, demonstrating how this
serves to unify propositions of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus concerning solipsism,
realism, ethics, aesthetics and mysticism with those pertaining to the picture theory of
meaning. The fourth chapter provides a historical overview of the development of van
Fraassen’s empiricism in relation to his adaptation of logical space, and evaluates his
recent proposal in Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective that the problem
of coordination in the semantic view of theories is dissolved through self-location in
logical space. After identifying a number of problems this proposal creates for his
empiricism, a brief suggestion is made about how van Fraassen might improve upon his
conception of logical space, and how an empiricist view of scientific representation might
be understood as a result.

Key Words: logical space, schema, self, image, picture, model, semantic view of
theories, Kant, Wittgenstein, van Fraassen, Helmholtz, Hertz, scientific representation,
philosophy of science, semantics
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Introduction
The schema of time a line. (Kant)1
[L]ogical space (time) is the real line …. (van Fraassen) 2

This dissertation investigates the origin, intellectual development and use of a
semantic variant of the idea of logical space – what might be called “image space” or
“picture space” – found implicitly in Kant and explicitly in early Wittgenstein and van
Fraassen.3 Among the most abstract ideas ever used in a philosophy, it sets the stage for
highly influential and complex philosophical systems in historical and contemporary
thought, which exemplify the traditions of transcendental idealism, metaphysics and
empiricism. When approached through the idea of logical space, these systems are shown
to be subtle variations in the way three major philosophers have understood the relations
among imaginative representation, reality and the self.
For these philosophers4 the idea of logical space is the idea of images or pictures
of reality organized into a logico-mathematical structure circumscribing a form of all
possible worlds. As the form of imaginative representation, the idea of logical space
functions as an arena where cognition engages reality and as an interface where images
meet up with concepts. It tells us how applied mathematics encounters logic and how
natural language receives its semantic content. And it enlightens us about the way we are
in the world.
Notwithstanding its potential appeal to a wide range of philosophical interests, the
idea of logical space common among Kant, Wittgenstein and van Fraassen has never been
elucidated.5 Inspiration came with van Fraassen’s latest book, Scientific Representation
(2008).

There the application of scientific theories in the semantic view, what is

sometimes called the “problem of coordination”, is accounted for by self-ascription of
location in logical space. However, the idea of logical space did not feature prominently
in van Fraassen’s writing since his early work on the causal theory of time and on the
semantic approach to the analysis of the structure of scientific theories more generally.
There he first adapted the idea of logical space from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
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(1921/1961) and used it to explicate the meaning of “time” on the basis of an argument
that we conceive time as an “ideal entity” in which the structure of all actual events
embeds. “Time”, he claimed, refers to this entity, an abstract structure of our choosing
we use to represent all actual events – a logical space. In our contemporary setting that
developed with Newtonian physics it is the real line. He had erred, however, in thinking
all he had done was “to objectify [Kant’s pure] form of our intuition, and to describe it as
a form, as opposed to a condition of sensible perception” (1970a, 101). As the quotations
at the outset of this introduction suggest, the connection to Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason (1781-1787/1998) is through the “schema of time” produced in our
spatiotemporal imagination.
This study was undertaken with the intention of elucidating the idea of logical
space in order to properly evaluate van Fraassen’s account of self-location in logical
space.

It was also prompted by a vague suspicion that important and revealing

connections among van Fraassen, Wittgenstein and Kant were to be had by seeking each
philosopher’s answer to three simple questions:

What is meant by an “image” or

“picture”? How is it organized? How does it relate to reality? It was a genuine surprise,
however, that such simple questions seemed to go to the heart of three philosophical
systems, providing insight into difficult exegetical problems and positions, such as how to
make literal sense of Kant’s chapter on the schematism of pure concepts in the Critique,
how to unify Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and how to understand Fraassen’s claim that we
know empirical structure of real entities even though the structure is not real. What
emerged, moreover, was a way to relate these three philosophers through developments in
the organization of images introduced by Helmholtz and Hertz.
Perhaps the most interesting insight to come into view was how the idea of logical
space is inextricably bound with a conception of self. Van Fraassen introduced his
account of self-location into his philosophical system some forty years after adopting the
idea of logical space. That he had simply recovered a notion of the self as a part of the
idea was an unexpected surprise. What became clear to me first in Wittgenstein and then
in Kant was that the idea of logical space is really the idea of a certain form of
imagination whose relation to reality is through a unique conception of the self. It
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appears that for Kant the form of imagination has the structure like that of a spherical
convex mirror and is induced by the self in the synthesis of reality. For Wittgenstein, on
the other hand, it seems the form of the imagination has the structure like that of a
spherical concave mirror and is projected as the self in expressive thought to reflect
reality. And for van Fraassen the self locates reality into a form of public imagination
that has features of what he characterizes as a mirage: an inter-subjective image bearing
a diffuse relation to reality that bewitches us into projecting it onto the world.
This dissertation is divided into four chapters and involves the analysis of five
philosophical systems around their notion of an image or picture, its organization and its
relation to reality. The first chapter, “Schemata and the Birth of Logical Space”, argues
that the idea of logical space can be found in Kant’s Critique in the organization of
schemata of pure sensible concepts, i.e., concepts such as those of time, space, and
geometric figures, within the potential classificatory space Kant describes in his
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. It provides a new more literal interpretation of
Kant’s schematism that takes the transcendental schemata of the categories to be
constitutive of pure sensible schemata, and pure sensible schemata to function similar to
regulative schemata. It shows that a regulative schema is the form of a regulative idea,
and as such it is a logical outline (syllogistic inference pattern) correlated to a focus
imaginarius and (through the major premise of the inference) to an original image.
Building upon this pattern, it demonstrates that a pure sensible schema is the form of a
pure sensible concept, and as such it is a spatiotemporal outline produced as a focal point
in pure or empirical synthesis of a kind of image. The chapter then argues that a subset of
points within Kant’s classification space corresponds to pure sensible schemata, and that
this subset of points has a logico-mathematical structure circumscribing the form of all
possible figurative experience. It concludes by claiming that this structure is induced by
Kant’s conception of the transcendental self as a formal limit.
Divided into two parts, the second chapter, “From Schema to Model”, presents a
novel intellectual history through the philosophical systems of Helmholtz and Hertz that
illuminates the intellectual path taken to the development of Wittgenstein’s idea of logical
space. The first part is a reconstruction of Helmholtz’s philosophical system that appeals

4
to Kant’s architectonic to fill out the implications of Helmholtz’s characterization of the
concept of causality as a transcendental regulative idea.

The substitution of a

transcendental schema for a regulative one is shown to be the basis of Helmholtz’s claim
that an image of external causes is the major premise of an unconscious (inductive)
syllogistic inference as well as his account of concept formation in the physical sciences
as the interpretation of this inference. It provides evidence that Helmholtz understood full
well that images in his system were organized under a regulative schema into a space
converging towards a focal point, and that the major premise of the schema was an
original image serving as an ideal for cognitive activity.
The second part of the chapter demonstrates how in his Principles of Mechanics
(1900/1956) Hertz adopts two key features of Helmholtz’s philosophical system. In
rejecting Helmholtz’s principle of causality, Hertz throws out his mentor’s use of Kant’s
regulative idea and corresponding focus imaginarius. Hertz retains, however, the idea of
images organized under an original image. He develops, moreover, his notion of an
“image of things” around Helmholtz’s view of a concept in the physical sciences, but in
this case as having the form of a conscious (deductive) syllogistic inference. Bringing
these two features together, Hertz conceives of a “general” and “simple” scientific image
as having the form of a logical schema under which images of things are organized, and
serving as an ideal for philosophical reconstruction.

This reconstruction involves

evaluating images of things, since he also takes a scientific image to constitute them
through interpreted a priori forms of intuition and conventional definitions. Presenting
what he takes to be a superior scientific image of mechanics, Hertz enhances the
predictive power of its logical form by encasing it within a convenient mathematical
schema. This schema is an outline for a multi-dimensional coordinate system, and it both
organizes and constitutes idealized “dynamical models” that express the logical form of
images of things. Significantly, Hertz speculates that the conformity between thought and
reality is because mind and nature share the form of this schema.
It is from Hertz’s suggestion of a thought schema organizing and constituting
models of reality that we enter the third chapter, “From Model to Mysticism”. This
chapter argues that there is a simple “picture” that the propositions of the Tractatus
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describe, and it is because this “picture” is not in logical space but of logical space that
the Tractatus is ultimately treated as nonsensical. The chapter shows how this picture of
logical space is an amalgam of Hertz’s speculation of a thought schema with
Schopenhauer’s view of the self as will: in expressive thought the self projects itself as
the completed whole of logical space, a spherical concave mirror reflecting reality to a
focus imaginarius; in willing silence the self collapses into the focus imaginarius where it
exists as the potential whole of logical space. The central claim of chapter three is that it
is the shift in perspective in relation to the world that unifies the seemingly intractable
propositions of the Tractatus concerning solipsism, realism, ethics, aesthetics, and
mysticism with those concerning the picture theory of meaning.
The final chapter, “From Mysticism to Myth”, presents van Fraassen’s adaptation
of Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space to a contemporary empiricist setting, one that
attempts to sever the idea from its metaphysical underpinning and psychologistic
overtone. In this chapter we encounter van Fraassen’s initial thought that an imaginative
and conventional coordinate system of possible entities embedding the concrete structure
of actual entities, i.e., a logical space, can solve issues in the interpretation of a scientific
theory within the syntactic view of theories. Rather than appeal to modal realism, the
suggestion is that a logical space can provide necessary “intuitive content” for modal
notions of a theory involving basic physical relations.

When the syntactic view of

theories is rejected some time later, we see logical space take on a life of its own in a
semantic view of theories as the form of models that have an unmediated relation to real
entities. We become aware that it encounters its own problem of interpretation, one van
Fraassen attempts to solve by introducing the notion of self-location. The final section of
the chapter shows how self-location recovers three unities traditionally associated with
the idea of logical space, and how these unities conspire against the viability of the idea
of logical space within van Fraassen’s empiricism.
Based on insights gathered from Kant, Hertz and Wittgenstein, this dissertation
concludes with a very brief suggestion of how van Fraassen might modify the idea, and
how an empiricist view of scientific representation could be understood as a result.
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Chapter 1: Schemata and the Birth of Logical Space
[The schema of an idea] lies in reason like a seed, all of
whose parts still lie very involuted and are hardly
recognizable even under microscopic observation.
This schematism of our understanding with regard to
appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths
of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from
nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty.
Kant, (A834/B862; A141/B180-181)

1.1 Introduction
Hume spurred Kant into action with the claim that
… reason completely and fully deceives herself with [the concept of cause], falsely taking
it for her own child, when it is really nothing but a bastard of the imagination, which,
impregnated by experience, and having brought certain representations under the law of
association, passing off the resulting subjective necessity (i.e., habit) for an objective
necessity (from insight). (Ak. IV, 257-258)6

Kant set out to show that the concept of cause was in fact the legitimate child, having
developed from a transcendental schema in the womb of the intuitive imagination
impregnated by pure understanding. And just like the concept of cause, the birth of idea
of logical space can be traced to Kant’s theory of schemata running through the heart of
his Critique of Pure Reason.
This chapter identifies Kant’s idea of logical space as the logico-mathematical
organization of figurative pure sensible schemata within a space of classification, and is
based largely upon a novel interpretation of Kant’s theory of schemata. Inspired by
Kant’s account of a regulative schema as a logical outline executing a pure concept by
directing a convergence of empirical concepts towards an imaginary focal point, it
demonstrates that a (figurative) pure sensible schema is a spatiotemporal outline that
serves as a focal point towards which an empirical synthesis of a certain kind of image
occurs. It also serves as a criterion for the application of a pure sensible concept evident
in empirical images of a sort. On this construal, a transcendental schema is constitutive of
pure sensible schemata, serving as a criterion for the application of a category by
specifying “schemata of sensibility” evident in images in general.
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This new interpretation of Kant’s theory of schemata is motivated by the general
sense that existing scholarship has not been successful in coming to terms with Kant’s
chapter “On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding”. Even though
he regarded his chapter to be “one of the most important”, Kant recognized that “[i]n
general, the schematism is one of the most difficult points” (2005, R 6359 (1797, 18: 6857)). It is so obscure that Schopenhauer characterized it as a curiosity “famous for its
profound darkness, because nobody has yet been able to make sense of it” (as quoted in
Schaper 1964, 270, n.4), a description that rings true even today. Schemata are variously
described as rules governing imagination (Chipman (1972, 42); Longuenesse (1998, 116);
Allison (2004, 210)), methods or procedures of the imagination (Pippin, (1976, 162);
Young (1984, 128); Friedman (1992, 41)), concepts of understanding (Bennett (1966,
141); Walsh (1957/1958, 102); Guyer, (1987, 159)), and formal intuitions of sensibility
(Paton (1936, 30); Allison (2004, 216)). Aside from their lack of consensus, these
interpretations all attribute misstatements, inaccuracies or unintelligibility to Kant, even
though he saw fit not to amend the chapter for the second edition of the Critique. Perhaps
the hermeneutical problem posed by Kant’s schematism requires an approach different
from the one that seems have been taken: rather than try to reconcile Kant’s schematism
with an interpretation of the Critique, perhaps an attempt should be made to reconcile the
Critique with an interpretation of the schematism that does not attribute misstatements,
inaccuracies or unintelligibility to Kant. In taking the latter tack, this Chapter can be
thought of as the first step of a larger project in Kant scholarship.
The body of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section provides a
brief overview of the development of Kant’s notion of a schema from its pre-critical
conception, as a divine plan for the structure of a monadic realm of simple substances
underlying a spatial and temporal world, to its critical transformation into a regulative
idea of reason and products of the spatiotemporal imagination. The next two sections
place the faculty of the imagination symmetrically between the faculties of sensibility and
understanding in the context of Kant’s framework of representations. The following
section works through Kant’s chapter on the schematism, making literal sense of
notoriously obscure and controversial passages. The fifth section considers the role of
schemata in mathematical and philosophical cognition, identifying a potential logico-
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mathematical structure bridging the two. And the final section considers Kant’s view of
the self in relation to this structure, one that that allows it to be characterized as a
potential “logical space” as Wittgenstein uses this term.

1.2 From Divine Schema to Focus Imaginarius
Schaper (1964) notes that
[s]chemata in general for Kant, as for many thinkers of his age, were something like plans
or diagrams. For example, a blueprint for construction for a bridge stands midway between
a general idea and its particular construction in steel, iron, or wood. Schemata provide
rules for construction, but have no simple image character or necessary pictorial
resemblance. (271-272)

Kant’s schematism, or “the procedure of the understanding with … schemata”
(A140/B179), is the ascription to human cognition of a constructive process earlier
attributed to the divine intellect. Kant’s critical re-conception of God from creator of the
universe to ultimate end of human reasoning led to a transformation of a divine schema
from an outline constituting a “heavenly plan” to an outline of human reason bringing
about a focus imaginarius. Paralleling this development was the re-conception of human
schemata from appearances of the divine schema to focal points of empirical imagination.
What remains constant throughout is the role of a schema as a rule-based telos in the
execution of a pure concept, be it as a purposeful plan or as the aim of cognition.
In his first treatise on metaphysics, A New Exposition of the First Principles of
Metaphysical Cognition (1755/2010), Kant modified Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics to
accommodate Newtonian natural philosophy.7 While he maintained a conception of God
as creator of the ultimate constituents of the universe, Kant rejected the notion of active
force as an internal principle of change. In its place he proposed a view of physical influx
whereby one substance can bring about change of the inner state of another. As a result,
the basis of a single world of interconnected substances was no longer pre-established
harmony, but the Newtonian doctrine of divine omnipresence: through a “schema of the
divine intellect”, “the divine idea” (Prop. XIII) presented a fundamental law of mutual
interaction among simple substances. This interaction constituted phenomenal space in
which the fundamental law manifested as Newton’s laws of physics. Friedman points out
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that the divine schema, as captured in Kant’s Universal Natural History and Theory of the
Heavens, also written in 1755, was Kant’s notion of God’s plan:
The matter which is the primitive material of all things is therefore bound by certain laws
such that if these laws are allowed to operate freely matter must necessarily bring forth
beautiful combinations. Matter has no freedom to deviate from this plan of perfection.
Since it is thus subject to a supremely wise purpose, it must have necessarily been placed in
such harmonious relations through a first cause ruling over it …. (1, 228.3-11, as quoted in
Friedman (1992), 11)

Kant thus gave Newtonian physics a metaphysical foundation as the schematic
application of a divine idea: God’s plan directed his idea’s determination of the structure
of phenomenal interactions expressed by Newton’s laws.
By the time of his Dissertation (1770/1929), it became apparent to Kant that his
conception of space could not be sustained.8 At this point he rejected Leibniz’s relational
view according to which spatial properties are derived from simple substances,
supplanting it with a claim that space is a form of sensible intuition through which an
aspect of the fundamental law unifying the monadic realm into a single world appears to
us (§16).

Time also became a form of sensible intuition upon which the intuitive

continuity (not distinguished from infinite divisibility or denseness) of space was said to
depend (§14). Since the fundamental law continued to express a non-spatial (and nontemporal) divine schema, its appearance as an intuitive principle was taken to express the
divine schema as it appeared to human cognition: space is “subjective and ideal; and, as
it were a schema, issuing by a constant law from the nature of the mind, for the
coordinating of all outer sensa whatsoever” (§15.D). Human schemata thus originated as
an intuitive reflection of the divine plan for the phenomenal world. Indeed, Kant added
that if it were said that “the mind, along with all other things, is upheld by the infinite
power of a single cause”, the doctrine of divine omnipresence led to the position that
“space, which is the universal and necessary condition, sensitively apprehended, of the
co-presence of all things, can … be entitled omnipraesentia phaenomenon” and “the
concept of time as a single, infinite, and immutable, in which are and persist all things is
the aeternitatis phaenomenon of the general cause” (§22, Scholium).
It seems, then, that Kant’s idea of human schemata originated in the pre-critical
period as an intuitive appearance of the divine plan for the phenomenal world.

In
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conceiving space and time as forms of sensible intuition, however, Kant removed the
realm of simple substances from epistemic purview. Concomitantly, the gulf between
intellectual and sensible faculties became such that pure concepts (other than those of
space and time) had no application to objects of the phenomenal world, and were thus
without meaning. In response, Kant absorbed metaphysics as a theoretical science into an
intricate account of objective phenomenology. God as being became an illusion in the
Critique, an “imagined object” (A671/B699). He was no longer creator of the ultimate
constituents of the universe, but a regulative idea in a hypothetical use of reason
representing a direction of inquiry that maximally organized objective experience into a
systematic and purposive order:
Then it is said, e.g., that the things in the world must be considered as if they had gotten
their existence from a highest intelligence. In such a way the idea is only a heuristic and
not an ostensive concept and it shows not how an object is constituted but how, under the
guidance of that concept, we ought to seek after the constitution and connection of objects
of experience in general. (A671/B699)
The highest formal unity that alone rests on concepts of reason is the purposive unity of
things, and the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard every ordinance
in the world as if it had sprouted from the intention of a highest reason. Such a principle,
namely, opens up for our reason, as applied to the field of experience, entirely new
prospects for connecting up things in the world in accordance with teleological laws, and
thereby attaining the greatest systematic unity among them. (A686-687/B714-715)

Consequently, there was no longer room in Kant’s metaphysics for a divine schema that
brings about the nexus of objects: “it is not from a highest intelligence that we derive the
order of the world and its systematic unity” (A673/B701). But Kant maintained that
“[f]or its execution the idea needs a schema, i.e., an essential manifoldness and order of
the parts determined a priori from the principle of the end” (A833/B861). In the critical
shift to God as a regulative idea, the original notion of a divine schema was transformed
into a different kind of telos: no longer an organizing structure from which a purposeful
universe developed, it became an organizing structure that served as the end towards
which all empirical cognition aimed.
In the case of any regulative idea (e.g., God, a simple soul or a completed world),
a “schema of reason” is “the idea of the maximum of division and unification of the
understanding’s cognition in one principle” (A665/B693). More specifically, it is the
conceptual form that presents a logical rule to organize and unify experience. It is in
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relation to the use of a regulative idea, and thus its execution through a schema, that Kant
alludes parenthetically to a “focus imaginarius”:
… [regulative ideas] have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, namely
that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction
of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only an idea (focus imaginarius)
– i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it
lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience – nonetheless still serves to obtain
for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension. Now of course it is
from this that there arises the deception, as if these lines of direction were shot out from an
object lying outside the field of possible empirical cognition (just as objects are seen behind
the surface of a mirror); yet this illusion (which can be prevented from deceiving) is
nevertheless indispensably necessary if besides the objects before our eyes we want to see
those that lie far in the background, i.e., when in our case, the understanding wants to go
beyond every given experience (beyond this part of the whole of possible experience), and
wants to make the measure of its greatest possible and uttermost extension. (A644/B672)

This passage contains Kant’s only explicit use of the term “focus imaginarius” in the
Critique. A close reading of the passage suggests that he is associating a regulative idea
or, more precisely, a regulative schema with a “point” at the apex of “lines of direction”
of a mirror-type structure of the imagination, a structure that serves to facilitate the
heuristic role of the schema.
It may be tempting to interpret focus imaginarius, not as focal point of the
imagination, but as a fiction of reason and dismiss the structure as a sort of metaphor.9
There are at least three reasons to resist this. Most obviously the passage does not say
that a focal point is a fiction. It says that an object correlated to this point is illusory
precisely because the focal point “lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience”.
Rather than a fiction, Kant seems to be telling us that a focus imaginarius is the end-point
or limit of a mirror-type structure of the imagination.
To take the view that a focus imaginarius is in reason rather than in the
imagination overlooks the role of the imagination in relation to reason. This role is
evident in the following passage:
… it is precisely nature’s inadequacy to the ideas – and this presupposes both that the mind
is receptive to ideas and that the imagination [emphasis mine] strains to treat nature as a
schema for them – that constitutes what both repels our sensibility and yet attracts us at the
same time, because it is a dominance that reason exerts over sensibility only for the sake of
expanding it commensurately with reason’s own domain (the practical one) and letting it
look outward toward the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss. (Ak. XX, 265)
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Kant never conceived the imagination as merely a synthetic one constrained within the
bounds of possible experience.

In the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics

(1786/2004), for example, he describes his critical project as one where the understanding
must be relied upon to impose such bounds upon the imagination:
The imagination can perhaps be excused if it daydreams every now and then, that is, if it
does not cautiously hold itself inside the limits of experience; for it will at least be livened
and strengthened through such free flight, and it will always be easier to moderate its
boldness than to remedy its languor. That the understanding, however, which is supposed
to think, should instead of that, daydream – for this it can never be forgiven; for all
assistance in setting bounds, where needed, to the revelry of the imagination depends on it
alone. (Ak. IV: 317)

Indeed, Kant tells us that “Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even
without its presence in intuition” (B151). This can be understood as capturing two things.
The imagination can represent an object without matter (sensation).

Also, the

imagination can represent an object without form (space and time) and matter, i.e., as a
formless point that “lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience” correlated (as
we saw in the case of the regulative idea God) with an “imagined object”.
The interpretation of a focus imaginarius as a fiction of reason and not as a focal
point of the imagination also overlooks the implicit role of the imagination in the case of
an “original image” (not to be confused with an “imagined object”) associated with (at
least with some) regulative ideas:
But something that seems to be even further removed from an objective reality than the
idea is what I call the ideal, by which I understand the idea not merely in concreto but in
individuo, i.e., as an individual thing which is determinable, or even determined, through
the idea alone. … What is an ideal to us, was to Plato an idea in the divine understanding,
an object in that understanding’s pure intuition, the most perfect thing of each species of
possible beings and the original ground of all its copies in appearance.
Without venturing to climb as high as that, however, we have to admit that human
reason contains not only ideas but also ideals, which do not, to be sure, have a creative
power like the Platonic idea, but still have practical power (as regulative principles)
grounding the possibility of perfection of certain actions. … [E.g.] the sage (of the Stoics)
is an ideal, i.e., a human being who exists merely in thoughts, but who is fully congruent
with the idea of wisdom. Thus just as the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a case
serves as the original image for the thoroughgoing determination of the copy, and we have
in us no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine human being, which
we compare ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we
can never reach the standard. (A568-570/B596-598)
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Associated with a regulative idea such as wisdom or God (A673/B701), is an original
image.10 In saying reason “contains” original images, Kant seems to be identifying an
imaginative counterpart to at least part of the conceptual form, i.e., the schema, contained
within a regulative idea. In certain situations (we shall see) the original image correlates
to the schema’s major premise.
Kant makes a distinction between an “imaginary object” and an “original image”
of a regulative idea (e.g., A571/B579). How, then, are we to understand the relation
between them? He gives us a hint when he says, parenthetically, that an illusory object is
correlated with a focal point of converging lines “just as objects are seen behind the
surface of a mirror”. Given the heuristic role that a regulative idea plays in drawing the
understanding towards unity, the kind of mirror structure he seems to have in mind is a
spherical convex mirror. See Figure 1.1:

focus imaginarius

original image

Figure 1.1: Regulative Idea as Spherical Convex Mirror

As we shall later, this basic structure of imagination in relation to reason enables the
imagination to facilitate the discovery of empirical laws. I maintain that it is also the key
to understanding Kant’s view of the imagination in relation to the understanding.
It is through the relation of imagination to the understanding that human schemata
undergo critical development. No longer the appearance in intuition of a divine schema,
Kant’s pre-critical human schema becomes fragmented and associated with forms of
categories and pure sensible concepts.

However, unlike regulative schemata these
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schemata are not logical conceptual forms. I will argue that they are spatiotemporal
structures presenting the same rule as conceptual forms governing imaginative synthesis.
I will show that a figurative11 pure sensible schema, distinguished from an image
(A140/B179), is a focal point of the imagination for synthesis of a kind of image, one
constituted by categorical schemata for syntheses of images in general. See Figure 1.2:

schema

image

Figure 1.2: Pure Sensible Concept as Spherical Convex Mirror

Like Kant’s original notion of the divine schema, the notion of a human schema is
transformed from the appearance of an organizing structure from which phenomenal
reality develops to organizing structures towards which synthesis of phenomenal reality
aims.

1.3 Critical Representations
The Analytic teems with intuitive, conceptual, and imaginative representations –
generally “modifications of the mind” (A99) – unified by rule under the umbrella of
conscious self-identity that accounts for the cognition of an object of experience. An
object of experience comes about through a mixture of matter and form. Objective matter
is sensation such as “impenetrability, hardness, color” (A21/B35) given a posteriori as an
“effect” (A19/B34) on sensibility. Objective form arises from contributions of the forms
of intuition by sensibility and connected manifolds of intuition by understanding (B129).
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In virtue of conscious self-identity, the imagination synthesizes the separate forms and
manifolds of space and time together with matter into an image that, in virtue of being
thought through empirical concepts of the understanding, is cognized as an object of
experience.
Considered independently of one another, each of the faculties of sensibility,
imagination and understanding provides an impoverished representation an object of
experience, the form of which can also arise a priori. See Figure 1.3:

Understanding

Imagination

Sensibility

Thing-in-itself

Productive
Image

Pure Intuition

a priori

a posteriori

Thing-in-itself
(empirical sense)

Reproductive
Image

Appearance

Figure 1.3: Object of Experience Represented by Faculty

Sensibility represents an object as singular intuition. With matter the intuition is an
“appearance”;12 without matter the intuition is simply “pure” (A100). The imagination
represents an object as an image (A120-121), which may be synthesized reproductively or
productively (B152). While reproductive synthesis generates only empirical images,
productive synthesis generates either a pure image through the act of imagining or an
empirical image through the act of drawing (A713/B741). The understanding represents
an object a priori as a “thing-in-itself” (A254/B310), but also “in an empirical sense”.13
Cognition of an object takes place within a typology of concepts of the
understanding, concepts that either serve as conditions for the possibility of experience or
are derived by reflecting and abstracting from empirical images.14

“Borrowed”

(A220/B267) from, or “derived from actuality in” (A223/B270), experience, an empirical
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concept has “in it only some marks of a certain kind of objects of the senses”
(A727/B755). A “mark” is a property, and in the case of empirical concepts “[o]ne
makes use of certain marks only as long as they are sufficient for making distinctions;
new observations, however, take some away and add some, and therefore the concept
never remains within secure boundaries” (A728/B756). By contrast, a pure concept is
one where “nothing empirical is intermixed” (B3).

Pure concepts are further

distinguished between notions and pure sensible concepts. A notion “has its origin solely
in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility)” (A320/B377). Notions that are
the conditions for the possibility of objects of experience are pure concepts of the
understanding, i.e., the categories; otherwise, they are ideas of reason.15 That they have
their origin solely in the understanding accounts for the fact that categories can be
identified only by a metaphysical deduction from the forms of judgements. In virtue of
the categories, “every concept” has “the logical form of a concept (of thinking) in
general” (A239/B298).
A “pure sensible concept” (A140/B180) has its origin “in a pure image of
sensibility” and thus “contains a pure intuition in itself” (A719/B748). For Kant one
cannot think a pure sensible concept without instantiating an image, a cognitive process
he calls “the construction of concepts”.16 In the case of the pure sensible concepts line,
circle, space, and time, for example,
[w]e cannot think a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think a circle without
describing it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at all without placing three
lines perpendicular to each other at the same point, and we cannot even represent time
without … drawing a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of
time)…. (B154)

In addition to geometrical concepts and concepts of the forms of intuition, pure sensible
concepts include arithmetical concepts.17 Although sensibility contributes the forms of
intuition to the construction, the understanding contributes its unity of object:
By contrast, that which determines space into the figure of a circle, a cone, or a sphere is
the understanding, insofar as it contains the basis for the unity of the construction of these
figures. The bare universal form of intuition called space is therefore certainly the
substratum of all intuitions determinable upon particular objects, and, admittedly, the
condition for the possibility and variety of those intuitions lies in this space; but the unity of
the objects is determined solely through the understanding …” (Ak. IV: 321-322).
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Standard Kant scholarship readily attributes the unity of an object of experience to the
categories as temporal conditions for the possibility of experience in general, neglecting
the possibility that this unity is also attributed to pure sensible concepts of shapes as
spatial conditions for the possibility of a kind of figurative experience. In my view much
of the difficulty in coming to terms with Kant’s schematism is due to this oversight.
It must be remembered that the Critique is a mere “outline” of transcendental
philosophy, and does not “contain an exhaustive analysis of all human cognition a priori”
(A13/B27). It is framed within Kant’s general view that “all kinds of determinations of
space can and even must be able to be represented a priori if [empirical] concepts of
shapes as well as relations are to arise” (A29), and that determinations of parts of space
“are only thought in it” (A25/B39) through pure concepts:
Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not yet cognition at all; it only
gives the manifold of intuition a priori for a possible cognition. But in order to cognize
something in space, e.g., a line, I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring about a
determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the
same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and thereby is an object (a
determinate space) first cognized. (A137/B138)

The tendency in the literature is to limit the significance of passages like this to
mathematical reasoning.

Not only does this ignore the application of geometrical

propositions, however, it overlooks Kant’s subtle point that pure sensible concepts for
everyday objects can be discovered in experience.

I will establish this important

exegetical claim as the chapter progresses, but for now it should suffice to demonstrate its
plausibility through the following passage:
[E]ven in concepts is an origin of some of them revealed a priori. Gradually remove from
your experiential concept of a body everything that is empirical in it – the color, the
hardness or softness, the weight, and even the impenetrability – still remains the space that
was occupied by the body (which has now entirely disappeared), and you cannot leave that
out. Likewise, if you remove from your empirical concept of every object, whether
corporeal or incorporeal, all those properties of which experience teaches you, you could
still not take from it that by means of which you think of it as a substance or as dependent
on a substance (even though this concept contains more determination than that of an object
in general). Thus, convinced by the necessity which this concept presses itself on you, you
must concede that it has its seat in your faculty of cognition a priori. (B5-B6).

If one begins with the empirical concept of a (corporeal) body and removes “everything
that is empirical in it” (i.e., matter), one is not left with space per se, but “the space that
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was occupied by the body”. In other words, one is not left with space as the form of
intuition, but with space as a formal intuition that involves “comprehension of the
manifold” through understanding (B160n), i.e., the determination of the form of intuition
through a pure concept.

Likewise, if one begins with an empirical concept of a

(corporeal) body (or even an incorporeal object) and removes “all those properties of
which experience teaches you” (i.e., properties you discover through experience), one is
not left with the space that was occupied by the body, but with substance. The obvious
inference to make is that the space determined by a pure concept in relation to an
empirical concept can be discovered through experience. In the case of the empirical
concept dog, for example, experience teaches us that the space occupied by the body
involves a comprehension of the manifold through the pure sensible concept four-footed
animal in general (A141/B180), a kind of shape. As we shall see, a literal interpretation
of Kant’s schematism just involves taking pure sensible concepts to be conditions for the
possibility of a kind of figurative experience.

But we need to first appreciate two

symmetries of the synthetic imagination.

1.4 Symmetries of the Spatiotemporal Imagination
A point emphasized by Friedman (1992) is that the central distinction of the
Critique between the faculties of sensibility and understanding is underwritten by a
fundamental division between mathematics and logic. Kant’s logic is syllogistic, an
essentially monadic rather than polyadic logic. This is problematic from the point of
view of mathematical reasoning:

in monadic logic infinity cannot be represented

conceptually and therefore cannot represent the deduction of infinity of objects. Only in
polyadic logic can quantifier-dependence arise, and it is the dependence of existential
quantifiers on universal quantifiers that allows for infinite interability. To account for
mathematical cognition, Kant is forced to represent infinity intuitively in the forms of
spatial (A25/B39-40) and temporal (A32/B48) intuition. He bridges the conceptually
finite and the intuitively infinite through rules governing an infinitely iterable synthetic
process housed within the imagination.

It should be added that since imaginative

synthesis is finite, infinite iterability is only potential.
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More generally, the synthetic imagination plays the crucial role of reconciling the
otherwise distinct faculties of sensibility and understanding. As the source of intuitions,
the faculty of sensibility is the receptive faculty through which “objects are given to us”;
as the source of concepts, the faculty of understanding is the spontaneous faculty through
which “objects are thought” (A15/B29). Connecting concepts with intuitions is necessary
to bring about cognition of objects, for, as Kant famously states, “[t]houghts without
content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75).

However, as

representations intuitions are essentially different from concepts. Whereas an intuition “is
immediately related to the object and is singular”, a concept “is mediate, by means of a
mark, which can be common to several things” (A320/B377). The source of neither
intuitions nor concepts, the faculty of the imagination is “a blind though indispensable
function of the soul” (A78/B107) that resolves the singular non-discursive character of
intuition and the general conceptual character of understanding.
The imagination effects this reconciliation through a synthesis. In general, a
synthesis is “the action of putting different representations together with each other”
(A77/B103).

Friedman (1992, 40) emphasizes that imaginative synthesis is

spatiotemporal, and that for Kant this synthesis involves “motion, which unites both
elements”, “namely space and time” (A41/B58). Along with Stein (1977), Friedman goes
so far as to say that Kant “comes close to making the idea of [Newtonian] space-time
explicit” (161) in his Dissertation:
What is simultaneous is not made simultaneous simply by not being successive. For when
succession is taken away there is indeed removed a certain conjunction of things within the
temporal series, but there does not on that account at once arise another real relation, such
as is the conjunction of all in the same moment. For simultaneous things are joined in the
same moment of time just as successive things in different moments. Thus though time
possesses only one dimension, yet the ubiquity of time (to use Newton’s manner of
speaking), owing to which all things conceivably by sense are at some time, adds to the
quantum of actuals a second dimension, so far as they hang, as it were, from the same point
of time. For if you represent time by a straight line produced to infinity, and simultaneous
things at any point of time by lines drawn perpendicular to it, the plane thus generated will
represent the phenomenal world, both as to its substance and as to its accidents. (§14.5n.)

Indeed, implicit within Newtonian space-time is a function that identifies space-time
points that have the same time coordinate, as well as a function that identifies space-time
points that have the same space coordinate. It is thus endowed with projections of space-
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time onto time and onto space giving rise to conceptions of absolute time and absolute
space. The projection of space-time onto time “decomposes” space-time into an infinite
number of three-dimensional Euclidean spaces, each representing “all of space at a given
time”; the projection of space-time onto space “decomposes” space-time into an infinite
number of point trajectories each representing “a given place over all time” (DiSalle
2009). See Figure 1.4:

Figure 1.4: Projections of Newtonian Spacetime (From DiSalle (2009), Figure 6)

As the passage from his Dissertation suggests, Kant seems to picture the projection of
Newtonian space-time onto time.
My working hypothesis is that Kant conceives imaginative synthesis in the
Critique, which he describes in three synthetic steps as “apprehension in the intuition”
(A98), “reproduction in the imagination” (A100) and “recognition in the concept”
(A103), against this projection. Indeed, since his notion of image in the second step is a
temporal succession of distinct apprehensions from the first step (A100-102, A120-121),
its synthesis appears to be in the context of the former projection, not the latter.18 The
value of this working hypothesis is that it facilitates the articulation of two symmetries
that untangle Kant’s schematism.
The first spatiotemporal symmetry is what I call the vertical symmetry between
productive and reproductive synthesis of a figure in space:
It may look, to be sure, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from its concept
in itself (it is certainly independent of experience); for in fact we can give it an object
entirely a priori, i.e., construct it. But since this is only the form of an object, it would still
always remain only a product of the imagination, the possibility of whose object would still
remain doubtful, as requiring something more, namely that such a figure be thought solely
under those conditions on which all objects of experience rest. Now that space is a formal
a priori condition of outer experiences, that this very same formative synthesis by means of
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which we construct a figure in the imagination is entirely identical with that which we
exercise in apprehension of an appearance in order to make a concept of experience of it –
it is this alone that connects with this concept the representation of the possibility of such of
such a thing. (italics added, A223-224/B271)

I agree with Friedman (1996, 102) that this passage accounts for the application of
mathematics. As I see it, these syntheses are identical because they are both determined
by the same pure sensible concept of a figure in space, in this case the pure sensible
concept triangle.
It is not obvious, however that the two syntheses should be “entirely identical”.
As Friedman (1992, 126) also emphasizes, Kant’s notion of the synthesis of shapes in
space is based upon Euclidean construction from points, lines, a compass and a ruler.19
Pure apprehension in the a priori construction of a figure in the imagination generates
only part of the shape in the first instant: “motion, as description of a space, is a pure act
of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through
productive imagination” (B155n) involving the motion of a mathematical point (Ak: IV,
489). However, empirical apprehension will “run through and then … take together this
manifoldness” of an appearance into a “unity of intuition” (A99) called a “perception”
(A120n). Although this “action” (A99) of the imagination20 is also described as motion
and, by analogy, drawing (cf. B162)), it synthesizes the shape in the first instant. The
passage thus equates the syntheses illustrated in Figure 1.5:

productive

reproductive

Figure 1.5: Productive and Reproductive Synthesis

As a succession of intuitions the first is an image, but the second is not (until it perdures
in succession). The syntheses are “entirely identical”, I suggest, if we recognize that a
figure productively constructed over time contains as much four-dimensional space-time
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structure as that empirically apprehended at an instant of time, and that the form of a pure
sensible concept presents a common rule governing both.
Keep in mind that this vertical symmetry only implies that the understanding
determines figurative kinds; it does not derogate from the role Kant tells us reason plays
in determining other empirical kinds. Moreover, even though the syntheses may be
identical, the infusion of matter in the reproductive imagination changes the character of
its product, making it less abstract and ideal by comparison. For this reason Kant claims
that distinguishing whether “a case in concreto” belongs under “the universal in
abstracto” (A134/B173) arises from “mother-wit”, “the power of judgment … that cannot
be taught but practiced” (A133/B172).
The vertical symmetry just identified is consistent with Kant’s account of rules of
apprehension in the formation of empirical concepts.

Every empirical concept is

borrowed from experience via comparing, reflecting and abstracting a number of
empirical intuitions (images):
I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one
another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches,
the leaves, etc.: but next I reflect what they have in common, trunk, branches, and leaves
themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire the
concept of a tree. (Ak, IX: 94-95)

Kant is clear that in this case empirical intuitions are serving, not as schemata, but
“examples” (Ak: XX, 351). To compare is to look for differences among the examples
selected from among all other empirical intuitions, and so differences noted are among
examples that already instantiate a kind of form (e.g., the shape of a tree). Only after
such comparison does reflection and abstraction give rise to an empirical concept tree
representing a kind of empirical image. Once formed, an empirical concept presents a
“rule of apprehension” involving both form and matter for comparison with other
empirical intuitions:
We compare only what is universal in the rule of our apprehension. For example, one sees
a sapling, so one has the representation of a tree; an elongated rectangle makes one think of
a square. (Ak. XVI: 557) (This passage and the prior one are as quoted in Longuenesse
(1998, 116).)
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Contrary to Longuenesse, just as rules of apprehension involving shapes presuppose
categories, they also presuppose spatiotemporal rules presented by pure sensible
concepts.21
The second spatiotemporal symmetry is the horizontal symmetry among the
faculties of understanding, imagination and sensibility. The imagination bridges the
singular non-discursive character of intuition with the general conceptual character of
understanding through a spatiotemporal synthesis that “has as its aim no individual
intuition but rather only unity in the determination of sensibility” (A140/B179). Where I
depart from most scholars, even from Friedman (1992, 197-200), is in my emphasis that
the “unity in the determination of sensibility” to which the spatiotemporal imagination
aims is not a unity in sensibility. Unlike this traditional interpretation of Kant (e.g.,
Paton, (1936, 18)), I do not take Kant to be saying that the imagination imposes its
synthesis upon time or space, but rather takes ingredients from both – specifically, a
structure of the manifold of time determined by pure concepts of the understanding and
(in certain cases at least) a structure of the manifold of space determined by a pure
sensible concept – and brings them together (with or without matter) in the synthesis of a
spatiotemporal object within the imagination itself. Although I see understanding and
sensibility as distinct from the imagination, they are united with it in apperception
through a common unity of spatiotemporal rule (i.e., the unity of an object of experience)
presented by the form of pure concepts in understanding, the a priori affinity (presynthetic associability) of appearances in sensibility and pure schemata in imagination.
That a unity of spatiotemporal rule is presented by a pure sensible concept is
evident from the following passage that involves an appeal to the pure sensible concept
triangle to explain the unity of an object of experience:
Hence we say that we cognize the object if we have effected a synthetic unity in the
manifold of intuition. But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced
through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule that makes the reproduction of the
manifold necessary a priori and a concept in which this manifold is united possible. Thus
we think of a triangle as an object by being conscious of the composition of three straight
lines in accordance with a rule according to which such an intuition can always be
exhibited. Now this unity of rule determines every manifold, and limits it to conditions that
make the unity of apperception possible, and the concept of this unity is the representation
of the object = X, which I think through those predicates of a triangle. (A105)
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Kant’s point is that the pure sensible concept triangle structures the predicates “three”,
“straight”, “line” in virtue of a form presenting a rule for the construction all possible
triangle images.22 Cognition of a triangle object in experience involves thinking the form
of the pure sensible concept of a shape (and the form of the categories more generally)
while empirically synthesizing an actual triangle image.
That the same unity of spatiotemporal rule is presented by an a priori affinity of
appearances is more obscure. It is perhaps easiest to first abstract from the synthesis
brought about by the imagination and consider the pre-synthetic unity attributable to the
separate manifolds of space and time:
We have forms of outer as well as inner sensible intuition a priori in the representations of
space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must
always be in agreement with the latter, since it can only occur in accordance with this form.
But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but
also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of
the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).*
*Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the
mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance
with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition
merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the
Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all
concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses
but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible.23 For since through
it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as
intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the
concept of the understanding. (B160-161)

Kant’s point in this controversial passage becomes clear in light of the horizontal
symmetry relevant to space “represented as object (as is really required in geometry)”. A
pure sensible concept has its origin in an image in the sense that one cannot think the
concept without simultaneously constructing it in space-time; equivalently, one cannot
construct the concept in space-time without simultaneously thinking a pure sensible
concept.

Its possibility thus “presupposes a synthesis” that both determines and is

determined by sensibility. If one were to abstract from this synthesis to the separate
forms of space and time, what “precedes all concepts” is a structure of the manifold of
space (i.e., space as a “formal intuition”) determined by the pure sensible concept and a
structure of the manifold of time (i.e., time as a “formal intuition”) determined by the
categories and presupposed by pure sensible concept.
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Now think of formal intuitions of space and time as ingredients for synthesis. In
relation to an empirical synthesis, they constitute a potential in sensibility, i.e., an affinity
of appearances: “[t]he ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, insofar
as it lies in the object, is called the affinity of the manifold” (A113), and in relation to an
object in general it is called “transcendental affinity” (A114). Kant claims that by means
of their affinity, appearances “stand under constant laws and must belong to them”
(A113). In other words, the affinity of appearances presents rules of spatiotemporal
synthesis.
Since synthetic unity in the determination of sensibility is effected by the
understanding, the understanding is “the legislation for nature” (A126). But the same
unity is also aimed for by the spatiotemporal imagination in the production of a schema:24
The schema is in itself always a product of the imagination; but since the synthesis of the
latter has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the determination of
sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image. … [The] representation of a
general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call
the schema for this concept. (A140/B179)

On a literal construal of this passage, a schema is neither rule nor procedure. In the
Critique, representations only ever present rules, and if a schema is understood as a rule
its distinction from other representations collapses.25 To interpret a schema as the
operations or procedures of the imagination that the rule governs is to attribute to Kant
the elementary mistake of confusing product for activity.26 The only interpretation that
can do justice to this passage is this: a schema is, as Kant says elsewhere, an “outline”27
serving as a telos that presents a rule of synthesis and thereby represents a general
synthetic procedure that the rule governs. As I will now show, simply taking Kant at his
word makes perfect sense of his schematism.

1.5 Schematism of Pure Concepts
Kant’s chapter on the schematism is the first chapter of the second book of the
Analytic called “The Analytic of Principles” that introduces the faculty of judgement. “If
the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of
judgement is the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of determining whether something
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stands under a given rule (casus datae legis) [“case of the given law”] or not”
(A132/B171).

The chapter on the schematism identifies imaginative conditions of

subsumption of appearances under the categories. The following chapter then uses these
conditions to derive a set of principles of the pure understanding that serve as the basis of
all synthetic a priori propositions.28
The key to understanding Kant’s schematism is to recognize exactly why he does
not think it necessary to state these conditions of subsumption in the case of pure sensible
concepts:
In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representations of the former must be
homogeneous with the latter, i.e., the concept must contain that which is represented in the
object that is to be subsumed under it, for that is just what is meant by the expression “an
object is contained under a concept. Thus the empirical concept of a plate has homogeneity
with the pure geometrical concept of a circle for the roundness that is thought in the former
can be intuited in the latter. (A137/B176)
In all other sciences, where the concepts through which the object is thought in general are
not so different and heterogeneous from those that represent it in concreto, as it is given, it
is unnecessary to offer a special discussion of the application of the former to the latter.
(A138/B177)

Kant is saying that for object O to be subsumed under a pure representation PR, PR must
contain some property X that every empirical representation ER represents of O, in which
case ER is “homogeneous” with PR. The individual plate is subsumed under the pure
concept circle because “the empirical concept [ER] of a plate [O] has homogeneity with
the pure geometrical concept [PR] of a circle for the roundness [X] that is thought in the
former can be intuited in the latter.”
The first thing to note is that the question of subsumption under pure concepts,
and thus the question of their application to what is subsumed, is evidential. In this
illustration, an object of experience such as a plate is the cognition through an empirical
concept of the formal unity of connected perceptions in an empirically synthesized image.
From the vertical symmetry of the imagination we know that this cognition is possible in
virtue of the determination of the empirical concept by a pure sensible concept of a shape.
But “distinct from all our representations,” an object “is nothing for us” (A105), and so
application of the rule presented by the form of the pure sensible concept to the object –
hence subsumption of an object under the concept itself – can only be made evident from
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properties of its form shared with reproductively synthesized images. Now the properties
of the form of a pure sensible concept are revealed in a productive synthesis of pure
intuition (“we cannot think a circle without describing it” (B154)). And properties of
reproductively synthesized images are revealed by empirical concepts arrived at through
abstraction from and conscious reflection upon these images. Because one can discern
the same property (e.g., roundness) in both pure intuition and empirical thought it is
unnecessary to identify the conditions of subsumption of pure sensible concepts.
In the paragraph that follows Kant takes note of the fact that subsumption under
pure concepts can not be taken as self-evident in the case of individual categories.
Because homogeneity cannot be found between a category and actual perceptions, it
cannot be said that appearances are evidently subsumed under the category; equivalently,
it cannot be said that the category applies to appearances:
Now pure concepts of the understanding, however, in comparison with empirical (indeed in
general sensible) intuitions, are entirely unhomogeneous, and can never be encountered in
any intuition. Now how is the subsumption of the latter under the former, thus the
application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would say that the
category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the
appearance? This question, so natural and important, is really the cause which makes a
transcendental doctrine of the power of judgement necessary, in order, namely, to show the
possibility of applying pure concepts of the understanding to appearances in general.
(A137/B176-A138/B177)

The first thing to note is the move from the subsumption of objects to the subsumption of
appearances. Presumably this is because causation is evident in a temporal series of
perceptions. Appearances are like objects in the sense that “without the relation to at least
possible consciousness” they “would be nothing at all” (A120). Accordingly, one must
look to homogeneity with their representations in order to determine their subsumption
under a pure concept.

By “intuited through the senses” Kant identifies these

representations as perceptions:

“[s]ense represents the appearances empirically in

perception” (A115). However, while a concept cannot be homogeneous with an object
because the object of cognition is not itself a representation (it is the effect of “the formal
unity of the consciousness” (A105)), it can nonetheless be homogeneous with
appearances, for “appearances are … but themselves only representations” (A109). This
is because properties contained in the perception are, as a matter of inference, “contained
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in the appearance”. Hence if subsumption of appearances involves homogeneity of a
category with perceptions, it also involves homogeneity of a category with appearances.
Given all this, Kant’s point is straightforward: unlike a pure sensible and empirical
concept, no property is evidently shared between a category and perceptions, and thus
between a category and appearances.29
Especially in the older literature one encounters the view that Kant has lost sight
of himself in his schematism and is tangled up in a pseudo-problem.30 However, in a
footnote found in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (2004a) Kant states
that the transcendental deduction establishes “that [experience] is possible solely through
[the categories], and, conversely, that these concepts are capable of meaning and use in
no other relation than to objects of experience” (475n-476n). In the same note, he
distinguishes the problem “how experience is now possible by means of these categories”,
and, conversely, how categories have meaning and use.31 The solution to this second
problem is generally understood to be the point of Kant’s schematism.32 Although Kant’s
semantics and epistemology run together, it seems these two problems separate them.
The first is more a semantic problem of establishing that pure concepts can relate to
appearances; the second is more an epistemic problem of establishing how they in fact
relate to appearances.
More perspicuously, without a spatiotemporal product of the imagination that
presents the rule that governs its synthesis, there is no criterion of evidence by which to
determine the application of pure concepts in the synthesis. Kant needs to correlate the
form of a pure concept with a spatiotemporal structure that captures its unity of synthetic
rule so he can identify properties of an imaginative synthesis to indicate the application of
the rule. As it stands there is no such mark of the pure concept to indicate a determinate
empirical use of it. The issue is rendered moot in the case of a pure sensible concept
because the concept’s empirical application is evident whenever it is thought and an
image productively constructed; that is, by productively constructing images of a
spatiotemporal kind we come to know in mathematical cognition universal properties that
serve as a criterion of what it is in appearances that counts as evidence for the concept’s
application. In the case of the pure sensible concept triangle, for example, what counts as
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evidence for its application is that the internal angles of a figure enclosed by three straight
lines add to 180˚.
But a category cannot be constructed since it does not originate in a pure image of
sensibility, but rather in the understanding.33 In virtue of the metaphysical deduction, the
form of each category can be said to contain a logical function of the understanding.
Even though the transcendental deduction of the categories that augments their form in
principle by demonstrating that the categories as a collective relate to the transcendental
affinity of appearances in virtue of a common unity of spatiotemporal rule,34 he has yet to
identify the spatiotemporal structure that presents this rule.35 In a dispute with Hume
over the application of the category causality, for example, Kant faces the objection that
he has not offered anything better than his metaphysical predecessors. Perhaps the form
of the category relates to the transcendental affinity of appearances that are the
appearance in human cognition of the divine plan. Indeed, a reason Kant says he needs to
address the problem of how categories make experience possible is so that
the perceptive reviewer may not be left with the necessity, certainly unwelcome even to
himself, of taking refuge in a pre-established harmony to explain the surprising agreement
of appearances with the laws of the understanding, despite their having entirely different
sources from the former. (Ak. IV: 476n)

In other words, Kant recognizes he has yet to eliminate the possibility claimed in his precritical philosophy that it is God that necessitates imaginative synthesis through a divine
schema that brings about the same spatiotemporal law as the form of the categories and
the transcendental affinity of appearances.36 A distinctly human “transcendental product
of the imagination” (A142/B181) must be introduced that features the law so as to serve
as criterion of evidence of the synthesis of the imagination that the law governs.37
I have yet to come across literature that explicitly takes notice of the fact that Kant
refers to categorical schemata in two distinct senses: “transcendental schemata” and
“schemata of sensibility” (A145/B185). When he refers to a “transcendental schema” he
is talking about a “representation [that] must be pure” (A138/B177) – i.e., a pure criterion
of evidence.

When he refers to “schema of sensibility” he is talking about a

representation of “how [things in general] appear” (A147/B186) – i.e., the empirical
evidence itself. The former represents a “pure synthesis” (A142/B181), while the latter
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represents an empirical one (a harbinger of his theory of concept exhibition (hypotyposis)
in the third Critique in which he claims “[s]chemata contain … direct exhibitions of the
concept” (Ak: V, 352)).38
With one exception, Kant gives us only schemata of sensibility, setting aside
“what is required for transcendental schemata” as a “dry and boring analysis”
(A142/B181). We can understand why Kant would focus on schemata of sensibility: the
infusion of matter in empirical synthesis in apprehension alters features of a rule of pure
synthesis, and it is from schemata of sensibility that the principles of the understanding
are derived. But we can also see how Kant’s failure to identify transcendental schemata
generates difficulties. How could he, in principle, identify a pure criterion of evidence to,
as he says, “indicate a priori the case” (A135/B175)39 without first appealing the
evidence itself? How is each criterion of evidence plausible or even unique?40 How can
a criterion of evidence explain how categories make experience possible and, conversely,
how categories have meaning and use?
From the literature one is left with the impression that because Kant does need to
account for the application of pure sensible concepts in terms of human schemata, the
pure sensible schemata do no philosophical work. To the contrary, we cannot answer
these questions about transcendental schemata without them.41 In the remaining part of
this section, I will present what I take a pure sensible schema to be, appealing to this
interpretation to make clear sense out of the infamous passages on pure sensible
schemata, and then argue that transcendental schemata are constitutive of them. My final
claim in this section will be that transcendental schemata are indeed “dry and boring”:
they are just properties of a line as Kant understood them.
Let us return to the illustration that opens the chapter. As noted, it is intended to
show how homogeneity between pure and empirical representations underwrites
subsumption under, and application of, a pure representation. We need to understand
exactly what “homogeneity”, “subsumption” and “application” mean in this context and
how the terms are integrated. Homogeneity for Kant means “sameness of kind” (A657658/B685-686). In saying that “the empirical concept of a plate has homogeneity with
the pure geometrical concept of a circle” Kant is saying that the “roundness” thought in
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the former is of the same kind as the roundness intuited in the latter. Now the roundness
thought in the empirical concept plate refers to a property shared by a posteriori image
examples. But the roundness that can be intuited in a priori images refers to the property
of a pure sensible schema:
… mathematical cognition considers the universal in the particular, indeed even in the
individual [drawn figure], yet nonetheless a priori and by means of reason, so that just as
this individual is determined under certain general conditions of construction, the object of
the concept, to which this individual corresponds only as its schema, must likewise be
thought as universally determined. (A714/B742)

The reason that a schema “is to be distinguished from an image” (A140/B179) is that it
bears only properties of a universal. Hence, roundness thought in an empirical concept
plate is the same kind as roundness that can be intuited in a pure sensible concept circle
because both cases involve the instantiation of properties of a pure sensible schema.42
For Kant homogeneity is a condition for the possibility of subsumption, which is
to say that the pure concept “must contain” the sameness of kind as that which “is to be
subsumed under it” (A137/B176). It is only by discerning the instantiation of a schema
that judgement can distinguish whether or not something stands under the rule the schema
presents, and, in virtue of the horizontal symmetry, whether or not it is contained under
the pure sensible concept whose form presents the same rule. If we stay within the
confines of the imagination, there is a picturesque way to understand the notion of
subsumption at play here. As a “product of the imagination” a schema is an outline that
represents “a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its
image” through a synthesis that “has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the
unity in the determination of sensibility” (A140/B179-180). What makes literal sense of
this claim is that a schema is an outline that that comes into being during synthesis of an
image as a telos: in pure synthesis it has the character of a purposeful plan; in empirical
synthesis has the character of a unified end. The vertical symmetry of productive and
reproductive synthesis of a figure is captured as follows: in productive synthesis it is
from a schema that synthesis begins; in empirical or reproductive synthesis it is towards
the schema that synthesis ends. A schema thus serves as a focal point of imagination.
See Figure 1.6:
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Productive synthesis
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Triangle schema

Reproductive synthesis

Figure 1.6: Pure Sensible Schema as Focal Point of the Imagination

In productive synthesis an image evolves from the schema; in reproductive synthesis an
image involves towards the schema.
Given that Kant introduced his schematism relatively late in the preparation of the
Critique,43 it is plausible think that he fashioned his conception of a schema of a pure
sensible concept upon the schema of an idea of reason:
For its execution the idea needs a schema, i.e., an essential manifoldness and order of the
parts determined a priori from the principle of the end. … [The] schema contains the
outline (monogramma) and the division of the whole into members in conformity with the
idea, i.e., a priori …. [It] lies in reason like a seed, all of whose parts still lie very involved
and are hardly recognizable even under microscopic observation. (A833-4/B861-2)

In the case of an idea of reason a schema has a logical form and as such belongs to reason
as the form of the idea. But it is correlated to a focus imaginarius, a formless limit in the
imagination that focuses it beyond the bounds of possible experience, giving rise to the
illusion of an object of experience. A schema of a pure sensible concept, on the other
hand, has a spatiotemporal form of an object of experience, and as such belongs to
imagination. Much like a regulative schema, however, it is an “embryo” born in the
imagination at the bounds of possible experience from the contribution of elements of the
understanding and sensibility. It is not a limit of reason’s imagination; it is the focal point
of understanding’s imagination.
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This imaginative account of subsumption sheds light upon Kant’s conception of
the “application” of a pure sensible concept.

A pure sensible concept applies to

experience in virtue of an identical synthesis in pure and empirical intuition organized
under a common schema produced in the imagination. By realizing the form of a pure
sensible concept in a focused synthesis, a schema accounts for how the pure sensible
concept makes experience possible. By serving as criterion of evidence gathered from
pure syntheses, the exhibition of the schema in empirical synthesis is evidence of the
application of a pure sensible concept that can be distinguished by judgement. In the
exhibition of their form, schemata thus account for how pure sensible concepts have
meaning and, at the same time, how their significance is restricted to an empirical use.44
The strength of this interpretation of pure sensible schemata lies in its ability to
make clear a notorious paragraph that appears just before Kant’s discussion of
transcendental schemata. The paragraph begins with a passage pertaining to productive
synthesis of pure intuition:
In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts. No
image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it would not attain the
generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, right, or acute, etc., but
would always be limited to one part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can never
exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination
with regard to pure shapes in space. (A141/B180)

By “ground” Kant likely means “cause”45 and so the point of the passage concerns
concept formation.

In particular, he wants to qualify his general claim that a pure

sensible concept originates “in a pure image of sensibility” and say that it originates in a
schema produced in the imagination. The first thing he says is that a productively
constructed triangle image in pure intuition can only be an instance of a subclass of
possible triangle images. Since the form of the concept triangle presents a rule that
governs the productive synthesis all possible triangle images, the concept cannot originate
in a triangle image, but in an outline of all possible triangle images. The second is that
the schema “can never exist anywhere except in thought”. For Kant “existence denotes
the way in which an object of possible experience comes into being through the
categorical structure of the understanding” (Caygill 1995, 183), and (I will show below) a
pure sensible schema is constituted by categorical structure. The schema exists only “in
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thought” in the sense that it does not come into being unless and so long as the pure
sensible concept triangle is thought and an image simultaneously constructed.
Although this passage concerns pure intuition, its claims extend symmetrically to
empirical intuition: “I put together in a pure intuition, just as in an empirical one, the
manifold that belongs to the schema of a triangle in general and thus to its concept”
(A718/B747). Accordingly, it is no surprise that what immediately follows in the same
paragraph is a passage concerning empirical intuition:
Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical concept,
rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule
for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept. The
concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the
shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular
shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto.
(A141/B180)

This passage is the source of interpretive difficulties that are wholly unnecessary. A
tradition seems to have become entrenched whereby Kant is taken to attribute to the
empirical concept dog what is being said about a “general concept”.46 But clearly the
example is not about the form and matter of appearances, but only about their form
(shape). What Kant is saying is just that the empirical concept dog is determined by “a
certain general concept”, i.e., the pure sensible concept four-footed animal in general.
Indeed, it is because the rule presented by the latter concept governs both a reproductive
and productive synthesis that the passage contains the connections it does: “an object of
experience or an image of it”; “any single particular shape that experience offers me or
any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto”.
It must be remembered that Kant characterizes pure sensible concepts only by
their origin “in a pure image of sensibility” or, more precisely, in a schema. This is
evident by the fact that one cannot think a figurative pure sensible concept without
constructing an individual image of a kind of shape. Given this characterization, it is
possible for experience to tell us there are pure sensible concepts of figures that have yet
to be (and may never be) used in geometrical proofs. We cannot think the concept fourfooted animal in general, a concept concerning form only, without instantiating an image
of a four-footed animal.

(One cannot think the empirical concept dog without
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instantiating an image of a dog either, but this concept is determined by the understanding
and concerns not only form but also matter). By Kant’s characterization, it is a pure
sensible concept.
In this second passage, Kant is making a similar point about geometrical
congruence and concept formation as the one that just precedes it. More so than in the
case of a pure sensible concept, only a schema – not an image – can account for the origin
of an empirical concept of a figure in space. How so? “Pure shapes” discussed in the
first passage are images conjured in the productive imagination without drawing. Since
they cannot be physically measured to establish their degree of congruence, Kant must
appeal to the incongruence of sub-classes of images. Since empirical images can be
measured, he does not need to make this appeal to establish their incongruence with one
another. His point is that an outline of a kind of figure rather than particular incongruent
figures of a kind is what accounts for the origin of empirical concepts (inasmuch as they
concern figures in space).
This interpretation of pure sensible schemata is the only interpretation that can
make literal sense of Kant’s summary of both passages occurring next in the paragraph:
This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their mere form is a
hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from
nature and lay before our eyes only with difficulty. We can only say this much: the image
is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the schema of sensible
concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori
imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become
possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which they are in themselves
never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema that they designate.
(A141/B181)

That Kant intends to refer to both passages just discussed is indicated by the phrase
“appearances and their mere form”, i.e., empirical intuition and empirical intuition
without matter (pure intuition).

The key to decoding this difficult passage is the

symmetries of the spatiotemporal imagination. With these symmetries in mind, let us
work through this passage line by line.
That we are to divine the schematism from nature highlights the import of the
element of discovery of pure sensible schemata and thereby pure sensible concepts in use
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in experience; that the schematism is a “hidden art in the depths of the human soul”
highlights and the import of its relation to the self. Although the empirical faculty of the
imagination carries out a reproductive synthesis of a figurative image, the necessity of this
synthesis presupposes a productive synthesis of that image.47 Now the term “sensible
concepts” is rarely used by Kant,48 but in keeping with the vertical symmetry just implied
it seems he intends to refer to empirical concepts determined by pure sensible concepts.
Accordingly, the “schema of a sensible concept (such as figures in space)” is the schema
of the pure sensible concept, which is why Kant says it “is a product and as it were a
monogram of pure a priori imagination”.

It is because the schema focuses the

reproductive imagination that images first become possible “through” it; it is because the
schema presents the rule of construction that images first become possible “in
accordance” with it.

That images “designate” a schema refers to their schematic

exhibition, and because an empirical concept arises from comparing images initially
selected in virtue of exhibiting a common schema, incongruent images connect with the
empirical concept “always and only by means of the schema”.
With this conception of pure sensible schemata, Kant ends the paragraph
contrasting transcendental schemata:
The schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the contrary, is something that can
never be brought to an image at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a
rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is a
transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the determination of the inner
sense in general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all
representations, insofar as these are to be connected together a priori in one concept in
accord with the unity of apperception. (A142/B181)

Transcendental schemata are like pure sensible schemata in that they are both products of
the imagination and present a rule governing a pure synthesis. Where they differ is that a
transcendental schema “can never be brought to an image at all” presumably because it
“concerns the determination of the inner sense in general”. There is a strong temptation
to equate a transcendental schema with determined inner sense (e.g., (Allison 2004, 216))
and account for its inability to bring about an image as due to a lack of spatial elements.
But Kant does not say this exactly, nor can he. Since “time cannot be perceived in itself”
(A183) it would follow that a transcendental schema is itself imperceptible; yet, the very
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goal of Kant’s schematism involves establishing the application of a category evident in
perception.
Kant only says a transcendental schema “concerns the determination of the inner
sense in general” and that such schemata are “nothing but a priori time-determinations in
accordance with rules” (A145/B184).

The phrase “in accordance with rules” is an

important qualification, for it refers to governance of the spatiotemporal imagination.
What Kant is saying, more precisely, is that a transcendental schema is a spatiotemporal
criterion for what counts as the perception of a time-determination,49 without which “one
cannot grasp through an example what sort of thing is really intended by [categories]”
(A241/B300).

This is clarified in the second edition:

“in order to understand the

possibility of things in accordance with the categories, and thus to establish the objective
reality of the latter, we do not merely need intuitions, but always outer intuitions” (B291).
Since the “objective reality” of a category can be “exhibited only in outer intuition, and
by means of that alone can it subsequently also be applied to inner sense” (B293),50 to
“understand the possibility of things in conformity with the categories” is just to be able
to identify the property that the categories have in common with perceptions.
The temptation now is to swing the other way and equate a transcendental schema
with a rule expressed by the category’s form. Aside from the difficulty of understanding
how a rule can serve as a criterion of evidence, this undermines the status of a schema as
a “representation”. Just like categories and appearances, a transcendental schema must
have the status of a distinct representation in order stand between them:
Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the
category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the
application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure (without
anything empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a
representation is the transcendental schema. (A138/B177)

The horizontal symmetry brings clarity here. A transcendental schema is not a rule; like
other representations in the Critique it presents a rule: as a distinct “modification of the
mind” a transcendental schema is a “third thing” that presents the same rule as a category
(through its form) and appearances (through a transcendental affinity), and can be
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ascribed properties that stand in relations of homogeneity with these other
representations.
What makes the Kant’s transcendental schematism so obscure is that it is hard to
see in what sense a schema is a pure representation. In the case of a pure sensible schema
this is clear: it is a pure representation in the sense of a spatiotemporal outline of possible
images of a kind that is a focal point in synthetic imagination. Yet we must think about a
transcendental schema differently.

Unlike a pure sensible schema, a transcendental

schema does not come into being through categorical structure, for it is categorical
structure insofar as it is a criterion for its perception. Transcendental schemata must thus
be constitutive of pure sensible schemata, and the lack of sufficient spatiotemporal
structure is why it cannot be brought to an image. Being constitutive of a focal point of
the synthetic imagination is what accounts for how categories make experience possible
and how they have meaning and use.51
Yet the “dry and boring analysis” Kant avoids still haunts us: How can Kant
possibly identify pure criteria of evidence without appealing to impure evidence? How is
each criterion plausible or even unique? A significant hint comes from Kant’s own notes
to the first edition: “The schema of time a line”.52 It may seem Kant is confusing a
schema for an image. But recall that images contain schematic exhibitions. In saying the
“schema of time a line”, we should understand Kant as referring to schematic exhibition
of the pure sensible concept time. If productive and reproductive syntheses are indeed
“identical”, then figures are constructed from curved or straight lines. Thus the pure
sensible concept time is constitutive of all figures. But if transcendental schemata – as a
collective – are constitutive of pure sensible schemata, they too are constitutive of all
figures.53 It seems, then, that transcendental schemata are related to a line.
Kant did not amend his chapter on the schematism for the second edition to
incorporate notes he made to his copy of the first edition. But he did add a new section to
the B-Deduction entitled “On the application of the categories to objects of the senses in
general”. Here Kant tells us we perceive time-determination “under the name of the
categories” whenever we construct the pure sensible concept time by drawing a line:
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We also always perceive [“the determination of the manifold through the transcendental
action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on inner sense)”] in
ourselves. … [W]e cannot even represent time without, in drawing a straight line (which is
to be the external figurative representation of time), attending merely to the action of the
synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine inner sense, and
thereby attending to the succession of this determination of inner sense. Motion, as action
of the subject (not as determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the
manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the action
in accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense, first produces the concept
of succession at all. The understanding therefore does not find some sort of combination of
the manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by affecting inner sense. (B154-155)

The straight line synthesized a priori whenever the pure sensible concept time is thought
is a spatial image constructed in time through a potentially infinite iterable process
intuited as “motion of a point in space” (B292). Kant already tells us in the first edition
that it is from the spatiotemporal properties of such a line that he infers properties of time:
[W]e … represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the
manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer from the properties of
this line to all the properties of time, with the sole difference that the parts of the former are
simultaneous but those of the latter always exist successively. From this it is also apparent
that the representation of time is itself an intuition, since all its relations can be expressed in
an outer intuition. (A33/B50)

From the last sentence Kant appears to be saying that inference from the properties of a
line is to time, not as a form of intuition, but as a formal intuition (cf. B160). In
executing this inference, “we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the
action in accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense”. In other words,
the collective effect of the categories on inner sense accounts for time as a formal
intuition we perceive in outer sense as a constructed line. It follows that the individual
effect of a category on inner sense is a time-determination which we perceive in outer
sense as the property of a line or as the property of a relation to a line.54 Hence as a pure
criterion of evidence, a transcendental schema is simply a certain property of, or in
relation to, a line.55 Can it get any more “dry and boring”?
Let us consider this interpretation of transcendental schemata in light of their
grouping under “time-series”, “content of time”, “order of time” and “sum total of time”
(A145/B184-185).56 For each Kant provides a summary in the following form “the
schema of each category contains and makes representable …” (A145/B184) and
identifies either a transcendental schema (criterion of evidence) or schemata of sensibility
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(evidence), but not both.

Under “time-series” Kant locates a single “pure” schema

number for the categories of quantity: unity, plurality and totality. It “contains and
makes representable … the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive
apprehension of an object” (italics added, A145/B184). There are two characteristics of
this transcendental schema. The first is that it “is nothing other than the unity of the
synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general” (A143/B182). Here the
schema number concerns the unity from which a line is generated, i.e., the unity of a point
(from which is inferred time as an instant). The unity of a point is a criterion by which
application of the category unity is evident in perception. It is evident, for example, in the
unity of “one representation” (A99) (i.e., a potentially infinite three-dimensional slice of
simultaneity) synthesized in apprehension:
Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension
of its manifold, my ground is the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in
general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the
manifold in space. This very same synthetic unity, however, if I abstract from the form of
space, has its seat in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the
homogeneous in an intuition in general, i.e., the category of quantity, with which that
synthesis of apprehension, i.e., the perception, must therefore be in thoroughgoing
agreement. (B162)

Furthermore, “because I generate time itself in the apprehension of an intuition” (A142143/B182) the schema number also serves as “a representation that summarizes the
successive addition of one (homogeneous) unity to another”. It is thus not only a criterion
of evidence for the category unity, it is a criterion by which application of the categories
plurality and totality is evident in perception.
In the remaining groupings, Kant shifts from identifying a transcendental schema
to specifying schemata of sensibility where the pure criterion is related to both form and
matter. Under “time-content” one finds a single schema of sensibility for the categories
of quality, i.e., reality, negation, and limitation. Kant does not give us a name for this
schema, but refers to it as the “schema of a reality”, asserting that it “contains and makes
representable … the synthesis of sensation (perception) with the representation of time or
the filling of time” (A145/B184). Sensation (matter) indicates “thing-hood, reality” and
has “a degree or magnitude, through which it can more or less fill the same time”
(A143/B182).

Kant tells us that the category reality “indicates a being (in time)”,
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negation “a non-being (in time)” (A143/B182) and (suggests) limitation indicates gradual
approach to these two extremes.
Hence there is a relation and connection between, or rather a transition from reality to
negation, that makes every reality representable as a quantum, and the schema of a reality,
as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform
generation of that quantity in time, as one descends in time from the sensation that has a
certain degree to its disappearance or gradually ascends from negation to its magnitude.
(A143/B182-183)

It seems to me that the “schema of a reality” for all three categories makes evident the
linear property of (Euclidean) continuity in the variation of sensations found in perception
(from which is inferred the continuity of time).57
We now come to a critical juncture with the other two groups of schemata of
sensibility. All transcendental schemata, as criteria of evidence, are identified from the
properties of a line constructed in the productive imagination. But recall Figure 1.5.
Productive synthesis of a shape does not involve an instantaneous synthesis; it involves a
synthesis over time into an image. In reproductive synthesis, by contrast, a shape is
synthesized in an instantaneous perception that is reproduced over time as an image.
Schemata of sensibility thereby fall into two groups: those that can exhibit the category
in a single perception and in a series of perceptions; those that can exhibit the category in
a series of perceptions only. The properties of a line denoted by schemata for “timeseries” and “content of time” belong to the former, which makes them evident a priori in
constructions.58 Accordingly, their “manner of their evidence” (A180/B223) is said to be
“immediate” (A161/B200) and “intuitive” (A162/B201), and can be exhibited a priori. It
is because of this feature (A178-179/B220-222) that the schemata give rise to principles
of the pure understanding Kant calls “mathematical” (A160/B199) or “constitutive”
(A179/B222) in that the categories are evidently applied in the intuitive “composition”
(B201n) of a single perception. On the other hand, the schemata of “time-order” and
“sum total of time” (to be considered next) denote properties of, or in relation to, a line
that cannot be exhibited in a construction. Although they are constitutive of experience
(A664/B692), their manner of evidence is “mediate” (A160/B199) and “discursive”
(A161/B201), for they must be exhibited in a series of individual perceptions. These are
said to give rise to “dynamical” (A160/B199) or “regulative” (B179/B222) principles in
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that the categories are evidently applied in a “connection” (B201n) of perceptions either
among themselves or to the a priori faculty of cognition.
Under “order of time” one finds schemata for each of the categories of relation,
i.e., subsistence, causality and community. Each “contains and makes representable the
relation of the perceptions among themselves to all time (i.e., in accordance with a rule of
time-determination)” (B145/B184).

These schemata, it seems to me, are structural

properties that govern the two-place relation < of points on a line (from which is inferred
a linear order of the manifold of time59).

The schema of sensibility of substance,

persistence, is “the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical timedetermination in general … and in it alone can the succession and simultaneity of
appearances be determined in regard to time” (A144/B183).

That perceptions are

connected to each other is evidence of the connectedness among points of a line (what
today we would formally introduced through the axiom: a < b v b < a v a=b). The
schema of sensibility of causality “consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it
is subject to a rule” (A144/B183).

That perceptions would then stand in transitive

relations is evidence of transitivity among points of a line (what we would today
introduce through the axiom a < c & c < b  a < b).60 Finally, the schema of sensibility
of community “is the simultaneity of the determinations of the one with those of the
other, in accordance with a rule” (A144/B183-184).

That perceptions in reciprocal

relations of causality happen at the same time is evidence of the property of irreflexivity
individual points of a line (what we would today introduce through the axiom ~ (a < a)).61
Corresponding to each of the categories of modality, i.e., possibility, existence and
necessity is a schema falling under the group, “sum total of time” that “contains and
makes representable … time itself, as the correlate of the determination of whether and
how an object belongs to time” (A145/B184). Here the schema is not a property of a line,
but a property of relating to a line. The schema of sensibility of possibility “is the
agreement of the synthesis of various representations with the conditions of time in
general” (A144/B184) – i.e., the application of the category possibility is evident in that
the form of any perception is synthesized from a line or that any series of perceptions
maps to a line. The schema of sensibility of actuality “is existence at a determinate time”
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(A145/B184) – i.e., the application of the category actuality is evident in that perceptions
map to a segment of a line. The schema of sensibility of necessity “is the existence of an
object at all times” (Ibid.) – i.e., the application of the category necessity is evident in that
perceptions that map to a segment of a line can map to any other segment of a line.
The distinction of empirical evidence from a pure criterion of evidence is what
allows us to make sense of the following passage:
But it is also obvious that, although the schemata of sensibility first realize the categories,
yet they likewise also restrict them, i.e., limit them to conditions that lie outside the
understanding (namely in sensibility). Hence the schema is really only the phenomenon, or
the sensible concept of an object, in agreement with the category. ([Translated from Latin:
Number is the quantity of the phenomenon, sensation the reality of the phenomenon,
constancy and the endurance of things the substance of the phenomenon, eternity the
necessity of phenomena, etc.]). … [S]chemata [are] merely representing [things in general]
how they appear… (A146-147/B186)

Transcendental schemata are pure products of a focused imagination and identify what
counts as intuitive evidence for the application of the categories to perceptions. But the
evidence itself – sensible schemata – represent “how they appear”. Sensible schemata
“realize” the categories by constituting the spatiotemporal form of objects of
experience;62 in this sense a schema of sensibility is the “phenomenon”63 or the “sensible
concept of an object” in agreement with the category. At the same time, schemata of
sensibility “limit” the categories by restricting their meaning to sensibility itself.
With this understanding of transcendental schemata, let us now return to Kant’s
solution to the problem he set out to answer:
The concept of the understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general.
Time as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, thus of the connection of all
representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now a transcendental timedetermination is homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is
universal and rests on a rule a priori. But it is on the other hand homogeneous with the
appearance insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold.
Hence an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the
transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the
understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former. (A138-139/B177178)

By “every empirical representation of the manifold” (ER) I take Kant to mean every
spatiotemporal perception. (As noted above, perceptions contain the properties of
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appearances, so homogeneity with the former is homogeneity with the latter.) Kant wants
to mediate the subsumption of appearances (A) under a category (PR) via subsumption
under a schema (S). Given the example that opens the chapter, he needs to establish two
things: 1) PR contains some X1 that any schema S represents, in which case S is
“homogeneous” with PR; and 2) schema S contains some X2 that any representation ER
represents of A, in which case ER (and A) is “homogeneous” with S. X1 is identified as a
universal property expressed by a (spatiotemporal) rule.64

X2 is identified as (the

perception of) time.65 In virtue of the latter, A is subsumed under S; in virtue of the
former, A is further subsumed under PR.
Clearly, for Kant’s stated solution to work, a transcendental schema must be a
pure representation – a modification of the mind – to which properties can be ascribed; it
cannot be a rule or procedure. Moreover it must be distinct from both intellectual
(concepts) and sensible (space and/or time) representations, yet common to them. As a
criterion of evidence produced in the imagination, a transcendental schema presents the
same rule as the form of the intellectual category and constitutes the spatiotemporal focus
of sensible syntheses of the manifold of space and time. One might also say that as
evidence, a schema of sensibility is distinct from and yet common to both sensible and
intellectual representations. It is the “footprint” in the perception of appearances of the
effect of a category on time. Together the two sides of categorical schemata tell us how
categories apply appearances and how they have meaning and use.
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Kant’s schematism is summarized in Figure 1.7:
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Figure 1.7: Kant’s Schematism

Kant takes ownership of the imagination through schemata. A pure sensible schema is a
spatiotemporal outline that guides the synthesis of images of a kind by focusing the
imagination. It is a telos that presents the same rule governing a spatiotemporal synthesis
as the form of a pure sensible concept and the affinity of appearances for a spatiotemporal
kind from which Kant abstracts a formal intuition of space and the formal intuition of
time. It serves as a criterion of evidence for the application of a pure sensible concept in
that any image synthesized under its guidance will exhibit its properties and thus the
properties of the form of the pure sensible concept.

A transcendental schema is a

spatiotemporal outline that guides the synthesis of images in general and constitutes every
pure sensible schema of the imagination.

It presents the same rule governing the

spatiotemporal synthesis as the form of a category and the transcendental affinity of
appearances from which Kant abstracts a property of the formal intuition of time. It
serves as a criterion of evidence for the application of a category in that any series of
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perceptions synthesized will exhibit its properties and thus the properties of the form of
the category.

1.6 Schemata and Reasoning
What has stood in the way of this understanding of Kant’s schematism is a failure
to appreciate the role pure sensible concepts play as conditions for the possibility of a
spatiotemporal kind of experience. It seems pure intuition is commonly given a Platonist
construal in that an object constructed in pure intuition is taken to be essentially different
from an object of experience, with the result that pure sensible concepts are relegated to
mathematical cognition.

In addition, empirical kinds are thought to be determined

exclusively through reason. A literal construal of Kant’s schematism tells against former,
and Kant’s account of mathematical and philosophical cognition, I will now show, tells
against the latter. We will find that at the heart of both forms of cognition is a structure of
schemata that constitutes a transcendental logical space.
In general, cognition is “objective perception” (A320/B377).

“Philosophical

cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cognition that from the
construction of concepts” (A713/B741).

In demarcating the two Kant is not

distinguishing concepts; rather, by separating the “the discursive use of reasoning in
accordance with concepts from its intuitive use through the construction of concepts”
(A719/B747) Kant is distinguishing methods of cognitive reasoning.

He illustrates

mathematical cognition with the standard proof of Euclid’s proposition that the sum of
the angles of a triangle equals 180˚:
Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in his way how the
sum of its angles might be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the concept of a
figure enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally many angles. Now
he may reflect on this concept as long as he wants, yet he will never produce anything new.
He can analyze and make distinct the concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the
number three, but he will not come upon any other properties that do not already lie in
these concepts. But now let the geometer take up this question. He begins at once to
construct a triangle. Since he knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all
of the adjacent angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line, he extends one side
of his triangle, and obtains two adjacent angles that together are equal to two right ones.
Now he divides the external one of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite
side of the triangle, and sees that here there arises an external adjacent angle which is equal
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to an internal one, etc. In such a way, through a chain of inferences that is always guided
by intuition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time general solution of the
question. (A716-717/B744-745)

We construct the proof as follows (see Figure 1.8): Draw triangle ABC. Extend side BC
by drawing a line from C to D. Draw line CE parallel to AB. Note that α = α' and β = β',
so α + β + γ = 180˚. Q.E.D.

A

E

α

α'
γ

β
B

β'
C

D

Figure 1.8: Proof of Euclid’s Proposition 32

For Kant this proof is constructed by the productive imagination through a rule-governed
iterative process that involves:

1) thinking a pure sensible concept (“triangle”); 2)

making general inferences from the construction of a particular image (Figure 1.8); and 3)
judging a synthetic a priori proposition (“the sum of the angles of a triangle equals 180˚”).
But how is this method of cognition an “objective perception” and thus empirical?
Mathematical cognition is based on the presupposition that pure sensible concepts
actually apply to experience:
Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that
which, through sensation, is immediately represented as real in space and time. Through
determinations of the former we can acquire a priori cognitions of objects (in
mathematics), but only as far as their form is concerned, as appearances; whether there can
be things that must be intuited in this form is still left unsettled. Consequently all
mathematical concepts are not by themselves cognitions, except insofar as one presupposes
that there are things that can be presented to us only in accordance with the form of that
pure sensible intuition. Things in space and time, however, are only given insofar as they
are perceptions (representations accompanied with sensation), hence through empirical
representation. (B146-147)
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Reasoning to the synthetic a priori proposition by constructing the concept triangle, for
example, is no cognition except insofar as one presupposes that the triangle form is
synthesized in empirical apprehension. The basis of this presupposition is the vertical
symmetry of imaginative synthesis:
… by means of mathematical and here indeed of geometrical construction … I put together
in a pure intuition, just as in an empirical one, the manifold that belongs to the schema of a
triangle in general and thus to its concept, through which general synthetic propositions
must be constructed. (A718/B747)

Of course, the vertical symmetry of imaginative synthesis does not guarantee that an
empirical synthesis will in fact obtain, for the introduction of matter is entirely
contingent. Indeed, I may construct pure sensible concepts that have yet to be (and may
never be) encountered in any experience. That I construct a pure sensible concept of a
hundred-sided figure in a geometrical proof, for example, does not entail there is such a
thing – i.e., the figure mixed with sensation given in experience.66 Experience must
disclose whether we can regard the geometrical object as “real” (A720/B749). That is,
we must discover not whether a pure sensible concept can apply to experience, but that it
actually does.
Mathematical cognition differs from philosophical cognition in the type of
inference involved in arriving at synthetic a priori propositions: mathematical cognition
“considers the universal in the particular”; philosophical cognition “considers the
particular only in the universal” (A714/B742). This difference turns on Kant’s distinction
between form and matter of appearances:
There are thus two uses of reason, which, regardless of the universality of cognition and its
a priori generation, which they have in common, are nevertheless very different in
procedure, precisely because there are two components to the appearance through which all
objects are given to us: the form of intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and
determined completely a priori, and the matter (the physical), or the content, which
signifies a something that is encountered in space and time, and which thus contains an
existence and corresponds to sensation. (A723/B751)

Doing the work in mathematical cognition are pure sensible schemata that concern only
the form of appearances. When the pure sensible concept is thought, a corresponding
schema arises in the imagination that serves as a purposeful plan from which the
productive synthesis of an image evolves. Objective perception is presupposed because
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the schema may also serve as an end towards which the reproductive synthesis of a kind
of image, i.e., kind of a temporal succession of appearances, involves.
The central role played by pure sensible schemata in mathematical cognition is
clear. Kant tells us that mathematical reasoning “make[s] the [pure sensible] concept
itself” (A730/B758) by assessing “the universal in concreto (in the individual intuition)”
(A734/B762). The inference from a constructed image to properties of the form of the
pure sensible concept is through a pure sensible schema (evident in the image) that
presents the same unity of rule: “just as this individual is determined under certain
general conditions of construction, the object of the concept, to which this individual
corresponds only as its schema, must likewise be thought as universally determined”
(A714/B742). The constructed image in Figure 1.8, for example, exhibits the schematic
content of the form of the pure sensible concept triangle, enabling the inference of
synthetic a priori propositions. In arriving at the proposition “the sum of the angles of a
triangle equals 180˚” a property of the form of the pure sensible concept triangle, and
thus the object triangle, is demonstrated.67 Since the truth of the mathematical judgement
is made evident from Figure 1.8, the constructed image can considered a mathematical
space of reasons. As a potential kind of image, therefore, a pure sensible schema is also a
potential space of reasons.
Now if, as I claim, a transcendental schema is constitutive of pure sensible
schemata, two things should follow. Inasmuch as a category determines a pure sensible
concept, there is no cognition without the presupposition of the latter’s applicability to
experience.
The pure concepts of the understanding, consequently, even if they are applied to a priori
intuitions (as in mathematics), provide cognition only insofar as these a priori intuitions,
and by means of them also the concepts of the understanding, can be applied to empirical
intuitions. Consequently the categories do not afford us cognition of things by means of
intuition except through their possible application to empirical intuition. This, however, is
called experience. The categories consequently have no other use for the cognition of
things except insofar as these are taken as objects of possible experience. (B147-148)

Furthermore, because an individual transcendental schema lacks sufficient spatiotemporal
structure to guide synthesis of a kind of image, derivation of a synthetic a priori
proposition concerning the form of an individual category, or what Kant calls a principle
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of the understanding, cannot directly involve a transcendental schema that represents a
“pure synthesis”.

Rather, its derivation must involve identifying properties of the

corresponding schema of sensibility evident from experience in general that represents an
empirical synthesis:
… if I am given the transcendental concept of a reality, substance, force, etc., it designates
neither an empirical nor a pure intuition, but only the synthesis of empirical intuitions
(which thus cannot be given a priori), and since the synthesis cannot proceed a priori to the
intuition that corresponds to it, no determining synthetic proposition but only a principle of
the synthesis of possible empirical intuitions can arise from it. A transcendental
proposition is therefore synthetic rational cognition in accordance with mere concepts, and
thus discursive, since through it all synthetic unity of empirical cognition first becomes
possible, but no intuition is given by it a priori. (A722/B750)

This shift to schematic exhibition of the categories marks a decisive move from
mathematical cognition to philosophical cognition.68
In philosophical cognition one no longer assesses the universal in the particular,
but rather the particular in the universal. Philosophical cognition “confines itself solely to
general concepts” (A715/B743) and assesses “the universal in abstracto (through
concepts)” (A734/B762), not in concreto (through construction of images). Deriving the
synthetic a priori principle “all alterations occur in accordance with the law of the
connection of cause and effect”, for example, one considers the schematic exhibition of
the category cause in empirical intuition:
By means of the concept of cause I actually go beyond the empirical concept of an
occurrence (that something happens) but not to the intuition that exhibits the concept of
cause in concreto, rather to the time-conditions in general that may be found to be in accord
with the concept of cause in experience. I therefore proceed merely in accordance with
concepts, and cannot proceed through the construction of concepts, since the concept is a
rule of the synthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intuition and which therefore cannot
be given a priori. (A722/B750n)

To proceed “to the time-conditions in general that may be found to be in accord with the
concept of cause in experience”, Kant tells us, is to “look around for some third thing”
(A732-733/B761), i.e., a spatiotemporal schema of sensibility, upon which the principle is
inferred.69 One might say that in mathematical cognition properties of pure sensible
schemata are inferred, while in philosophical cognition properties of schemata of
sensibility are recognized.
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In mathematical cognition derivation of synthetic a priori principles from pure
sensible schemata involves judgement of pure intuition that is determinative (cf.
A722/B750). In philosophical cognition, derivation of synthetic a priori principles from
schemata of sensibility involves judgement of empirical intuition that is both
determinative and reflective:
The faculty of judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained
under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the
faculty of judgement which subsumes the particular under it (even if, as transcendental
faculty of judgement, it specifies a priori the conditions according to which alone [the
particular] can be subsumed under this universal) is determinative. But if only the
particular is given, for which the universal is to be found then the faculty of judgment is
merely reflective. (Ak. V: 179, as quoted in Friedman (1992, 245n))

A quick reading of this passage can lead to confusion. All judgement of empirical
intuition is reflective. When empirical intuition is determined by the understanding,
judgement is also determinative:
With respect to the universal concepts of nature, under which an empirical concept in
general (without particular empirical determinations) is first possible, reflection already has
its instructions in the concept of a nature in general, and the faculty of judgement needs no
particular principle of reflection, but schematizes these concepts a priori and applies these
schemata to each empirical synthesis, without which absolutely no empirical judgement
would be possible. The faculty of judgement is here in its reflection at the same time
determinative, and the transcendental schematism serves here at the same time as the rule
under which given empirical intuitions are subsumed. (Ak., XX, 212, as quoted in
Friedman (1992, 245))

In this case judgement is not “merely reflective” because the category is “given” as a
condition for the possibility of experience and thus is “not to be found” in cognition. This
signals the “apodictic” use of reasoning in that “the universal is in itself certain and given,
and only judgment is required for subsuming, and the particular is necessarily determined
through it” (A646/B674). As we shall see, reflective and determinative judgement also
occurs when pure sensible concepts apply to experience.
Contrasting the apodictic use of reasoning is the “hypothetical” or regulative use
of reason discussed in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique. In a
regulative use of reason “the universal is assumed only problematically”; “it is a mere
idea, the particular being certain while the universality of the rule for this consequent is
still a problem” (A646/B674). Since the rule is a “logical principle” (A648/B676), the
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hypothetical use of reasoning is solely syllogistic. This use of reason involves “merely
reflective” judgement: “it is only reflective judgement that uses this idea as a principle,
for reflection rather than determination” (Ak. V: 180).70 As we shall also see, regulative
use of reason can be punctuated by episodes of apodictic use when reflective judgement is
augmented by determinative judgement.
In its regulative use, reason extends the understanding beyond actual experience to
all possible experience through a “purposive application” that systematically unites the
manifold of the empirical concepts:
Reason never relates directly to an object, but solely to the understanding and by means of
it to reason’s own empirical use, hence it does not create any concepts (of objects) but only
orders them and gives them unity which they can have in their greatest possible extension,
i.e., in relation to the totality of series; the understanding does not look to this totality at all,
but only to the connection through which series of conditions always come about according
to concepts. Thus reason really has as object only the understanding and its purposive
application, and just as the understanding unites the manifold into an object through
concepts, so reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by positing a
certain collective unity as the goal of understanding’s actions, which are otherwise
concerned only with distributive unity. (A643-644/B671-672)

Reason effects this organization through a regulative idea that, in virtue of its form, is a
schema serving as a purposeful plan and presenting a logical principle. Yet the idea
(along with the schema and the logical principle) is only assumed, and so the organization
“is only a projected unity” (A647/B675) towards a focus imaginarius. Without more,
however, a regulative use of reason would fail to seek unity, for reason remains free to
admit that the “idea … entirely contradicts the arrangement of nature” (A651/B679).
The logical principle is thus “without sense or application” (A656/B684) unless
the regulative idea is also accompanied by a “presupposition of … an object in the idea”
(A671/B699):
For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason,
and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark
of empirical truth; thus in regard to the latter we simply have to presuppose the systematic
unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary. (A651/B680)

In virtue of this “transcendental presupposition”, logical principles are “synthetic
propositions a priori” that act as “heuristic principles” (A663/B691) through which “we
question nature according to these ideas, and we take our cognition to be defective as long
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as it is not adequate to them” (A645/B673). Hence, it is a transcendental presupposition
that correlates a focus imaginarius with the illusion of an object.
Kant sometimes refers to the regulative use of reasoning as philosophical
“cognition according to analogy” (Ak. IV: 357), the main reason being that a schema of
reason is an “analogue” of a schema of sensibility:
Yet although no schema can be found in intuition for the thoroughgoing systematic unity of
all concepts of the understanding, an analogue of such a schema can and must be given,
which is the idea of the maximum of division and unification of the understanding’s
cognition in one principle. For that which is greatest and most complete may be kept
determinately in mind, because all restricting conditions, which give indeterminate
manifolds, are omitted. Thus the idea of reason is an analogue of a schema of sensibility,
but with this difference, that the application of concepts of the understanding to the schema
of reason is not likewise a cognition of the object itself (as in the application of the
categories to their sensible schemata), but only a rule or principle of the systematic unity of
all use of the understanding. (A665/B693)

Here Kant is drawing an analogy between the “collective unity” evident in application of
an idea of reason and the “distributive unity” evident in the application of a category
(noted in the passage before last paragraph). Although unity of the evidence is similar,
the nature of the evidence is different.
We see this more clearly in the theory of the exhibition of a pure concept, or
“hypotyposis”, found in the third Critique. Here Kant says a schema of reason gives rise
to symbolic evidence of an idea:
Hence all intuitions supplied for a priori concepts are either schemata or symbols.
Schemata contain direct, symbols indirect, exhibitions of the concept. Schematic
exhibition is demonstrative. Symbolic exhibition uses an analogy (for which we use
empirical intuitions as well), in which judgement performs a double function: it applies the
concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by which it
reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only
the symbol. Thus a monarchy ruled according to its own constitutional laws would be
represented as an animate body, but a monarchy ruled by an individual absolute will would
be represented as a mere machine (such as a hand mill); but in either case the representation
is only symbolic. For though there is no similarity between a despotic state and a hand mill,
there certainly is one between the rules by which we reflect on the two and how they
operate. (Ak. XX, 352)

Symbolic exhibition is analogical to schematic exhibition in that there is an agreement “in
terms of the form of reflection rather than its content” (Ibid., 351).

In schematic

exhibition, reflective judgment determines a schema of sensibility according to a rule
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presented by a transcendental schema. In symbolic exhibition, the reflective judgment
analogously determines symbols of sensibility according to a rule presented by a schema
of reason. But in symbolic exhibition there is “a transfer of our reflection on an object of
intuition to an entirely different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly
correspond” (Ibid., 353). In Kant’s example the perception of a state is organized under
the ideas of rule of law or despotic rule. Application of either idea to perception is only
symbolic: in the former the empirical concept monarchy is symbolically organized as the
empirical concept animate body; in the latter the empirical concept monarchy is
symbolically organized as the empirical concept machine.
Schemata of sensibility present synthetic mathematical and dynamical principles
that, although constitutive and regulative (respectively) of intuition, are constitutive of
empirical concepts in that they express conditions for their very possibility (A664/B692).
Because schemata of sensibility also serve as evidence, they are involved in the cognition
of an object such that “one judges in all strictness the truth of the universal rule”
(A647/B675) it presents. In virtue of this “transcendental truth”71 the principle has a
determinate meaning.

By contrast, a schema of reason presents a logical principle

regulative of empirical concepts by organizing them in virtue of a transcendental
presupposition of applicability. Since it is not constitutive of empirical concepts, the
principle lacks transcendental truth. In our investigations of nature, the projected unity
serves as “as the standard for the empirical use of reason” (A675/B703) and thereby a
“touchstone of truth” (A647/B675). Yet it is “not such that if one judges in all strictness
the truth of the universal rule assumed as hypothesis thereby follows” (A647/B675);
rather, any evidence only makes the principle more “probable” (A649/B677) at best
“approximating the rule to universality” (A647/B675).

But because it organizes

empirical concepts, a logical principle has significance, though not a determinate sense
(A665/B693).
A “touchstone of truth” is a euphemism for a criterion of evidence. As the form
of a pure concept, a schema of reason is analogous to a schema of sensibility because of
its analogy to a transcendental schema. Recall that a transcendental schema identifies a
priori a criterion in relation to a distributive structure of empirical intuition – a line – as
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evidence of the application of a category. By analogy, a schema of reason identifies a
priori a criterion in relation to a collective structure of empirical concepts – what might be
called a “space of reason” – as evidence of the application of an idea of reason. This is
the occupation of a “place” within the structure:
If we survey the cognitions of our understanding in their entire range, then we find that
what reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about concerning it is the
systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one principle. This unity of
reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of cognition, which
precedes the determinate cognition of the parts and contains the conditions for determining
a priori the place of each part and its relation to the others. Accordingly, this idea
postulates complete unity of the understanding’s cognition, through which the cognition
comes to be not merely a contingent aggregate but a system of interconnected in
accordance with necessary laws. (A645/B673)

Recall also that a transcendental schema is constitutive of a focal point; by analogy, a
schema of reason is correlated to a “point” at the apex of this structure, i.e., a focus
imaginarius, towards “which the lines of direction of all [the understanding’s] rules
converge”.
However, whereas this focal point of reason’s imagination is a formless limit that
“lies entirely outside the field of possible empirical cognition” (A644/B672), a focal point
of understanding’s imagination is a spatiotemporal form that lies entirely inside the field
of possible empirical cognition. Moreover, in the case of the former “there arises the
deception, as if these lines of direction were shot out from an object” (A644/B672); in the
latter case, the focal point is the spatiotemporal unity of an object of experience. And
whereas a schema of reason may be associated with a non-synthetic “original image” that
presents part of its principle, a transcendental schema is associated with a synthetic image
that involves towards the principle it presents.
Kant allows for a variety of such spaces of reason, depending on the organizing
idea. Significant for our purposes is his illustration of the organization of empirical
concepts into a systematic unity of genera, species and sub-species through the interplay
of three ideas and their principles:

the idea unity contains the principle of the

“homogeneity” of forms, “a principle of the sameness of kind in the manifold under
higher genera”; the idea manifoldness contains the principle of the “specification” of
forms, “a principle of the variety of what is same in kind under lower species”; and the
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idea affinity contains the principle of the “continuity” of forms, a principle that “arises by
uniting the first two”72 “which offers a continuous transition from every species to every
other through a graduated increase of varieties” (A658/B686;A662/B690). Without these
ideas, Kant tells us, philosophical cognition with empirical concepts would be impossible:
without the principle of homogeneity “there could be no use of reason, because we can
infer from the universal to the particular only on the ground of the universal properties of
things under which the particular properties stand” (A652/B680); “if there were no lower
concepts, then there would also be no higher ones” (A656/B684), and so the principle of
specification is necessary; and without the principle of continuity, derivations of the
particular from the universal could not “go much further than experience can reach”
(A662/B690).
Together the three ideas organize the classification of “individual things”
(A651/B679) based on their matter or content (A578/B606) – not their form. To help us
grasp the systematic unity they bring about, Kant appeals to the structure of an organizing
space of reason:
Systematic unity under the three logical principles can be made palpable in the following
way. One can regard every concept as a point, which, as the standpoint of an observer, has
its horizon, i.e., a multiplicity of things that can be represented and surveyed, as it were,
from it. Within this horizon a multiplicity of points must be able to be given to infinity,
each of which in turn has a narrower field of view; i.e., every species contains subspecies in
accordance with the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists only of
smaller horizons (subspecies), but not of points that have no domain (individuals). But
different horizons, i.e., genera, which are determined from just as many concepts, one can
think as drawn out under a common horizon, which one can survey collectively from its
middle point, which is the higher genus, until finally the highest genus is the universal and
true horizon, determined from the standpoint of the highest concept and comprehending all
manifoldness, as genera, species, and subspecies, under itself. (A658-659/B686-687)

It seems73 that the focus imaginarius of this classification space correlates to the
regulative idea God and illusory “ens realissimum” (“most real being”) (A576/B605).
The form of the idea is a schema74 presenting the “principle of thoroughgoing
determination” (i.e., the principle that one of each pair of all possible contradictory
predicates applies to each thing) (A572/B600) through a disjunctive syllogism:
The logical determination of a concept through reason rests on disjunctive syllogism, in
which the major premise contains a logical division (a division of the sphere of a general
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concept), the minor premise restricts this sphere to one part, and the conclusion determines
the concept through this part. (A576-577/B604-605)

Kant seems to have in mind the following:
Major premise:
Minor premise:
Conclusion:

All A’s are either F or G.
Some A’s are not G.
Therefore some A’s are F.

where “A” is a genus (species of sub-species), “F” and “G” are contradictory predicates,
and the conclusion determines a species (or sub-species) of “A”. What makes this logical
outline a form of the regulative idea God is that serving as the “transcendental major
premise” (A577/B605) is an original image,75 a universal representing “the sum total of
all reality” (A577/B605) and serving (as we shall see) as an ideal for scientific discovery.
From the regulative idea God a cascading lattice of concepts and correlated points
“can be derived only by repeated determination” (A652/B680) via disjunctive attribution
of one of two contradictorily opposed predicates. For example:
Major premise:
Minor premise:
Conclusion:

All absorbent earths are either chalky or muriatic.
Some absorbent earths are not muriatic.
Therefore, some absorbent earths are chalky.

Note that 1) the syllogistic inference instantiates the logical schema; 2) the major premise
represents a kind of empirical image organized under the original image; and 3) the
conclusion represents a kind of empirical image that is, in turn, represented by major
premises of other determinations. This space of reason is a space of disjunctive reasons,
i.e., a framework of disjunctive inferential relationships that justifies certain empirical
propositions. Although the idea God is related to a thoroughly determined individual (ens
realissimum) (A576/B604), “since each species is always a concept that contains within
itself only what is common to different things, this concept cannot be thoroughly
determined, hence it cannot be related to an individual” (A655-656/B683-684).76

77

For

this reason the space must be continuous in Kant’s sense that “a multiplicity of points
must be able to be given to infinity”. Yet the space is only potentially infinite78 and
actual places occupied in the space are discrete.79
If too rigid a distinction is made between philosophical and mathematical
cognition, one can lose sight of how the potential classification space, a potential space of
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disjunctive reasons, connects with potential spaces of mathematical reasons. Kant is not
oblivious to the fact that philosophical cognition makes use of mathematical cognition as
a tool “to advance the essential ends of human reason” (A839/B867). Accordingly, “the
regulative unity of experience rests not on appearances themselves (of sensibility alone),
but on the connection of its manifold by understanding (in one apperception)
(A583/B661). The structure of the classification space is moulded by determinations of
the understanding that cuts the form of appearances into kinds through the application of a
spatiotemporal principle before reason further cuts the matter of appearances into kinds
through application of a logical principle. The necessity of the space for philosophical
cognition is thus motivated by the content and not the form of appearances.80
This is easy to overlook, since it is through reason that we discover empirical
kinds, including spatiotemporal ones determined a priori. Kant provides an important
example:
If we transpose the principles we have adduced, so as to put them in an order which
accords with their experiential use, then the principles of systematic unity would stand
something like this: manifoldness, affinity, unity, each taken, however, as idea in the
highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes those cognitions of the
understanding which are first applied to experience [emphasis mine] and seeks the unity of
these cognitions in accordance with ideas that go much further than experience can reach.
The affinity of the manifold, without detriment to its variety, under the principle of unity,
concerns not merely the things, but even more the mere properties and powers of things.
Hence if, e.g,. the course of the planets is given to us as circular through a (still not fully
corrected) experience, and we find variations, then we suppose these variations to consist in
an orbit that can deviate from the circle through each of an infinity of intermediate degrees
according to constant laws; i.e., we suppose that the movements of the planets that are not a
circle will more or less approximate to its properties, and then we come upon the ellipse.
The comets show an even greater variety in their paths, since (and far as observation
reaches) they do not ever return in a circle; yet we guess at a parabolic course for them,
since it is still akin to the ellipse and, if the major axis of the latter is very long, it cannot be
distinguished from it in all our observations. Thus under the guidance of those principles
we come to a unity of genera in the forms of these paths, but thereby also further to unity in
the cause of all the laws of this motion (gravitation); from there we extend our conquests,
seeking to explain all variations and apparent deviations from those rules on the basis of the
same principle; finally we even add on more than experience can ever confirm, namely in
accordance with the rules of affinity, even conceiving hyperbolical paths for comets in
which these bodies leave our solar system entirely and, going from sun to sun, unite in their
course the most remote parts of a world system, which for us is unbounded yet connected
through one and the same moving force. (A662-663/B690-691)

The passage becomes perspicuous if we bear in mind the observational characteristics of
orbits and their geometrical relation to one another:
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Figure 1.9: Astronomical Orbits and their Geometrical Relationship81

The passage illustrates how reason takes us beyond actual experience to all possible
experience by facilitating discovery of the understanding’s determination of
spatiotemporal kinds through pure sensible concepts.

Kant ascends the space of

classification from our cognition of actual appearances (astronomical orbits around the
sun) to a unifying causal genus (the empirical concept82 gravity) then descends to a
species of possible (non-actual) experience (the empirical concept hyperbolic orbit).
Doing the work is judgment, “a mediating link between understanding and reason” (Ak.
V: 177), where reflective judgement in the use of reason can also be determinative
judgement in the use of understanding.
More specifically, beginning with actual perceptions of circular orbits around the
sun and simple laws that seem to govern them, we seek to unify these orbits under a more
general empirical law in virtue of the ideas of manifoldness, affinity and unity organized
under the idea God. Following the principle of specification, reason groups perceived
orbits into two species:

observationally bound orbits (planets) and observationally

unbound orbits (comets). Following the same principle, reason specifies sub-species of
bound orbits: either an observationally bound orbit is a circle or it is not, and those that
are not circles we “suppose” are grouped as ellipses. Returning to the species of unbound
orbits, two sub-species are further specified: either an observationally unbound orbit is
parabolic or not. Again, we “guess” they are grouped as parabola. But what grounds
these two suppositions?
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There are two things:

1) “[r]eason presupposes those cognitions of the

understanding which are first applied to experience”; and 2) in the case of the ellipse “we
suppose … an orbit that can deviate from the circle through each of an infinity of
intermediate degrees according to constant laws” and we guess a parabola because “it is
still akin to the ellipse and, if the major axis of the latter is very long, it cannot be
distinguished from it in all our observations”. On the first ground reason is subject to the
understanding that divides the shape of appearances into spatiotemporal kinds.
Accordingly, inasmuch as the empirical concept circular orbit is determined by the pure
sensible concept circle, we suppose that orbits that are not circles are nonetheless
determined by pure sensible concepts. On the second ground, the principle of affinity
dictates that the pure sensible concepts that determine the sub-species of orbits deviate
minimally from one another. Hence we arrive at the empirical concept elliptical orbits
and the empirical concept parabolic orbit.
From these orbits actually experienced, we “come to the unity of genera in the
forms of these paths” and “thereby further” to the empirical concept gravity. Although
Kant does not supply the details of these two moves, we can turn to the Critique of
Judgment (1790-1793/1987)83 and the Prolegomena to fill them in. Now Kant describes
ascensions generally as a process of abstracting from the determination of empirical
concepts (A656/B684), which involves removing a pair of contradictory predicates. In
the first ascension this would involve removing the predicates “bound” and “unbound”.
In doing so, the orbits are unified under the empirical concept conic orbits. That we
arrive at this genus is through an earlier mathematical discovery of the organization of
these curves by geometers who, “unwittingly working for posterity”, constructed the pure
sensible concept cone (Ak. V: 363).
Organization of the orbits further under the empirical concept gravity is less
obvious and more complex. The form of the empirical concept gravity presents the
empirical law of gravity.

According to this law, attraction between two bodies is

proportional to their masses and inversely proportional to the square of their distance.
Proportionality to mass alone makes the law empirical, and thus to be discovered. Kant
took the view that some laws, such as those of chemistry, are “merely empirical” in that
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they “are not receptive to the application of mathematics”, but only because there is “no
concept to be discovered that can be constructed” (italics added, Ak. IV: 471). In relation
to the inverse square law of the law of gravity, however, §38 of the Prolegomena tells us
there is a concept to be discovered that can be constructed: the pure sensible concept
sphere. Determination by a pure sensible concept needs to be discovered through reason
not only because we are unaware whether it actually applies to experience, but also
because we cannot grasp a priori how it may do so.84
Kant tells us that under the guidance of the principles of manifoldness, affinity
and unity we come to “unity in the cause of all the laws of this motion”. By “laws of
motion” he is likely alluding to Kepler’s law of areas: if a body is observed to move in a
circle, ellipse or parabola in a way that satisfies this law with respect to the focus of the
orbit, we observe that the body is accelerated to that focus inversely proportional to the
square of the distance from it. Kepler’s laws are independent of mass and concern only
the kinematics of relative motion,85 and for Kant they likely have the status of inductive
generalizations of orbital motion.86 Now ascension from the empirical concept conical
orbits seems to be in virtue of reflective judgement that also determines the schema of
sensibility evident in the acceleration of orbits and subsumes them under the category
cause. In ascending to the empirical concept gravity judgement appears to have in hand a
comparison of the intensive magnitude of other perceptions, for “the degree of reality as
cause” is called “the moment of gravity” (A168/B210).87 Here reflective judgement that
also determines the shape of the orbits subsumes them under the pure sensible concept
sphere, for the inverse square relation rests “merely on the relation of spherical surfaces
with different radii” (Ak. IV: 321).
Having organized conical orbits under the empirical concept gravity as the “power
of things”, we are in a position to extend understanding to all possible experience. If we
“descend” to the empirical concept conic orbit, we know from previous mathematical
work that there remains a sub-species of unbound orbits not actually experienced past,
present or future determined by the pure sensible concept hyperbola and captured by the
empirical concept hyperbolic orbits.

It seems at this point reflective judgement
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speculates on the mere possibility (“more than experience can ever confirm”) of intersolar orbits of comets.
This reconstruction is thrown into relief when we examine §38 of the
Prolegomena in detail. Taking the empirical law of gravity as exemplar, it tries to show
… that laws which we discover in objects of sensory intuition, especially if these laws have
been cognized as necessary, are already held by us to be such as have been put there by the
understanding, although they are otherwise in all respects like the laws of nature that we
attribute to experience. (italics added, Ak. IV: 320)

More specifically, “nature rests on laws that the understanding cognizes a priori, and
indeed chiefly from principles of the determination of space” for “that which determines
space into the figure of a circle, a cone, or a sphere is the understanding, insofar as it
contains the basis for the unity of the construction of these figures” (Ak., IV: 321-322).
But rather than illustrate this through the use of reason in the classification of empirical
concepts, here Kant works strictly with pure sensible concepts, providing a classification
structure of astronomical orbits through the progressive generalization of schematic
properties.
In the first paragraph Kant begins with a universal property of a circle:
If one considers the properties of the circle by which this figure unifies in a universal rule at
once so many determinations of the space within it, one cannot refrain from ascribing a
nature to this geometrical thing. Thus in particular, two lines that intersect each other and
also the circle, however they happen to be drawn, nonetheless always partition each other
in a regular manner such that the rectangle from the parts of one line is equal to that from
the other.88 Now I ask: “Does this law lie in the circle, or does it lie in the understanding?”
i.e., does this figure, independent of the understanding, contain the basis for this law in
itself, or does the understanding, since it has itself constructed the figure in accordance with
its concepts (namely, the equality of the radii), at the same time insert into it the law that
chords cut one another in geometrical proportion? If one traces the proofs of this law, one
soon sees that it can be derived only from the condition on which the understanding based
the construction of this figure, namely, the equality of radii. (Ak. IV: 320-321)

By “geometrical thing” Kant is alluding to the fact that because a circle’s universal
properties are exhibited in experience, a circle is “immediately represented as real in
space and time”. By “nature” he means “the first inner principle of all that belongs to the
existence of a thing” (Ak: IV: 467) as well as that which “signifies the connection of
determinations of a thing in accordance with an inner principle of causality”
(A418/B446n). It is a mistake to interpret “causality” mechanically in terms of universal
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laws89 when Kant is clear in the third Critique that in this context he only means
“causality in terms of purposes” (Ak. V: 359):
… suppose two lines are to intersect so that the rectangle under the two parts of the one line
will be equal to the rectangle under the two parts of the other: solving this problem seems
very difficult; but in fact all lines that intersect within a circle and are bounded by its
circumference divide automatically in this proportion. The other curves in turn provide us
with other purposive solutions that we did not think of at all in the rule for their
construction. (Ibid., 362-363)

His first point then is that when we consider universal properties of a circle, they seem to
be derived from the circle’s inner purpose. But they originate in the understanding, for
“when I draw a figure in accordance with a concept, I introduce the purposiveness into
the figure” (Ibid., 365). I introduce this purposiveness when, beginning with an outline or
“plan” in the imagination, I construct a circle whose schematic properties (e.g., the
equality of radii) are attributable to the form of the pure sensible concept circle.90
Following the same path as the Appendix, the paragraph then shifts from a circle
to other conic sections:
If we now expand upon this concept so as to follow up still further the unity of the manifold
properties of geometrical figures under common laws, and we consider the circle as a conic
section, which is therefore subject to the very same fundamental conditions of construction
as other conic sections, we then find that all chords that intersect within these latter (within
the ellipse, the parabola, and the hyperbola) always do so in such a way that the rectangles
from their parts are not indeed equal, but always stand to one another in equal
proportions.91 (Ak. IV: 321)

Because it builds upon the first passage, we should take Kant to be referring to elliptical,
parabolic and hyperbolic conic sections – indeed the cone figure itself – as “geometrical
things”. The claim implied is that when we consider universal properties of non-circular
conic sections, we realize they originate in the understanding, for their proof arises from
the a priori constructions of conic sections displays schematic properties attributable to
the form of pure sensible concepts, most generally to the pure sensible concept cone.
The final part of the paragraph marks a generalization from geometrical things in
actual experience to all possible experience through the pure sensible concept sphere:
If from there we go still further, namely to the fundamental doctrines of physical
astronomy, there appears a physical law of reciprocal attraction, extending to all material
nature, the rule of which is that these attractions decrease inversely with the square of the

64
distance from each point of attraction, exactly as the spherical surfaces into which this force
spreads itself increase, something that seems to reside as necessary in the nature of the
things themselves and which therefore is customarily presented as cognizable a priori. As
simple as are the sources of this law – in that they rest merely on the relation of spherical
surfaces with different radii – the consequence therefrom is nonetheless so excellent with
respect to the variety and regularity of its agreement that not only does it follow that all
possible orbits of the celestial bodies are conic sections, but also that their mutual relations
are such that no other law of attraction save that of the inverse square of the distances can
be conceived as suitable for a system of the world. (italics added, 4: 321)

Here it becomes clear we are to understand previous conic sections as “geometrical
things” in virtue of the orbits of celestial bodies given in experience. These orbits are
observed to obey the inverse square law, and if one considers this universal property of
celestial bodies orbiting the sun, one cannot refrain from ascribing an inner principle of
causality to the things. And since the reciprocal attraction of bodies extends to “material
nature”, i.e., “the whole of all appearances” (Ak. IV: 467), the same can be said of all
bodies. Yet, the inverse square law does not originate in things but in the understanding,
for it is based on the a priori constructions of spheres of different radii, which rests on
schematic properties attributable to the form of the pure sensible concept sphere. Thus
some properties of the empirical concept gravity are features of the schema of the pure
sensible concept sphere that can be cognized through a mathematical space of reasons.
In summary, reason organizes experience under a schema in harmony with
schemata of categories and pure sensible concepts. These schemata underwrite a logical
and mathematical heuristic that guides judgment to discover empirical laws. The force of
this heuristic arises from an imaginative structure, a potential classificatory space of
points converging towards a focus imaginarius, some of which are themselves focal
points of the synthetic imagination. In its relation to an image, each focal point has the
structure of a spherical convex mirror. See Figure 1.10:
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focus imaginarius
(correlated to regulative schema God)

“original image”
pure sensible schemata
synthetic images

Figure 1.10 Kant’s Logical Space

The substructure constituted by focal points of the synthetic imagination is logicomathematical structure that lies at the heart of Kant’s theory of cognition. Not only is it a
potential logico-mathematical space of reasons, it circumscribes a form of all possible
spatiotemporal experience. And because, as we shall see next, its particular structure
appears to be due to Kant’s conception of the self, it is a potential logical space (in
Wittgenstein’s sense of the term).

1.7 The Self
Kant distinguishes between two senses of ‘I’ from the nature of selfconsciousness: “the I that I think [differs] from the I that intuits itself (for I can represent
other kinds of intuition as at least possible)” (B155). The former is the transcendental I,
… the simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot
even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept.
Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a
transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that
are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least
concept; because of which we therefore turn in a constant circle, since we must always
already avail ourselves of the representation of it at all times in order to judge anything
about it; we cannot separate ourselves from this inconvenience, because the consciousness
in itself is not even a representation distinguishing of a particular object, but rather a form
of representation in general, insofar as it is to be called a cognition, for of it alone can I say
that through it I think anything. (A345-346/B404)
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The transcendental I is a limit of the intellect: it is “that which remains after all accidents
(as predicates) have been removed” (Ak. IV: 333) from the inner sense. As a limit “it is
nothing more than a feeling of an existence without the least concept, and is only a
representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation” (Ak. IV: 334 n.).
Schopenhauer understands Kant’s notion of the transcendental self in the
following way:
If we summarize Kant’s utterances, we shall find that what he understands by the synthetic
unity of apperception is, so to speak, the extensionless centre of the sphere of all our
representations, whose radii converge on it. It is what I call the subject of knowing, the
correlative of all representations. (1966, vol. I, 451-452)

Criticizing it, Schopenhauer asserts that it confers upon the intellect the unity of
consciousness “at most only as much as a convex mirror has, whose rays converge at an
imaginary point behind its surface” (1966, vol II, 139-140). In saying this he seems to be
influenced by an understanding of the relation between the transcendental I and the
second sense of self – the psychological I. In order to obtain “a systematic unity of all the
appearances of the inner sense” reason “makes out” “a concept of reason (an idea)” “of a
simple self-sufficient intelligence” (A682/B710). Although this “psychological idea”
signifies “nothing other than the schema of a regulative concept” (A684/B712), the
transcendental presupposition of an object in the idea correlates an illusory “soul”
(A342/B400) with its focus imaginarius. Since “we intuit ourselves only as we are
internally affected by our selves” (B166), Schopenhauer likely sees the focus imaginarius
as brought about by the limit that is the transcendental I, prompting him to characterize
the latter the way he does.

Add to this Kant’s claim that the procedure of the

understanding with pure sensible schemata is “a hidden art in the depths of the human
soul” (italics added, A141/B180), the transcendental I might then be taken to affect a
general structure of the imagination.
Indeed, what this chapter has shown is that a literal interpretation of Kant’s
schematism is to be had by patterning the structure of understanding’s imagination upon
the structure of reason’s imagination. Schopenhauer’s insight suggests that as the “form
of representation in general”, the transcendental I induces a general structure of the
imagination similar to that of a convex mirror. It is through this structure that the
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imagination accommodates the formal proposition “I think”, i.e., “the form of
apperception, which belongs to and precedes every experience” (A354) that must be able
to accompany imaginative representation (B132). Moreover, it is through this structure
that focal points arise in virtue of which regulative ideas, categories and pure sensible
concepts apply to reality in the synthesis and organization of empirical images.

1.8 Conclusion: The Birth of Logical Space
Kant’s pre-critical notion of a schema was God’s plan for a structure of the
universe that executes a divine idea as God imagines. In the Critique the divine schema
is internalized in human cognition as regulative schemata along with transcendental and
pure sensible schemata that execute pure concepts as the transcendental self imagines.
Although fragmented, critical schemata are unified through a general structure of the
imagination patterned on a spherical convex mirror. Through this structure a potential
classification space of empirical concepts is organized under the regulative idea God
where a subset of places converging towards the focus imaginarius are themselves focal
points of spatiotemporal syntheses determined by the categories and pure sensible
concepts.
This is Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space in its transcendental form: a logicomathematical structure circumscribing a form of all possible worlds through which the
self applies imaginative representations to reality. But in Kant’s case the space is only
potential, the logic monadic and the mathematics limited to Newtonian space-time. The
development of polyadic logic and the geometric treatment of mechanics that will give
rise to the idea of logical space we see in Wittgenstein.
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Chapter 2: From Schema to Model
For better and worse, almost every philosophical
development of significance since 1800 has been a response
to Kant.
Coffa (1991, 7)

2.1 Introduction
This chapter explores developments in the logical organization of images that
occurred in 19th century philosophy of science leading from Kant to Wittgenstein’s idea
of logical space.

These developments transpired in the philosophical systems of

Helmholtz and Hertz, offering a glimpse into how these working scientists understood the
relation between imaginative representation and reality.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first is a general reconstruction
of Helmholtz’s philosophical system that appeals to the architectonic of Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason (1998) to articulate the implications of Helmholtz’s adaptation of
causality as a regulative idea. It demonstrates that Helmholtz possessed remarkable depth
in his understanding of Kant, knowing full well the repercussions of substituting a
transcendental schema for a regulative one in his notion of an image, its organization, and
its relation to reality. The second part presents a novel exegesis of Hertz’s Principles of
Mechanics (1900/1956) that lays bare his basic move of replacing the original image
associated with the major premise of a regulative idea with a scientific image associated
with the logical schema of a set of fundamental ideas connected by a fundamental law. It
brings to light Hertz’s incorporation of mathematical developments in geometry and
physics that capture his scientific image as an idealized multi-dimensional coordinate
system. I shall argue that Hertz’s suggestion that this mathematical form is shared with
reality is the likely precursor to Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space.

2.2 Helmholtz
The emergence of non-Euclidean geometries in the 19th century had a profound
effect on philosophy of science. Helmholtz was among a number of philosophers who
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came to reject Kant’s view of the intuitive construction of pure sensible concepts and thus
the expression of their schematic properties in synthetic a priori propositions. What Kant
failed to realize, Helmholtz surmised, was that in “Euclid’s method of constructive
intuition” we have “involuntarily and unconsciously drawn in some very general results
of experience, which the power of executing certain parts of the operation has already
taught us practically” (1870/1971, 247). Although Helmholtz abandoned pure intuition in
order to return to the empiricist tradition Kant had rejected, he nonetheless allowed Kant
to dominate his philosophical and scientific thought:
I was faithful to Kant in the beginning of my career as I am now; or rather, I believed then
that that which I wished to see altered in Kant was an insignificant side issue which, next to
that which I still esteem to be his chief result, need not come up for consideration.
((Vortäge und Reden, 1884, I, vii) translated by Kahl (1971 xxii, n.9))

Kant’s chief result, Helmholtz tells us in his well-known epistemological essay, The Facts
of Perception (1878/1971a), was that “[t]he law of causality is in reality a transcendental
law, a law which is given a priori” (390). Helmholtz surmised, however, that it is not a
constitutive principle but a regulative one, conceiving the form of the pure concept
causality as a regulative schema organizing a potential space of all images.

2.21 Physiological Forms of Intuition
Helmholtz adopts Kant’s general position that philosophy and science grapple
with common epistemological questions from different points of view: “[t]he laws of
thought, after all, are the same for the scientist as for the philosopher” (1878/1971a, 369).
As Hatfield (1990) points out, however, “Helmholtz was a scientist first and a
philosopher second” (165). His scientific investigations in physiological acoustics and
optics led him to reconceive Kant’s epistemology around the psychology of perception
and a physiology of empirical intuition.

His starting point was Johannes Müller’s

principle of specific energies of nerves found in his Treatise of Human Physiology (18381840). Kahl (1971) summarizes this principle as follows:
Fundamental to this principle is the assumption that all we know about the external world
enters our consciousness as the result of external causes. These causes affect the sense
organs, producing excitations which are transmitted by the nerves to the brain. It is in the
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brain that they first become conscious sensations, and there they are combined to produce
perceptions of the objects around us. (xxvi)

Building upon this principle, Helmholtz makes a distinction between differences in
“quality” of sensations (e.g., red, warm, sweet) that belong to a particular sense and
differences in the “modality” of the five senses (1878/1971, 368-369). Following Fichte,
each sense is said to define an exclusive “circle of quality” where qualities of one circle
cannot transition or be compared to those of another. Circles of quality are accounted for
on the basis of different types of nerves: “Every sensory nerve … when excited by even
the most varied stimuli, produces sensation only within its own specific circle of quality”
(Ibid., 370). A circle of quality accounts for structure through the make-up of sensory
nerves, such as that of colours in the combinations of red, green and blue-violet
sensations and the patterns of consonance and dissonance that result from tone sensations
that lie close together. For this reason Helmholtz says that “our physiological makeup
incorporates a pure form of intuition insofar as the qualities of sensation are concerned”
(Ibid., 373).
It seems that a collection of nerves from various circles of quality (e.g. sight and
touch) give rise to a version of Kant’s forms of temporal and spatial intuition. The
“ordering in the time sequence is the inescapable form of our inner intuition” (Helmholtz
1887/1971, 441); “[s]pace is an a priori form of intuition, necessarily prior to all
experience, insofar as the perception of it is related to the possibility of motor volitions,
the mental and physical capacity for which must be provided by our physiological makeup before we can have intuitions of space” (Helmholtz 1878/1971, 374). The former
accounts for the direction of the natural number series92 and (presumably) for the onedimensionality of time, while the latter accounts for the three-dimensionality of space.93
As is well-known, Helmholtz argued that the necessity of three-dimensional
spatial experience did not necessitate Euclidean space:
Our eyes see everything in the field of vision as a number of colored plane surfaces. That is
their form of intuition. However, the particular colors that appear at any one time, the
relationships among them, and the order in which they appear are the effects of external
causes and are not determined by any law of our organization. Equally, the fact that space
is a form of intuition implies just as little concerning the facts which are expressed by the
axioms. (Helmholtz 1878/1971, 378)
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He claimed that axioms of Euclidean geometry (1870/1971) and axioms of arithmetic
(1887/1971) are discovered from regular sense impressions.94 In the case of geometry,
the specific structure of Euclidean space arises from perceptions that objects of finite
shape can be moved without changing shape (free-mobility) and that the curvature of
space is indiscernible.95 In the case of arithmetic, repetitive counting gives rise to the
regularity of the natural number series. Hence, the axioms of geometry and those of
arithmetic “are not propositions given a priori, but propositions that must be confirmed or
refuted by experience” (Helmholtz 1887/1971, 437).

2.22 Intuitive Images in a Theory of Representation
Helmholtz denied any relation of similarity between sensations and their causes
on the basis that sensations are “signs” not “images” of external objects:
Our sensations are simply effects which are produced in our organs by objective causes;
precisely how these effects manifest themselves depends principally and in essence upon
the type of apparatus that reacts to the objective causes. What information, then, can the
qualities of such sensations give us about the characteristics of the external causes and
influences which produce them? Only this: our sensations are signs, not images, of such
characteristics. One expects an image to be similar in some respect to the object of which it
is an image; in a statue one expects similarity of form, in a drawing similarity of
perspective, in a painting similarity of color. A sign, however, need not be similar in any
way to that of which it is a sign. The sole relationship between them is that the same
object, appearing under the same conditions, must evoke the same sign; thus different signs
always signify different causes or influences. (Helmholtz 1878/1971, 372)

Unlike Kant, Helmholtz did not consider sensations to be merely matter for
representational form. He appears to have adopted a two-world interpretation of the
Critique, taking sensations to be effects of things-in-themselves conceived as objective
causes, signals96 that transmit information from particularized external sources. At the
same time Helmholtz denied sensations are “images” because they lack the similarity
relation we find in any graven image,97 such as structural, perspectival or colour
similarity. His implicit claim is that the notion of an “image” as a representation is to be
understood in the context of a theory of representation that takes the relation between a
representation and what is represented as similarity in some respect.
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Just as Kant distinguishes between “form of intuition” and “formal intuition”,
Helmholtz distinguishes between “form of intuition” and “intuition”. But for Kant, recall,
formal intuition is a unity of the manifold of intuition determined by pure concepts. For
Helmholtz, on the other hand, “intuition” is a posteriori, designating “the occurrence of
ideas wherein only a sense impression is experienced, the idea of an object coming
subsequently to consciousness without the mediation of any further conceptualization”
(1894/1971b, 506).

Sense impressions first give rise to a non-reflective and non-

conceptual “idea” called “perception” (Ibid., 505-506). Through their impression into
memory, regular perceptions give rise to an “intuitive image” beneath the surface of
consciousness:
Among the traces which frequently repeated perceptions leave behind in the memory, the
ones conforming to law and repeated with the greatest regularity are strengthened. In a
receptive, attentive observer, intuitive images of the characteristic aspects of the things that
interest him come to exist; afterwards he knows no more about how these images arose
than a child knows about the examples from which he learned the meanings of words.
(Helmholtz 1878/1971, 380)

An intuitive image is a relation among different kinds of signs, serving as the major
premise of a pre-conceptual “inductive” (Helmholtz 1894/1971b, 508) inference:
In some of my earlier works I called the connections of ideas which take place in these
processes unconscious inferences. These inferences are unconscious insofar as their major
premise is not necessarily expressed in the form of a proposition; it is formed from a series
of experiences whose individual members have entered consciousness only in the form of
sense impressions which have long since disappeared from memory. Some fresh sense
impression forms the minor premise, to which the rule impressed upon us by previous
observations is applied. (1878/1971, 381)

This inference or intuition is a “fact of perception”98 in virtue of which we are said to
have pre-conceptual knowledge.99
Generally speaking, Leroux (2001, 192) is right to say that Helmholtz follows
Kant in identifying an empirical image with a lawful temporal succession. But this claim
is apt to mislead. For Kant the temporal succession is lawful because empirical synthesis
of an image is governed by an a priori rule of association of perceptions (17811787/1998, A100-102). In virtue of this rule, the synthesis has unity. I have argued,
moreover, that in the case of figurative images (at least) it has the unity of a kind of
image. For Helmholtz the temporal succession is lawful because (as we shall see) the
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empirical synthesis of an image arises from a repeated association of distinct kinds of
perceptions believed to be repeatable. In virtue of this belief, the image has unity in
relating kinds of perceptions. Characterized by definite properties, an image is a structure
of perceptions that arises from the interaction among empirical, physiological and mental
elements and functions as an a posteriori rule of association of these perceptions.
Helmholtz’s theory of representation adds that as an adequate representation, an empirical
image is isomorphic to a structure of causes:100
To popular opinion, which accepts on faith and trust the complete veridicality of the images
which our senses apparently furnish of external objects, this relationship [between
sensations and objective causes] may seem very insignificant. In truth it is not, for with it
something of the greatest importance can be accomplished: picturing101 the lawful
regularities in the processes of the external world. All natural laws assert that from initial
conditions which are the same in some specific way, there always follow consequences
which are the same in some other specific way. If the same kinds of things in the world of
experience are indicated by the same signs, then the lawful succession of equal effects from
equal causes will be related to a similar regular succession in the realm of our sensations.
If, for example, some kind of berry in ripening forms a red pigment and sugar at the same
time, we shall always find a red color and a sweet taste together in our sensations of berries
of this kind. (Helmholtz 1878/1971, 372)

He is more explicit about this in his earlier Handbook of Physiological Optics (1857-67):
“the representations of the external world are images of the lawlike succession of natural
events” (446, translated in (Schiemann 1998, 27)).
A key difference between Kant and Helmholtz concerns when images are
organized. For Kant empirical images are synthesized from individual perceptions and
then further organized under the regulative idea God into kinds of images described by
the major premise of a conscious inference. For Helmholtz empirical images are formed
already organized as a relation among kinds of perceptions under the regulative idea
causality, and function as a major premise of an unconscious inference (e.g., “All red
strawberries are sweet”).

2.23 Law of Causality as Regulative Principle
Having adopted Müller’s principle, Helmholtz always adhered to a version of
causal realism, but moderated it over time.

Initially he presented a “hidden-causes
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realism”, the view that changes are caused by a material world hidden behind the
phenomena (Heidelberger 1998, 10-11). Images were said to be true if they enable us to
predict the results of our actions:
Every image is the image of a thing merely for him who knows how to read it, and who is
enabled by the aid of the image to form an idea of the thing. Every image is similar to its
object in one respect, and dissimilar in all others, whether it be a painting, a statue, the
musical or dramatic representation of a mental mood, etc. Thus the ideas of the external
world are images of the regular sequence of natural events, and if they are formed correctly
according to the laws of our thinking, and we are able by our actions to translate them back
into reality again, the ideas we have are also the only true ones for our mental capacity. All
others would be false. ((1857-67), as translated by Kahl (1971, xxxiv))

Later Helmholtz adopts the more sophisticated view that it is a “metaphysical hypothesis”
that “the material world about us exists independently of our ideas”, no more than “an
exceedingly useful and practical hypothesis” (1878/1971, 385-386). Although he found it
to be highly improbable, he could “not see how a system of even the most extreme
subjective idealism, even one which treats life as a dream, can be refuted” (Ibid.).
As other commentators have noted, this moderation in Helmholtz’s causal realism
coincides with a refinement in his view of the principle of causality.

Initially the

principle was an a priori law of thought on par with the principle of sufficient reason
(Hatfield 1990, 211). Later it developed into a regulative principle, “nothing but the
presupposition of the lawful regularity or uniformity in all natural phenomena” (1881
appendix to 1847/1971, 49). In failing to appreciate Helmholtz’s understanding of Kant,
however, it seems many commentators fail to appreciate the implications of adopting this
view of the principle of causality.
It has been claimed, for example, that Helmholtz’s principle of causality is
“constitutive of the real” (Hatfield 1990, 211) or “constitutive of [the] relationship of
[sensations] to an external world” (Friedman 1997, 33). Whatever these claims may
mean, they overlook the significance of Müller’s principle. Helmholtz tells us that “[a]ny
epistemology which is based on the physiology of the senses must advise man to proceed
to action in order to take possession of reality” (as quoted in Heidelberger (1998, 13)).
More specifically,
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[e]ach movement we make by which we alter the appearance of objects should be thought
of as an experiment designed to test whether we have understood correctly the invariant
relations of the phenomena before us, that is, their existence in definite spatial relations.
(Helmholtz 1878/1971, 384)

If we must always test invariant appearances for illusion, then obviously Müller’s
principle implies a rejection of a constitutive view of the real or of our relation to the real.
Recall that for Kant a regulative principle is assumed “problematically”.
Helmholtz recognizes this in his claim that the regularity of sensations actually
encountered only makes the principle more probable: “We have no justification other
than its results … for the application of the law of causality” (Helmholtz 1971a, 390), yet
“all … natural laws arrived at by induction … should properly be thought of as only more
or less probable” (Ibid., 398). He also recognizes this in his claim that the principle of
causality is “our intellectual impulse to view everything that happens as conforming to
law and thus as conceivable” (1878/1971c, 361), for we know from Kant that this impulse
arises because the regulative principle is accompanied by the transcendental
presupposition of an object in the idea. Indeed, it is only in virtue this presupposition that
the regulative principle of causality can have the status Helmholtz attributes to it of being
a “transcendental law” (Ibid., 390).102 If one adopts Müller’s principle that sensations are
effects of an independently existing world, then given the presupposition of an object in
the idea causality there must also arise the presupposition that sensations are the effects of
objective causes. It is precisely because such objects are presupposed that Helmholtz’s
mature causal realism is hypothetical.
For Helmholtz the regulative idea causality arises in virtue of our ever-present
belief in the uniformity of regularity: “We can do no more than accept the proverb, “Have
faith and keep on!” (1878/1971, 390). This departure from Critique does not preclude our
bringing to light the significance of replacing a category with a regulative idea by
examining what it means to replace a transcendental schema with a regulative one. The
regulative schema Helmholtz seems to have in mind is the following:
Major premise:
Minor premise:
Conclusion:

All occurrences of A are followed by occurrences of B.
A occurs.
Therefore B is will occur.
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In virtue of this logical schema, the regulative idea causality presents the principle of
causality, “all changes in nature necessarily follow from causal conditions” (1894/1971b,
525). Now in Helmholtz’s case the impact of the schema of causality must be explored
by considering the pre-conscious and conscious levels separately.
Let us begin with at the pre-conscious level of images. Associated with the
presupposition of an object in the idea is a focus imaginarius that serves to obtain “the
greatest unity alongside the greatest extension” (Kant 1781-1787/1998, A644/B672).
Functioning as the major premise of the regulative schema is an original image, i.e.,
“something fundamental and unchanging which is the cause of the changes we observe”
(Helmholtz 1878/1971, 390), serving as an ideal towards which our involuntary
movements (e.g., of the eye during perception) aim in testing invariant appearances.
Converging towards the focus imaginarius is a potentially infinite space of interconnected
“places”, each of which is “occupied” by an image. Each image functions as the major
premise of a syllogistic inference that instantiates the regulative schema causality, whose
minor premise and conclusion are kinds of sensations. For example:
Major premise:
Minor premise:
Conclusion:

All red strawberries are sweet.
Red strawberry.
Therefore sweet.

The major premise is a lawful temporal succession, an image, representing hypothetical
causal structure in the real world. This image is organized under an image functioning,
say, as the major premise “All strawberry plants grow red strawberries”.
Helmholtz provides a more sophisticated illustration in his elucidation of the “idea
of the material form”:
… the memory images of pure sense impressions can also be used as elements in
combinations of ideas, where it is not necessary or even possible to describe those
impressions in words and thus to grasp them conceptually. A large part of our empirical
knowledge of the natural relations among the objects around us obviously originates in this
way. The blending of many perspective images of an object into the idea of a threedimensional form seems to me an especially clear example of the kind of combination of
sensual intuitions which corresponds to an inference. The idea of the material form
represents or stands for all the perspective images, which in turn can be derived from it by a
sufficiently powerful geometric imagination. Even views not previously perceived, such as
those which result when cross-sectional cuts are made in any one of a number of directions,
are derivable from such an idea. Indeed, the idea of a three-dimensional figure has no
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content other than the idea of the series of visual images which can be obtained from it,
including those which can be produced by cross-sectional cuts. In this sense, we may
rightly claim that the idea of the stereometric form of a material object plays the role of a
concept, formed on the basis of the combination of an extended series of sensuous
intuition-images. It is a concept, however, which, unlike a geometrical construct, is not
necessarily expressed in a verbal definition. It is held together or unified only by the clear
idea of the laws in accordance with which its perspective images follow one another.
(1894/1971b, 507)

The idea of the material form “plays the role of a concept” in that it
… comprehends under itself an infinite number of particular intuitions following one
another in time, all of which can be derived from it just as the generic concept ‘table’ in
turn comprehends within itself all particular tables and expresses their common characters.
((1857-67), as quoted in Friedman (1997, 31)).

Like an image in Kant’s classification space, the idea of the material form occupies a
place in structure under which is organized a potentially infinite number of places, the
first level down being occupied by a potentially infinite number of perspectival images,
the second level down, presumably, being occupied again by a potentially infinite number
of less comprehensive images, and so on. Unlike Kant’s classification space, however,
this structure is organized at an unconscious level.
This potential space of all images reconciles Helmholtz’s view that when it is
taken to be an adequate representation, an image represents causal structure with his
claim that it also represents a “cause”:
If we have fully investigated some regularity, have established its conditions completely
and with certainty and, at the same time, with complete generality, so that for all possible
subsequent cases the effect is unequivocally determined – and if we have therefore arrived
at the conviction that the law is true and will continue to hold true at all times and in all
cases – then we recognize it as something existing independently of our ideas, and we label
it a cause, or that which underlies or lies behind the changes taking place. (Note that the
meaning I give to the word cause and its application are both exactly specified, although in
ordinary language the word is also variously used to mean antecedent or motive.)
(1878/1971a, 387)

Our “conviction that the law is true” is our belief that certain repeated regularities
investigated are repeatable, grounded in our belief that our perceptions are uniform. With
this conviction we take the image to be an adequate representation. That it represents a
“cause” is not a shortcoming in Helmholtz’s exposition of his views as some have
suggested.103 He recognizes that, organized under the regulative idea causality, images
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are like sensations in that kinds of images can stand in a lawful succession that is a more
general image. See Figure 2.1:

focus imaginarius
(correlated to regulative schema causality)

“original image”

Idea of the Material Form

Mind
Nature

Perspectival Image A

Perspectival Image B

Hypothetical Cause

Figure 2.1: Helmholtz’s Potential Space of All Images

We thus see how Helmholtz’s philosophical system is based on adopting a view of the
structure of imagination analogous to that of Kant.
From Helmholtz’s potential space of all images can we specify a potential logical
space as we did in Kant? The obvious contender is the subspace of ideas of the material
form since it is a figurative space whose points are unities of objects.

But I am

disinclined to characterize this subspace as a logical space. Although the images may be
mathematizable, the organizational structure would have been regarded as merely logical.
More significantly, it does not bear any relation to a conception of self. Helmholtz’s
potential space of all images may be similar to Kant’s potential classification space, but
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this omission of Kant’s transcendental self is no oversight.

In adopting Müller’s

principle, Helmholtz wants to replace Kant’s top-down synthesis of images under the
transcendental unity of apperception with a bottom-up theory of pre-conscious image
formation under a tacit belief in the uniformity of perceptions that, giving rise to the
regulative idea causality, induces a structure of imagination.
Let us now shift to the conscious level of concepts. Belief in the uniformity of
regularity – and the regulative idea causality it gives rise to – is a condition for the
possibility of “conceptual understanding”, i.e., “the method by which the world is
submitted to our thoughts, facts are ordered, and the future predicted” (Helmholtz
1878/1971, 390). This is the Kantian element of Helmholtz’s system. Without our
experience of repeated regularity “our conscious activities would cease” (Ibid.) and
without our belief that repeated regularities are repeatable, the conscious activity we did
have would not involve conceptual understanding:
Every inductive inference is based upon the belief that some given relation, previously
observed to be regular or uniform, will continue to hold in all cases which may be
observed. In effect, every inductive inference is based upon a belief in the lawful regularity
of everything that happens. This uniformity or lawful regularity, however, is also the
condition of conceptual understanding. Thus belief in uniformity or lawful regularity is at
the same time belief in the possibility of understanding natural phenomena conceptually. If
we assume that this comprehension or understanding of natural phenomena can be achieved
– that is, if we believe that we shall be able to discern something fundamental and
unchanging which is the cause of the changes we observe – then we accept a regulative
principle in our thinking. It is called the law of causality, and it expresses our belief in the
complete comprehensibility of the world. (Ibid., 389-390)

“To comprehend … means to form concepts” (1894/1971b, 517), and so belief in the
uniformity of perception is also a condition for the possibility of concept formation.
Helmholtz rejects the following account of concept formation presented by
traditional logic:
First we combine objects which are the same in some respect to form a class. Then we
specify the set of characteristics that will be used to distinguish the objects in the class; this
is usually called the definition of the class. Giving a definition, therefore, consists in
specifying the complex of properties which are necessarily present in all members of a
class. (1894/1971a, 518)

Without more, empirical concepts would only specify properties “necessary and sufficient
to form the definition, to delimit the class, and to fix the name” giving rise to
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tautologically necessary propositions (e.g., “mammals are animals born alive and suckled
by their mothers”) (Ibid.).

Following Mill,104 he adds that concepts also have

“connotations” present to all members grouped under the concept, supporting universal
statements that can be used in syllogistic inference (e.g. “all mammals are warmblooded”) (Ibid.). Still, he retains a Kantian view of concept formation from the univocal
interpretation of images:
The term thought should rightly be applied only to those combinations of ideas for which a
person is able to formulate explicitly the individual propositions from which inferences105
are drawn, to verify their reliability, and finally to connect them consciously in making
inferences. (1894/1971a, 506)106

As suggested in the last clause, empirical concepts formed this way are connected in
virtue of connections among the interpreted images. One might say that at the level of
consciousness Helmholtz’s potential space of all images manifests as a potential space of
causal reasons: i.e., a potentially infinite space of interconnected “places”, each of which
is occupied by a concept and described by a major premise of a syllogistic inference that
instantiates the regulative schema of causality, conveying a notion of justification relative
to network of causal inferences.
Compared to his potential space of all images, Helmholtz’s potential space of
causal reasons has a number of distinguishing features.

The first is that it has

significantly less structure. Helmholtz recognizes that
[l]anguage is much too poor for the exact description of the many sense impressions which
even a single object, especially one of somewhat irregular or complicated form, affords the
eye and the hand. To describe such impressions in words, moreover, would be an
enormously lengthy, time-consuming occupation – one which we obviously need not carry
out if we have had the intuition-image of the object impressed upon us. Where this has
been done, as well as in cases where no verbal description is possible, the sense
impressions without any verbal expression are quite sufficient. (1894/1971b, 503)

Another feature is that it is an idealization: “natural bodies [never] in fact correspond
exactly to the abstract conception we have obtained of them by induction” (1870/1971,
263). A third characteristic is that the principle of causality plays an expanded role. At
the pre-conceptual or unconscious level, the principle functions as a heuristic whereby we
seek out and test invariant sense impressions through involuntary bodily activity. At the
conceptual level the principle also functions this way, but in relation to experimental

81
activity. Moreover, it impels us to “seek and, if possible, find still more inclusive laws
under which many more individual circumstances are comprehended” (Helmholtz
1894/1971a, 528).

In other words, it also serves as a standard of conceptual

understanding: we take our comprehension to be defective so long as “places” in the
potential space of causal reasons remain “unoccupied”. Notwithstanding the differences
between these two spaces, the heuristic impulse associated with both is explained through
the patterning of their structure on a convex mirror, one that draws both imagination and
comprehension towards unity.

2.24 Science
Because the heuristic function of the principle of causality occurs at both
conscious and the pre-conscious levels, Helmholtz regards the process of arriving at laws
in physical sciences through the method of deliberately contrived experimental
interposition to be similar to the process of arriving at intuitive images by means of
everyday bodily action. This is implicit from the following passage:
Of the greatest importance, finally, for the fixity of our conviction in the correctness of our
sensory perceptions are the tests that we undertake by means of the optional motions of our
body. There thereby arises the same kind of fixed conviction, relative to merely passive
observation, that we gain in scientific investigations through the experimental method. The
proper ultimate ground, through which all our consciously executed inductions receive the
power of conviction, is the law of causality. ((1857-67, 29) as quoted in (Friedman 1997,
32))

Because the principle of causality also functions at the conscious level as a standard of
conceptual understanding, “[t]he goal of the physical sciences is to comprehend natural
phenomena” (1894/1971a, 517).
In order to accomplish this goal,
… we seek in general to determine what changes occur, what external influences and
causes must exist in order for these changes to take place, and what must exist in order to
prevent these changes. To comprehend these processes of change which we observe
among the objects in the external world, we must carry out in the physical sciences a
procedure completely analogous to the procedure of concept formation with respect to
natural forms. (Helmholtz 1894/1971a, 520)
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Concept formation with respect to natural forms observed in natural sciences such as
zoology and botany is the one mentioned above in which we “seek to include classes of
bodies under concepts and to look for their connotations” (Ibid.). But there the task “is to
describe static conditions” (Ibid.). In the physical sciences the task is “a description of
the processes we actually perceive” (Ibid., 521).
This is really the same conceptual task; only the form of the linguistic product is different.
We can give linguistic expression to a class encompassing the conditions and course of
some process of change only in the form of a natural law. For example, “two ponderable
bodies which are at a finite distance from each other in space undergo an acceleration, each
in the direction of the other” – that is, they move with increasing velocities towards each
other. … Our task, in other words, is to form classes of changes or processes such that, in
addition to the observed invariant relation which corresponds to the definition of the
concept, there are other regular processes analogous to the connotations of the concept. …
[W]e can express all regularities in the processes of nature as laws, each with its specific
factual content. To do this, we have only to state precisely the conditions under which a
specific phenomenon takes place and then specify exactly how the process will continue.
(Ibid., 520-521)

In Helmholtz’s example the law of gravitational acceleration arises from the concept
gravity, and the concept is formed from 1) the conditions of “two ponderable bodies” and
“finite distance from each other in space”; and 2) the invariant relation of changes in the
position of these bodies.
Helmholtz’s point is that in the physical sciences concept formation is not merely
a univocal interpretation of an image serving as the major premise of a certain
unconscious inference that instantiates the regulative schema causality; rather, it is a
univocal interpretation of the inference itself. For this reason a concept in the physical
sciences is not static like the concept of an object. The concept of an object is formed
from an image that implies another image from a given image. By contrast, a concept in
the physical sciences is formed from the interpretation of all images functioning as the
condition, the consequent and the major premise that connects the two. As we shall see,
Hertz takes these as a single image.
Before turning to Hertz, a brief examination of Helmholtz’s linguistic account of
force is in order.
As a rule, in the linguistic formulation of a law we deviate from the formulation of natural
laws just indicated in that we form abstractions, and indeed introduce verba substantia. For
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example, we express the first of the [law of gravity] by stating that between any two
material bodies at a finite distance from each other in space there exists a continuous force
of attraction of a certain magnitude. Instead of the simple description of the phenomenon
of movement, we introduce an abstraction – the force of attraction. (1894/1971a, 521)

We inject this “empty abstraction” (Ibid.) into the descriptive formulation of physical
laws when “we recognize a law as a power analogous to our will” (Helmholtz 1878/1971,
387).

And since “the abstractions material object and force cannot be separated”

(Helmholtz 1894/1971a, 524), the concept force is inseparable from the concept cause.
Helmholtz summarizes:
A law, considered as an objective power, we call force. Cause, according to its original
meaning, is the unchanging existent (that is, matter) which lies behind the changes of
phenomena; the law of its effects is force. The impossibility … of conceiving of these in
isolation from each other thus follows simply from the fact that the law of an effect
presupposes certain conditions under which it is realized. A force separated from matter
would be the objectification of a law which lacked the conditions for its realization.
(Appendix (written 1881) to 1847/1971, 50)

The point is that the regulative idea causality accounts, not only for the hypothetical
concept cause, but also for the “hypothetical substantive” (Helmholtz 1894/1971a, 524)
that is the concept force.107 Helmholtz asserts that as long as we do not take the latter as
denoting “a real thing having independent existence” (Ibid., 525) its use is legitimate, for
“[o]nly by using this mode of expression can we state that a law which we have
discovered is always ready to operate and may show its power at any moment” (Ibid.).
With Helmholtz’s adaptation of Kant’s transcendental law of causality the
groundwork was laid for an epistemological tradition in Germany beginning with Hertz
where “[a]ll of our ideas and concepts are … inner thought-pictures or, when uttered,
combinations of sounds” and the Bildtheorie view that “science is only an inner picture, a
thought-construction” in virtue of a “thought schema”.108

2.3 Hertz
Helmholtz was Hertz’s scientific and philosophical mentor; Hertz was
undoubtedly Helmholtz’s most famous student. However, Hertz’s own experimental
findings and philosophical reflections led him to abandon the notion of force in

84
electrodynamics (Heidelberger 1998, 20). The Principles of Mechanics (1900/1956)109 is
Hertz’s attempt to integrate electrodynamic theory with a general theory of mechanics
that takes effects of forces to be effects of a mechanical medium comprised of rigidly
connected systems of hidden masses in fast cyclical motion.
Published a few months after Hertz’s death in 1894, the Principles is a work of
physics in its own right. Yet its author did not consider its import to be its contribution to
science: “What I hope is new, and to this alone I attach value, is the arrangement and
collocation of the whole – the logical or philosophical aspect of the matter” (Pref., iv).
Indeed, its intellectual influence is mainly to be found in its lengthy introduction, which
presents a novel image theory of scientific representation. It is here that an important link
between Kant and Wittgenstein is forged.110

2.31 “Images of a Riotous Imagination”
The place to start is Hertz’s return to a central motivation of Kant’s critical
project. Hertz’s ultimate philosophical concern is the effect our imaginative grasp of
scientific theories has on our images of external objects:
We see a piece of iron resting upon a table, and we accordingly imagine that no causes of
motion – no forces – are there present. Physics, which is based upon the mechanics
considered here and necessarily determined by this basis, teaches us otherwise. Through
the force of gravitation, every atom of the iron is attracted by every other atom in the
universe. But every atom of the iron is magnetic, and is thus connected by fresh forces
with every other magnetic atom in the universe. Again, bodies in the universe contain
electricity in motion, and this latter exerts further complicated forces which attract every
atom of the iron. In so far as the parts of the iron themselves contain electricity, we have
fresh forces to take into consideration; and in addition to these again various kinds of
molecular forces. Some of these forces are not small; if only a part of these forces were
effective, this part would tear the iron to pieces. But, in fact, all the forces are so adjusted
amongst each other that the effect of the whole lot is zero; that in spite of a thousand
existing causes of motion, no motion takes place; that the iron remains at rest. Now if we
place these conceptions before unprejudiced persons, who will believe us? Whom shall we
convince that we are speaking of actual things, not images of a riotous imagination? (13)

Hertz is expressing concern over how the concept force constitutes our images of things,
and the goal of the Principles is to subdue what is evidently a “riotous imagination”. As
we saw in the last chapter, the goal of Kant’s Critique can also be understood (in part) as
an effort to discipline the imagination. The understanding, Kant says, must “think”
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thereby “setting bounds” to the “revelry” of the imagination”, rather than “daydream” by
indulging it. His description of unbridled imagination presages that of Hertz:
The understanding begins all this very innocently and chastely. First it puts in order the
elementary cognitions that dwell in it prior to all experience but must nonetheless have
their application in experience. Gradually, it removes these constraints, and what is to
hinder it from doing so, since the understanding has quite freely taken its principles from
within itself? And now reference is made first to newly invented forces in nature, soon
thereafter to beings outside nature, in a word, to a world for the furnishing of which
building materials cannot fail us, since they are abundantly supplied through fertile
invention, and though not indeed confirmed by experience, are also never refuted by it.
(italics added, (Ak. IV: 317))

The essential difference between the two projects is that for Kant the imagination is
focused synthetically through constitutive concepts that give rise to transcendental and
pure sensible schemata, whereas for Hertz the imagination is moderated through an
appropriate choice of constitutive fundamental ideas (and principles connecting them),
the idea force not being one of them.
Hertz rejects Helmholtz’s conception of force not only by rejecting the
transcendental law of causality, but by more or less ignoring Müller’s principle and
Helmholtz’s account of physiological intuition. As a result, Hertz forsakes Helmholtz’s
invocation of hypothetical causes of sensations and perceptions, his notion of unconscious
inferences and his empirical account of the origin of the axioms of arithmetic and
geometry. He falls back onto Kant’s forms of intuition:
[Time] is the time of our internal intuition. It is therefore a quantity such that the variations
of the other quantities under consideration may be regarded as dependant upon its variation;
whereas in itself it is always an independent variable.
[Space] is space as we conceive it. It is therefore the space of Euclid’s geometry, with all
the properties which this geometry ascribes to it. It is immaterial to us whether these
properties are regarded as being given by the laws of our internal intuition, or as
consequences of thought which necessarily follow from arbitrary definitions.111 (45)

In keeping with Helmholtz, however, it is important to recognize Hertz continues to reject
Kant’s notion of formal intuition, i.e., the combination of the manifold as determined by
pure concepts of the understanding. As a result, forms of intuition do not apply to
experience through Kant’s a priori synthetic imagination. Instead, they are said to be
interpreted through conventional “laws of transformation” (§302) that connect them with
a metric.112 So interpreted, they become “symbols for objects of external experience in
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that we settle by what sensible perceptions we intend to determine definite times [and]
space-quantities” (§297). As interpreted symbols, forms of intuition are “fundamental
ideas” (4) that “become parts of our images of external objects” (§302), i.e., they are
constitutive of our images of external objects.
It is worth emphasizing that by “external objects” Hertz means “mind-independent
objects” not “spatial objects”. Apart from a conventional law of transformation, space
(and time) “are in no sense capable of being made the subjects of our experience” (§297).
A law of transformation associates these conceptions with “external experience, i.e.
concrete sensations and perceptions” (Ibid.). Here “external” has the sense of “given”.
Following Helmholtz, Hertz is taking concrete sensations and perceptions to be given to
us through a relation to things-in-themselves (though not the sign-cause relation his
mentor hypothesized). It is through a law of transformation connecting internal intuitions
of space and time with given sensations and perceptions that the former become
constitutive of our internal images of external things-in-themselves.
While the fundamental ideas of space and time arise from a priori forms of
intuition, other fundamental ideas such as that of mass, force and energy arise from a
priori definitions.

Interpreted through laws of transformation they too become

constitutive of our internal images of external things-in-themselves. Accordingly, we
always have “the possibility of modifying and improving our images” (2) through our
choice of such definitions. The Principles argues that all conventional fundamental ideas
except for a certain interpreted definition of mass typify a riotous imagination.

2.32 Images and Models
Notwithstanding his return to a central motivation of Kant’s critical project –
disciplining the imagination – Hertz incorporates adaptations introduced by Helmholtz.
He begins his introduction to the Principles with a statement Helmholtz could have
written:
The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious
knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that
we may arrange our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation. (1)
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This problem is solved when consciousness, relying upon our knowledge of past events
“obtained by chance observation” or “by prearranged experiment”, infers future events on
the basis of our images of external objects:
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form which we give
them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images
of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured. In order that this requirement
may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought.
Experience teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied, and hence that such a
conformity does in fact exist. (Ibid.)

Although Müller’s principle does not enter Hertz’s system, Hertz admits that images are
“built up” from “the results of experience” (3), which, as already noted, are external
concrete sensations and perceptions.113
Although it is generally recognized that Hertz owes his notion of an “image of
things” (4) to Helmholtz,114 the basis of the connection remains obscure. This because
there is confusion over what a Hertzian image is.

If one were to take Hertz as

distinguishing “image” from “form”, the previous passage seems to suggest images are
the conditions and consequents of a logical inference along the lines of Helmholtz’s
signs.115 Alternatively, one might interpret Hertz as claiming “the relations between
images of objects are images of relations between objects” (Leroux 2001, 192),
suggesting there are not two but three related images: the condition, the consequent and
their relation. Another option, one van Fraassen (2008, 196) suggests, is to say it is a
single image evolving logically from initial conditions to a final consequent.
Van Fraassen’s interpretation of the Hertzian image as a logical process is the
most natural reading of the passage. Furthermore, since Hertz is worried about how
fundamental ideas from physical science constitute our images of things, it is not
surprising he would begin with Helmholtz’s notion of a physical concept. As already
discussed in the last section, such a concept has the form of a logical inference, and arises
from the interpretation of images that serve as a major premise, a minor premise, and
conclusion. Since Hertz does not provide an account of concept formation but simply
takes it that “images are … our conceptions of things” (1), it would be natural for him to
adopt the notion of an image as having the logical form of Helmholtz’s physical concept.
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However, for Hertz the form of logical inference is not inductive but deductive.116
This shift in logic accommodates Hertz’s view that not only are images “built-up” from
experience, they are “built-down” from fundamental ideas, i.e., internal intuitions and a
priori definitions interpreted by laws of transformation. Fundamental ideas are symbols
constitutive of internal images, making them “symbols for external objects of
experience”117 and, since they are also concepts it seems, “the symbolic language” of
experience (§302).118 A Hertzian symbol of an external object should not be confused
with a Helmholtzian sign of an objective cause: it is not a signal transmitting information
from the external cause, but (like a Helmholtzian image) a representation of things-inthemselves.
Hertz appears to incorporate Helmholtz’s theory of representation as a theory of
symbolic adequacy: as an adequate symbol for an external object, an image is taken to be
similar to it. The similarity is not one of causal structure, however, but one of logical
structure. Thus Helmholtz’s theory of representation commits Hertz to a form of modal
realism where an external object is taken to have the form of a syllogistic logical
inference (cf. §428). Hertz adds that our epistemic access to things-in-themselves is
limited to this shared structure:
With the things themselves [our conceptions of things] are in conformity in one important
respect, namely, in satisfying the above-mentioned requirement. For our purpose it is not
necessary that they should be in conformity with the things in any other respect whatever.
As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our
conceptions of things are in conformity with them in any other than this one fundamental
respect. (1-2)

In light of the conventionality of Hertz’s constitutive approach to image formation,
however, it would be a mistake to equate “conformity” in this passage as a relation of
isomorphism between the representation and the represented.
The reason is that Hertz also tells us that in our attempt to form a lawful image of
the universe, our images of things (e.g., a piece of iron) must take on more structure (e.g.,
atoms subject to gravitational forces) than revealed in experience:
If we try to understand the motions of bodies around us, and to refer them to simple and
clear rules, paying attention only to what can be directly observed, our attempt will in
general fail. We soon become aware that the totality of things visible and tangible do not
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form a universe conformable to law, in which the same results always follow from the same
conditions. We become convinced that the manifold of the actual universe must be greater
than the manifold of the universe which is directly revealed to us by our senses. If we wish
to obtain an image of the universe we which shall be well-rounded, complete, and
conformable to law, we have to presuppose, behind the things we see, other invisible things
– to imagine confederates concealed beyond the limits of our senses. (25)

It is precisely because we can choose different presuppositions that “[v]arious images of
the same objects are possible” (2), and that our efforts to create a lawful image of the
universe should be evaluated in relation to their constitutive effect upon our images of
external objects.

Accordingly, “conformity” in relation to Hertz’s fundamental

requirement should be understood only as isomorphism of real logical structure to a part
of an image, or embedding. Hertz exemplifies what we would today call a species of
epistemic structural realism: through the empirical (logical) substructure of our images,
all we know about the external world is its empirical (logical) structure.
But Hertz’s epistemology is even more subtle than this. We access the structure
things through properties of “essential relations” (2) of our images taken to “represent
observable relations of things” (italics added, 9). This is to say that essential relations
represent not merely repeated regularities, but repeatable ones. Yet Hertz also admits
Hume’s problem of induction:

representational or symbolic adequacy is always

defeasible with “later and riper experience” (3). This feature of Hertz’s epistemology is
puzzling to many commentators.119

But what he seems to want is to balance a

constitutive account of image formation built upon properties and relations delivered
through experience with a theory of representation that takes the representational relation
to be one of structural similarity. The problem is that Hume shows that the empirical
elements of images (actual senses and perceptions) deliver only indefinite structure, i.e.,
properties of properties and relations for which there is always the possibility of
divergence. And so the deliverances of experience permit us at any given time to
constitute images having a definite empirical structure, i.e., properties of universal
properties and relations not subject to the possibility of divergence, through common
forms of intuitions and a priori definitions that apply to possible senses and perceptions
(cf.§302). The effect of adopting Helmholtz’s theory of representation is that this definite
empirical structure is projected onto reality as the form of an external object. None of
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this precludes experience from informing us at a later date that our projection was
premature.
Helmholtz had grounded a similar projection of images in our belief in the
uniformity of perceptions as a condition for the possibility of conceptual understanding.
In rejecting Helmholtz’s regulative idea causality, however, it seems Hertz is denying this
belief (he never mentions it). Without more this leaves Hertz’s claim of the conformity
between our images and external objects unexplained. However, Hertz expresses the
logical form of an image as an idealized mathematical structure, and, as discussed later,
suggests that it is shared mathematical structure between mind and nature that provides
this explanation, a remark picked up and developed by Wittgenstein.
Given the contemporary orientation that takes logic and mathematics to be
intimately related, it is not uncommon for commentators to overlook Hertz’s important
distinction between the “physical content of the image” and the “mathematical form in
which it [is] represented” (29).120 It must be remembered that the intellectual milieu of
the Principles continued to be dominated by Kant’s view that logic and mathematics
involve different types of reasoning. For Hertz the physical content of an image takes on
the form of a syllogistic logical inference. When this inference is expressed in an ideal
mathematical form, the physical content of an image is represented by a “model” (1). We
can think of the image as “encased” within the model. See figure 2.2:

Model

Model

Image (t1)

Image (t2)

Mind
Nature
Figure 2.2: Relationship between Mathematical Model and Logical Image
(The top arrow stands for the logical evolution of the image expressed mathematically in the model; the downward
arrows stand for the projection of logical structure as the form of an external object.)
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Hertz realizes that encasing an image within a model is necessary to enhance the
predictive power of its logical form because syllogistic logic cannot capture the notion of
infinity implicit in Hertz’s forms of intuition and explicit in his definition of mass (3).121
This is suggested at the two places in the introduction to the Principles where Hertz talks
of models. The first occurs at the outset:
When from our accumulated previous experience we have once succeeded in deducing
images of the desired nature, we can then in a short time develop by means of them, as by
means of models, the consequences which in the external world only arise in a
comparatively long time, or as the result of our own interposition. We are thus enabled to
be in advance of the facts, and to decide as to present affairs in accordance with the insight
so obtained. (1)

In this passage Hertz tells us that from images of things we have “succeeded in deducing”
we “then in a short time develop by means of them” models capable of making complex
predictions over extended periods of time or through experimentation. A number of
pages later Hertz adds that his statements concerning mathematical form “refer without
exception to concrete images of space as perceived by our senses”, that they “represent
possible experiences” and that they can be “confirmed by direct experiments, viz., by
measurements made with models” (30). Together the implication seems to be that a
model is a representation of the physical content of an image that mathematically
expresses its logical form, enabling sophisticated and detailed quantitative prediction.
Indeed, as we shall see Hertz is of the view that the physical content of an image can be
represented by any number of mathematical forms chosen as a matter of convenience.

2.33 Scientific Representation and its Mathematical Form
Hertz does not distinguish among images of things. What is usually overlooked,
however, is that he makes a distinction between images of things and a “general image”
(5).122 This distinction arises through Hertz’s notion of a “scientific representation” (2). It
appears that a scientific theory is a system of equations: “Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s
system of equations” (Hertz 1893/1962, 21) and in the case of mechanics it is Lagrange’s
equations of the first form (D'Agostino 1998, 91). A scientific representation, on the
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other hand, is a physical interpretation of these equations though a set of fundamental
ideas connected by a set of fundamental principles (4).

A scientific representation

presents two things: 1) a “first system of principles” (5); and 2) a general image – what I
will call a scientific image.

Hertz claims that because a first system of principles

“satisfies the requirement that the whole of mechanics can be developed from it by purely
deductive reasoning without any further appeal to experience”, a scientific representation
presents “the simplest image which physics can produce of things in the sensible world
and the processes which occur in it” (4).
Because a scientific representation involves fundamental ideas derived from
Kantian forms of internal intuition, the scientific image it presents must be taken to
constitute our images of things. But because a scientific image also involves interpreted
conventional elements, a plurality of scientific images is possible, the theory being their
“minimum denominator” (D'Agostino 1998, 90).

As Hertz famously says, “we can

choose as we please” “the cut and color” of the “gay garment which we use to clothe” a
theory with “our powers of imagination” (1893/1962, 28), and “we can thus obtain
various images of things”. These choices are not mere academic exercises, for it is
through our choice of scientific representation that we have “the possibility of modifying
and improving our images”.
What, exactly, is Hertz’s scientific image? If an image of an external object is a
syllogistic inference, then a “general” and “simple” image is a general and simple
syllogistic inference. This is to say that the scientific image is a logical schema that
presents principles of mechanics. This explains why Hertz “sketches” scientific images
through “general outlines” each of which provides a “general plan” according to which a
scientific representation is arranged (15, 26). This characterization of the scientific image
is consistent with a view of the Principles put forth by Boltzmann (1905/1960) who
understood it as presenting “an inner, mental picture” (249) or “thought schema” (251252). More significantly, it is in accord with the account of mechanics afforded by
Wittgenstein (1921/1961) who, mentioning Hertz (6.361), saw it generally as an attempt
to construct true pictures “according to a single plan” (6.343).
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As I understand Hertz, his notion of a scientific representation is a substitute for
Helmholtz’s regulative idea causality. Recall that a regulative idea has the form of a
logical schema that presents a regulative principle. Hertz’s scientific representation,
which is a set of fundamental ideas connected by fundamental principles, has the form of
a logical schema that presents the principles of mechanics. Unlike Helmholtz for whom
the major premise of the logical schema is an original image, however, Hertz takes the
logical schema as the original image, i.e., as the “general” yet “simple” scientific image.
Indeed, Hertz’s scientific image has at least two important attributes of Helmholtz’s
original image. In the Helmholtzian system the original image is an ideal of cognitive
activity. In the Hertzian system our choice of a scientific representation, and therefore
our choice of the scientific image it presents, is also an ideal of activity. But it is not an
ideal of cognitive activity. Nor is it an ideal of scientific activity (that aims only to suit
“practical applications or the needs of mankind” (40)).

Rather, it is an ideal of

philosophical activity that aims to reconstruct any scientific representation that develops
in order to perfect it:123 “[w]e cannot attain to perfection in any direction” (33), but “we
should endeavour to show [logical clearness] by a representation so perfect that there
should no longer be any possibility of doubting it” (9).124 Second, in the Helmholtzian
system the concept of an original image is an idealization of our images in virtue of
abstraction and induction. In the Hertzian system where concept and image are the same
a scientific image is an idealization in virtue of the laws of transformation that interpret
fundamental ideas (§290-300) and the fundamental principles connecting them (cf.
§315f.).125
If a scientific image is a logical schema that presents the principles of mechanics,
then deductions from these principles would correspond to our images of things.126 This
is to say that the scientific image constitutes images of external objects not only through
interpreted forms of internal intuition and a priori definitions, but through the
instantiation of a logical schema.

Hertz’s notion of a scientific representation can

therefore be thought of as organizing a potential space of all images of things similar to
what we saw in Helmholtz, though in this case having a deductive logical structure and
occurring at level of consciousness.
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This

helps

us

to understand

Hertz’s

frequently overlooked two-step

characterization of the evaluation of a scientific representation. The first step involves
appraising the fundamental

ideas

and

fundamental

principles

for “scientific

completeness” (8): “We require of [a scientific representation] that it should lead us to a
clear conception of what properties are to be ascribed to the images for the sake of
permissibility, what for correctness, and what for appropriateness” (2). In particular, it
must plainly show that: 1) “What enters into the images, in order that they may be
permissible, is given by the nature of our mind”; 2) “What enters into images for the sake
of correctness is contained in the results of experience, from which images are built up”;
and 3) “What is ascribed to the images for the sake of appropriateness is contained in the
notations, definitions, abbreviations, and, in short, all that we can arbitrarily add or take
away” (3).
The second step involves evaluating the scientific representation by assessing the
images of things it constitutes. There are three criteria. Of “greatest importance” (33) is
that images of things must be “permissible” in accordance with “the laws of our thought”
(2), which is to say “not only must its characteristics be consistent amongst themselves,
but they must not contradict the characteristics of other images already established in our
knowledge” (23). These laws of thought are “the laws of the internal intuition” and
“logical forms” (§1), the latter being for Hertz patterns of syllogistic inferences. Whether
this criterion is met is a “yes or no” question and its answer holds “for all time” (3).
The second criterion is Hertz’s fundamental requirement mentioned already “that
the consequents of the images must be the images of the consequents”: images of things
must be “correct” in that their “essential relations” that “represent observable relations of
things” do not “contradict the relations of external things” (2). As mentioned already,
meeting the criteria does not entail that an image is unique, for the necessity of
introducing relations concerning what is unobservable means that various images of the
same objects are possible. Moreover, although meeting this criterion is a “yes or no”
question, a “yes” answer is defeasible.127 Defeasibility means that an image correct by
the strict deliverances of experience may not be a true one vis a vis its essential relations.
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The third criterion is that images of things must be the “most appropriate” images
in that they are more “distinct” than other images satisfying the first two criteria by
picturing “more of the essential relations of the object”. The most appropriate images,
moreover, are “simpler” than other equally distinct images in that they contain “the
smaller number of superfluous or empty relations” (2).

These empty relations

unavoidably enter our images because images are, in addition to products of experience,
products of the mind. Whether the criterion is met is not a “yes or no” question, but one
answered “only by gradually testing many images” (3) and comparing them with each
other.
As I understand Hertz, a scientific representation that meets these standards of
evaluation is accepted as symbolically adequate, and the images it constitutes are
accepted as adequate symbols of external objects. As adequate symbols, images are taken
to be similar to reality. This similarity relation involves projecting the empirical structure
of an image onto reality and taking the projected structure to be the logical form of an
external object. But since it is a projection precisely because it goes beyond the strict
deliverances of experience, symbolic adequacy of images is always defeasible by later
experience. We will see something remarkably similar to this view of scientific
representation in the case of van Fraassen.
Hertz’s notion of a scientific representation is that of a physical interpretation of a
set of equations (a theory) through a general and simple image that both constitutes and
logically organizes images of things. In addition, he informally “outlines” (cf. 26 and 33)
the “mathematical form” (29) of the image. Since the image is a logical schema, the
mathematical form is a mathematical schema. In saying that “[t]he physical content of
the image is quite independent of the mathematical form” that represents it, Hertz does
not purport to establish an integration of mathematics with logic. To the contrary, he only
requires that the physical content and mathematical form of the scientific image “are so
suited that they mutually assist one another” (29). Mathematical form assists the physical
content of the scientific image by not suggesting fundamental concepts that would work
against the symbolic adequacy of the scientific representation;128 the physical content of
the scientific image assists the mathematical form through an appropriate choice of
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definitions.129 But for this criterion, Hertz implies that choice of mathematical form is
entirely a matter of convenience.

2.34 Hertz’s Scientific Representation
After assessing images of things constituted by the scientific representations of
Newtonian-Laplacian mechanics (the fundamental ideas of space, time, mass and force
connected via Newton’s laws of motion and d’Alembert’s principle) (4) and energetics
(the fundamental ideas of space, time, mass and energy connected via a principle of
energy transformation such as Hamilton’s principle), Hertz rejects these scientific
representations for reasons of permissibility and appropriateness. Seeking to rid himself
of the “oppressive feeling” that comes with “obscure and unintelligible” (33) scientific
images, he purports instead to “sharply delineate” (39) a complete scientific
representation (the fundamental ideas of space, time and mass connected by a
fundamental law) that presents a scientific image meeting his criteria for representational
adequacy.
To the fundamental ideas of space and time that arise from our forms of intuition,
Hertz adds the a priori fundamental idea mass. This definition has two notions at play:
“material particle” and “material point”. A material particle is “a characteristic by which
we associate without ambiguity a given point in space at a given time with a given point
in space at any other time”. It is, in other words, a property of a space-time location by
which it can be counted.130

Although a material particle is “invariable” and

“indestructible” its mass is infinitely small. The mass of any space volume, on the other
hand, is the ratio formed by the number of material particles of the space to the number of
material particles of some reference space. When the volume is conceived as an infinitely
small space, mass is called a “material point”.131

“A number of material points

considered simultaneously is called a system of material points” and its mass is the sum
of the masses of the separate points (§3-§8). “A system of material points which is
subject to no other than continuous connections is called a material system” (§121).
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In virtue of a conventional law of transformation that stipulates that the mass of a
tangible, i.e., observable, body is determined by weighing,132 the a priori definition of
mass is transformed into a fundamental idea symbolic of external objects and thereby
constitutive of our images of things:
The mass of a tangible body as determined by this [law of transformation] possesses the
properties attributed to the ideally defined mass. That is to say, it can be conceived [i.e.,
imagined] as split up into any number of equal parts, each of which is indestructible and
unchangeable and capable of being employed as a mark to refer, without ambiguity, a point
of space at one time to a point of space at any other time” (§300).

If intangible, i.e., unobservable, bodies are presumed to be part of these images, their
mass can “only be determined by hypothesis” through “properties which are consistent
with the properties of the ideally defined mass” (§301).
At this point in the Principles a non-idealized image of things becomes a
“material system”: “By a material system is henceforth understood a system of concrete
masses, whose properties are not inconsistent with the properties of the ideally defined
material system (§121)” (§305). By inference Hertz then introduces the term “natural
material system” (Ibid.), which I understand to mean nature as if it were a material
system.133 If material systems are taken as adequate symbols of external objects, we are
committed to the ontological position that there are relations constituting natural material
systems having properties isomorphic to the properties of the essential relations of the
material system (cf. §306).

This projection of empirical structure onto nature also

involves an extension of our “mode of conception” where we imagine these relations to
be among unobservable masses or “confederates concealed beyond the limits of our
senses” (25).
Hertz identifies essential relations by first specifying essential relations between
the various pairs of ideas. In the case of space and time these relations are the subject of
kinematics common to all scientific representations. Although there are no essential
relations among the ideas of mass and time,
[e]xperience teaches us that between mass and space there exists a series of important
relations. For we find certainly purely spatial connections between the masses of nature:
from the very beginning onwards through all time, and therefore independently of time,
certain positions and certain changes of position are prescribed and associated as possible
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for these masses, and all others as impossible. Respecting these connections we can also
assert generally that they only apply to the relative position of the masses amongst
themselves; and further that they satisfy certain conditions of continuity, which find their
mathematical expression in the fact that the connections themselves can always be
represented by homogeneous linear equations between the first differentials of the
magnitudes by which the positions of the masses are denoted. (27)

(To say experience “teaches” us this can be misleading. This passage must be read
alongside Hertz’s admission that the impossibility of certain connections is speculative:
“permissible connections are defined solely by continuity” and the proposition of natura
non facit saltus is “of the nature of a tentatively accepted hypothesis” (37).) More
specifically, experience teaches certain spatial connections are constant:
Suppose we find in any way that the distance between two material particles remains
constant at all times and under all circumstances. We can express this fact without making
use of any other conceptions than those of space; and the value of the fact stated, as a fact,
for the purpose of foreseeing future experience and for all other purposes, will be
independent of any explanation of it which we may or may not possess. (34)

What Hertz must mean by “fact” is similar to what Helmholtz meant by “fact of
perception”: experience teaches us there are constant spatial connections, but in the
deductive constitutive (vs. Helmholtz’s inductive regulative) process of image formation
we amplify these observed relations to observable ones. At this point they have the
definite property of being “fixed” or “rigid”.
Next, Hertz identifies the essential relation between the three ideas of time, space
and mass to be the “fundamental law”: “Every natural motion of an independent material
system consists herein, that the system follows with uniform velocity one of its straightest
paths” (27).134 Although this law is “the probable outcome of most general experience”
having only the status a “hypothesis” (§315), in the constitutive process in which we form
images of external objects the law is taken to introduce definite empirical structure.
Together the fundamental ideas of time, space and mass and the fundamental law
give rise to a scientific representation. This scientific representation presents both a
scientific image (logical schema) and first principles of mechanics. The scientific image
is an idealized image of “an all-pervading medium whose smallest parts are subjected to
rigid connections” (41), one along the lines of Kelvin who “in his theory of vortex atoms
… endeavoured to present an image of the universe in accordance with this conception”
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(26).135 This general mechanistic world-view constitutes images of external objects as
systems of rigidly connected masses in motion (§323). But it presents only a single
principle of mechanics – the fundamental law: “[t]he aggregate of inferences … drawn
from the fundamental law forms the content of mechanics” (§311). The appeal of this
scientific representation is that in our images of external objects inferred through the
fundamental law the effects of continuous cyclical motion account for the effects of
causes: “[i]n any new system of bodies which conforms to the fundamental law there is
neither any new motion nor any cause of new motion, but only the continuance of the
previous motion in a given simple manner” (§320).

It is only for the sake of

mathematical convenience that force enters “as a middle term conceived only between
two motions” where “the motion of the first body determines a force, and … this force
then determines the motion of the second body” (28). Hertz’s scientific representation
thus purports to eliminate our conceptions of cause and force by disciplining our
imagination to form images of external objects in continuous motion.
Following his two-step evaluative process, Hertz claims his scientific
representation is superior to those of Newtonian-Laplacian mechanics and energetics. For
one thing it is complete. It shows that laws of thought comprising laws of intuition and
logical forms are “given by the nature of our mind” and enter “into the images, in order
that they may be permissible”. It also shows that rigid connections and a certain inertial
motion are “contained in the results of experience, from which images are built up” and
enter “into images for the sake of correctness”. And it shows that mass and laws of
transformation are arbitrary “notations, definitions, abbreviations” that are “ascribed to
the images for the sake of appropriateness”.

For another thing its scientific image

constitutes images of things that are permissible and correct, as well as more appropriate
than those constituted by the other scientific images. Yet in light of its conventional
elements and speculative hypotheses Hertz is forced to acknowledge that his scientific
image is “not the only image of mechanics, nor yet the best image”, that he “only sought
to find an intelligible image and to show by an example that this is possible and what it
must look like” (33).
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Hertz’s scientific representation logically organizes the images of external objects
it constitutes through a potential space of images. But just as we saw with Helmholtz,
characterizing this space or any part of it as a logical space (as Wittgenstein uses the
term) is not justified. There is no obvious relation to the self. And although it is
mathematizable, the space is not mathematical – it requires the addition of a specific
mathematical form. To this form we shall now turn our attention.

2.35 Models
Hertz presents a mathematical form for his scientific image, one admired by
successors, in particular Lorenz, as a development in its own right (Lutzen 1994, 106).
Its key feature is that, rather than the motion of a single point in three-dimensional space
it considers the motion of a system of rigidly connected material points in multidimensional coordinate system, i.e., “[a] system of n points presents a 3n-manifold of
motion, – although this may be reduced to any arbitrary number by the connections of the
system”, that shares “many analogies with the geometry of the space of many
dimensions” (Hertz 1900/1956, 30). Although this is “the origin of the modern geometric
treatments of mechanics” (Lutzen 1994, 120), the idea did not arise ex nihilo. It is largely
indebted to the development of multi-dimensional geometry by Cayley, Grassmann and
Riemann that had preoccupied Helmholtz, as well as the preliminary extension of
geometry to mechanics by Lipschitz and Darboux (Ibid., 112-118). More generally, it is a
precursor to the modern concept of phase or state space, an idea which had been
fermenting within the intellectual milieu and which developed fully a few years later.136
Hertz did not consider his mathematical form to be a univocal expression of the
logical form of his scientific image. He chose it for reasons of convenience, i.e., for 1) its
“great simplicity and brevity”; 2) its ability to present the fundamental law in a way that
does not suggest conceptions that could impede the overall attempt to improve our images
of things, and; 3) the fact that it “gives a simple and intelligible explanation of …
analogies” “between ordinary mechanics and the geometry of space of many dimensions”
(31-33).
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Still, Hertz thinks the analogy to multi-dimensional geometry is only a formal one,
for unlike the “supra-sensible abstractions” (32) of the latter his mathematical form
represents the physical content of his scientific image. His idea is that inasmuch as his
scientific image constitutes images of things, its mathematical form constitutes models
that “encase” them by expressing their logical form. This hierarchical relation between
model and image is implicit in the following definition:
418. Definition. A material system is said to be a dynamical model of a second system
when the connections of the first can be expressed by such coordinates as to satisfy the
following conditions:
(1) That the number of coordinates of the first system is equal to the number of the second.
(2) That with a suitable arrangement of the coordinates for both systems the same
equations of condition exist.137
(3) That by this arrangement of the coordinates the expression for the magnitude of a
displacement agrees in both systems.
Any two of the coordinates so related to one another in the two systems are called
corresponding coordinates. Corresponding positions, displacements, etc., are those
positions, displacements, etc., in the two systems which involve similar values of the
corresponding coordinates and their changes.
419. Corollary 1. If one system is a model of a second, then, conversely, the second is also
a model of the first. If two systems are models of a third system, then each of these
systems is also a model of the other. The model of the model of a system is also a model of
the original system. All systems which are models of one another are said to be
dynamically similar.

(Note that equations of conditions of two systems will share the same number of
independent variables138 or dimensions, a point picked up by early Wittgenstein.) It must
be remembered that this definition occurs after §305 where Hertz says that “material
system” is to be understood going forward as “a system of concrete masses, whose
properties are not inconsistent with the properties of the ideally defined material system
(§121)”. In the context of this definition, therefore, “material system” is to be understood
as the image of an external object. The equations of conditions, on the other hand, tell us
that a dynamical model is an idealization.139 Hertz even says that a dynamical model can
be an abstraction from a material system.140 It seems to me, therefore, that the basic point
of this definition is to introduce a mathematical representation of the physical content of a
material system that can enhance the predictive power of its logical form.
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The corollary to the definition has the effect of encasing projected natural material
systems within what might be called “natural dynamical models”. Hertz makes this fairly
explicit in the following observation:
427. Observation 1. If we admit generally and without limitation that hypothetical masses
(§301) can exist in nature in addition to those which can be directly determined by the
balance [i.e., by weighing], then it is impossible to carry our knowledge of the connections
of natural systems further than specifying models of the actual systems. We can, then, in
fact, have no knowledge as to whether the systems which we consider in mechanics agree
in any other respect with the actual systems of nature which we intend to consider, than in
this alone, – that the one set of systems are models of the other. (italics added)

Using the language of idealized models, this observation captures what Hertz says at the
outset of his introduction using the language of concrete images: “As a matter of fact, we
do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of things are
in conformity with them in any other than this one fundamental [requirement]”: “the
consequents of the images must be the images of the consequents” (2). However, Lutzen
(2005) claims the observation is meaningless. Given that the whole idea of the image
theory is to allow for a plurality of images of nature, “it makes no immediate sense to
claim that the external world is an image of our mental image” (109). But this ignores the
conditional admission that unobservable masses, arrived at by extending our mode of
imagination from observable masses, can exist in nature. This is not to claim that reality
is an image; it is only to project an image onto reality. Through idealization the image
projected and the projection itself can each be represented by a dynamical model. If all
we can know about an external object is that it has a logical structure isomorphic to the
empirical structure of our image of it, then given this projection and idealized
representation all we can know about an external object is that it has a mathematical
structure isomorphic to our dynamical model of it.
This helps us make sense of the important observation that immediately follows:
428: Observation 2. The relation of a dynamical model to the system of which it is
regarded as the model, is precisely the same as the relation of the images which our mind
forms of things to the things themselves. For if we regard the condition of the model as the
representation of the condition of the system, then the consequents of this representation,
which according to the laws of this representation must appear, are also the representation
of the consequents which must proceed from the original object according to the laws of
this original object. The agreement between mind and nature may therefore be likened to
the agreement between two systems which are models of one another, and we can even
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account for this agreement by assuming that the mind is capable of making actual
dynamical models of things, and of working with them. (italics added §428)

In this observation Hertz speculates about why there is “the agreement between mind and
nature” or why there is “the conformity between nature and our thought” (2). Since by
his own definition a model represents another model representing it, Hertz analogizes the
agreement between mind and nature to the relation between two such models. But if we
now presuppose “that the mind is capable of making actual dynamical models of things,
and of working with them” then by definition there are models in nature representing
these models. This presupposition allows Hertz to go beyond the analogy to explain the
conformity between mind and nature in terms of shared structure. But notice that the
presupposition is only that the mind can make or construct dynamical models of things.
The explanation, then, is that the mind is a form from which dynamical models are
constructed, i.e., a mathematical schema, and that nature is a real form out of which
natural dynamical models actualize. See Figure 2.3:

Mathematical schema / Scientific image
(logical schema)

Dynamical models /
Images of things
Mind
Nature
Dynamical models

Real form
Figure 2.3 Explanation of Conformity between Thought and Reality
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Since dynamical models express logical form, this explanation allows Hertz to account
for his theory of representation where taking an image of an external object to be
symbolically adequate involves projecting empirical (logical) structure onto nature and
committing to its existence. Hertz’s idea of a mathematical schema sharing the structure
of real form out of which models are constructed that (in virtue of expressing a logical
schema) logically organizes a potential space of all models is, I suggest, the intellectual
precursor to Wittgenstein’s idea logical space.

2.4 Conclusion: Shifting Mirrors
I shall conclude this chapter with a summary of the developments in the
organization of images that Helmholtz and Hertz introduce leading to Wittgenstein’s idea
of logical space.

Helmholtz’s physiological investigations led him to reject Kant’s

notions of pure intuition and synthetic imagination. He nonetheless retained the notion of
causality as a pure concept, replacing its transcendental schema with a regulative one
presenting a transcendental law of causality. As a result, Kant’s potential space of
classification was transformed into a potential space of causal reasons, each place
occupied by a concept formed in the interpretation of an image and described by the
major premise of an inference that instantiates the regulative schema.

At the pre-

conscious level, the regulative idea causality organizes a much larger potential space of
all images, each place being occupied by an image impressed into memory through
repeated regularity of kinds of sense impressions. Each image functions as the major
premise of a syllogistic inference that instantiates the regulative schema. Functioning as
the major premise of the logical schema itself is an original image, an ideal of our
investigative acts.
In his criticism of the notion of force, Hertz replaces Helmholtz’s regulative idea
causality (and its principle of causality) with fundamental ideas connected by a
fundamental law, what he calls a scientific representation. Yet, he maintains Helmholtz’s
view of a concept in the physical sciences as a syllogistic inference and, in equating
conceiving and imagining, takes an image of a thing to be a deductive inference. As a
result, Hertz correlates Helmholtz’s original image with the logical schema of his
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scientific representation. Not only does the scientific representation organize a potential
space of all images, it constitutes them through interpreted forms of internal intuition and
an a priori definition. For reasons to do with predictive convenience, Hertz introduces the
form of a multi-dimensional coordinate system that can express his scientific image, and
from this mathematical schema dynamical models are said to be constructed that can
express the syllogistic form of images of things. In turn these mathematical models are
organized logically according to the organizational structure of these images. In order to
explain the predictive conformity between thought and reality, Hertz speculates that mind
and nature share the same (logico) mathematical structure: the former a thought
schema;141 the latter real form.
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Chapter 3: From Model to Mysticism
(The thought forces itself upon one): The thing seen sub
specie aeternitatis is the thing seen together with the whole of
logical space.
Notebooks (1914-1916/1961, 7.10.16; 83)

3.1 Introduction
The term “logical space” enters philosophy with neither definition nor elaboration
in a few terse propositions found within Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
The period of time between Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics (1900/1956) and
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1921/1961)142 is marked by the development of polyadic logic
in Frege and Russell’s attempt to reduce mathematics to logic.

The Tractatus is

motivated by Wittgenstein’s puzzlement over the nature of this new logic given the
problems which its founders encountered. A strange and brilliant philosophical work, it
was written during Wittgenstein’s service in the Austrian army in World War I and first
published in 1921 with the help of Russell.

Notwithstanding its influence in the

development of logical empiricism and philosophy of science in general, many would
agree that the Tractatus “may well be the most difficult philosophical book written this
century” (Coffa 1991, 142).
At least part of the difficulty with the Tractatus lies in the fact that, despite his
admission to having made “no claim to novelty in detail” (pref. 3),143 Wittgenstein was
apparently reluctant to credit influences for his claim to novelty in general.144 He does
express a debt to Frege and Russell, but only for the “stimulation” (Ibid.) of his thoughts.
With little else to go on, the general tendency in the commentary has been to situate the
Tractatus mainly in the analytic tradition, approaching it as an extension of the logical
considerations of Frege and Russell within a general philosophical movement to separate
semantics from epistemology.145 For many readers, however, this way of accessing the
book is not very satisfying. “Part of the Tractatus’s fascination lies in its elusive unity”
(Glock 1996, 365). Through a relatively small number of propositions it proffers “the
final solution” (pref. 5) to the problems of philosophy.

These include problems of
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solipsism, realism, ethics, aesthetics, and mysticism that give rise to what most consider
to be the book’s most intractable claims.
As a result, philosophers have looked to influences other than Frege and Russell
for insight. Two of them are Hertz and Schopenhauer. Hertz is mentioned at two points
in the Tractatus (4.04, 6.361), and references to scientific “pictures of reality” appear in
Wittgenstein’s writing as early as 1913.146 The substantial affect Hertz’s Principles had
on Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning is now routinely acknowledged.147
Unfortunately, Schopenhauer is not mentioned in the Tractatus, but he is referred to at
one point in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks (1961a, 2.8.16; 79). As a result, the extent of
Schopenhauer’s influence has come to be appreciated only relatively recently.
Commentators who examine the influences of Hertz and Schopenhauer consider them
separately, but the real significance of their influence upon the Tractatus becomes clear
only when we consider them together.
In this chapter I elucidate the Tractatus around the idea of logical space as an
autonomous development of Schopenhauer’s conception of the transcendental self and
Hertz’s speculation about a (logico) mathematical thought schema that shares the form of
reality. After exegesis of relevant propositions, I demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s idea of
logical space is his notion of the self, one that traces to Schopenhauer’s transcendental
self as will. I argue that this self has a perspectival relation to the world, shifting
timelessly from a potential whole of logical space associated with “pure realism” to a
completed whole of logical space associated with solipsism that has the structure of a
concave mirror of reality. As the former, logical space is a development of Hertz’s idea
of a thought schema; as the latter, logical space is a development of Kant’s spherical
structure of the imagination. I justify my interpretation of logical space by extricating
Wittgenstein’s propositions concerning solipsism, realism, ethics, aesthetics and
mysticism and bringing them seamlessly together with his picture theory of meaning.

3.2 The “Whole Sense” of the Tractatus
In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein describes its central thesis:
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The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason
why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The
whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at
all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.
Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit [Grenze] to thought, or rather – not to
thought but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought,
we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e., we should have to be able to
think what cannot be thought).
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the
other side of the limit will be nonsense. (pref. 3)

The “whole sense” of the book is captured more precisely by the following claims: 1)
“What can be shown cannot be said” (4.1212); 2) what can be said can be said only by
“means” (2.22) of what can be shown; and 3) what is said without means of what can be
shown is nonsense. As I understand Wittgenstein, 1) what can be shown is logical space;
2) what can be said is a picture in logical space; and 3) the completed “whole of logical
space” (3.42) circumscribes the Grenze (“limit” or “bound”148) we run up against in the
expression of our thoughts.
The point to recognize is that the whole sense of the Tractatus is said without
means of what can be shown. Unlike the propositions of natural science (4.11), the
propositions of the Tractatus are not pictures in logical space. Accordingly, Wittgenstein
asserts at the end of the book that anyone who understands the propositions of the
Tractatus “recognizes them as nonsensical” (6.54). But then any prefatory summary of
its whole sense is nonsensical as well. Yet Wittgenstein still claims that “the truth of the
thoughts that are communicated” are “unassailable and definitive” (pref. 5), and so there
is a sense in which it has “sense” after all. To grasp the whole sense of the Tractatus, I
suggest, is to recognize the coherent method behind its apparent madness.
The place to begin is with the phrase “whole sense” itself. Given the picture
theory of meaning that the Tractatus presents, prima facie a summary of the whole sense
of the Tractatus is a summary of a picture. “Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit
… to the expression of thought”. To draw this limit is not to present a picture in logical
space, however, but to present a picture of logical space. Notice the equivocation in the
use of the word “picture” this generates. The first use of “picture” is in accord with its
use in the Tractatus: a picture in logical space is a meaningful representation of reality.
The second use of “picture”, however, is along the lines of our use of “model” in formal
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semantics: a picture of logical space is an imaginative structure that interprets or satisfies
the propositions of the Tractatus. Obviously such an interpretation does not make the
propositions of the Tractatus meaningful representations of reality. They are, strictly
speaking, nonsense.

But it does give them a “sense” by which Wittgenstein can

communicate to the reader a way to realize something of value.
What this chapter will show is that the method of the Tractatus is to take the
reader along a journey of self-discovery of her existential relation to the world. The
journey involves shifting the vantage point from which the reader orients her self to the
world as logical space. Prior to proposition 6.4, the picture of logical space that satisfies
the propositions of the Tractatus can represented along the lines of Figure 3.1:

Self as complete form of all possible worlds
•
representational
o form (can be shown)
o content (can be said)
nonsense

Actual world
•
as represented (can be said; truth)

Figure 3.1: “Whole Sense” of the Tractatus prior to Proposition 6.4

Here logical space is a completed space of all possible worlds serving as the outer
boundary of the actual world that is its own inner boundary. The outer boundary is the
self of solipsism expressing itself imaginatively in representational thought. Like a great
spherical concave mirror that surrounds the world, it reflects the world towards a focus
imaginarius at its centre. This picture is not intended to convey information about the
actual world, but only a “sense” of our representational relation to it in order to
understand the logic of language and eliminate philosophical problems.
However, the goal of the Tractatus is not logical; rather “the book’s point is an
ethical one”.149 At proposition 6.4 there is a shift to aesthetics (6.41), ethics (6.42-6.43)
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and mysticism (6.44). After proposition 6.4 the picture of logical space that satisfies the
propositions of the Tractatus can represented along the lines of Figure 3.2:

Self as potential form of all possible worlds
•
non-representational
•
can only be shown
nonsense

Actual world
•
unrepresented (ineffable feeling; truth)

Figure 3.2: “Whole sense” of the Tractatus after Proposition 6.4

Here logical space is a potential space of all possible worlds serving as the inner limit at
the centre of the actual world that is its own outer boundary. The inner limit is the self of
pure realism willingly ceasing to express itself imaginatively in representational thought.
From this vantage of the world the self exists together with reality as a form of
potentiality. Again, this picture is not intended to convey information about the actual
world, but only a “sense” of our existential relation to it.
When Wittgenstein tells us at proposition 6.54 that his own propositions are
nonsensical, we realize that the ethical goal of the Tractatus is something only the reader
can do. The Tractatus has led the reader to a sort of precipice where she must willingly
discard the Tractatus along with all propositional thought in order for her self to
experience existential truth. The aim of the Tractatus, that is, is to bring about a feeling of
our existential relation to reality that is the basis of all representational truth, that is truth.
To understand the Tractatus is thus to “transcend” it and “see the world aright” (6.54)
through an act of self that experiences existence as ineffably mystical.
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3.3 “Reality”, “World” and “Exist”
The Tractatus begins with our representational relation to reality and moves us
towards our existential relation to it. In the process, it presents a picture of logical space
in which the self shifts from outer boundary to inner limit of the world. This is not to say
that one can conflate “reality” with “world”. Reality is both “form and content” (2.025).
“Form is the possibility of structure” (2.033); content is the presence together with the
absence of actual structure.

Real content is the actualization of the potentiality

determined by real form.
The content of reality given to us as the “totality of facts” (1.1) is the world. A
“fact” is “the existence of states of affairs” (2.01). Since what is actual determines what
is not actual, “[t]he totality of existing states of affairs also determines the states of affairs
that do not exist” (2.05). What might be called an elementary fact is the existence of a
single state of affairs.150 Elementary states of affairs are independent of one another:
“[f]rom the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the
existence or non-existence of another” (2.062).

Hence the world is the totality of

independent elementary states of affairs.
This leads us to Wittgenstein’s use of the term “exist”. In general there appear to
be two kinds of existence: real existence and representational existence. For each there is
existence that pertains to content and existence that pertains to form. In the case of real
existence in relation to content, a state of affairs that obtains is said to exist because it “is
a combination of objects (things)” (2.01). In an existing state of affairs there are “simple
objects” (2.02) that “fit into one another like links of a chain” (2.03) producing “material
properties” (2.0231).

Note that though “[i]n a state of affairs objects stand in a

determinate relation to one another” (2.031), a state of affairs is not “anything third that
connects the links”.151
In addition to content, real existence pertains to form.

Simple objects are

substantive: “Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is
changing and stable” (2.0271). And they have an essence: “the possibility of the states of
affairs must be written into the thing itself” (2.012). This is to say a simple object has
“internal properties” in contrast with the “external properties” produced through its
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configuration with other objects (2.01231). These internal properties constitute the form
that determines the potentiality of simple objects to combine with one another. Insofar as
a simple object is part of an actual configuration of simple objects, its internal properties
are said to “exist” (2.0121). But Wittgenstein also says, “What I once called ‘objects’,
simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible nonexistence; i.e., that for which there is neither existence nor non-existence”.152 What he
seems to be saying is that insofar as a simple object is not part of an actual configuration
of simple objects, its internal properties neither “exist” nor do not “exist”. (We shall see
why he might say this when we examine his argument for simple objects.)
Representational elements configure to form a “picture”. Just like states of affairs,
“[a] picture is a fact” (2.141). Wittgenstein attributes “existence” to this fact (3.4) even
though it represents only “a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs”
(2.201). What might be called an elementary picture is an elementary configuration of
representational elements. A central claim of the Tractatus is that the existence or nonexistence of an elementary picture is independent of the existence or non-existence of any
other elementary picture. In virtue of internal properties of its elements, pictures have a
“pictorial form” (2.15), an essence to which Wittgenstein also attributes “existence”
(5.131). (Later I will elaborate upon this notion of existence in relation to the existence of
the self.)

3.4 Elementary Pictures, Propositions and Logical Spaces
With this understanding of “reality”, “world” and “exist”, let us turn to
Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic use of “picture”.

For Wittgenstein “picture” and

“proposition” are interchangeable. A proposition is a picture:
4.01
A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we
imagine it.
4.016 In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider
hieroglyphic script, which depicts the facts that it describes. And alphabetic script
developed out of it without losing what was essential to depiction.

And a picture is a proposition:
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When I wrote ‘A proposition is a logical picture of a fact’ I meant that I could insert a
picture, literally a drawing, into a proposition and then go on with my proposition. I could
accordingly use a picture in the same way as a proposition. How is that possible? The
answer is, just because both agree in a certain respect, and what they have in common is
what I call a picture. (December 9, 1931, as recorded by Waismann (1979, 185))

Note that Wittgenstein conceives a picture more generally as a mathematical extension of
a drawn picture:
Here the expression ‘picture’ is already taken in an extended sense. I have inherited this
concept of a picture from two sides: first from a drawn picture, second from the picture of
a mathematician, which already is a general concept. For a mathematician talks of
picturing in cases where a painter would no longer use this expression. (December 9, 1931,
as recorded by Waismann (1979, 185))

What appears to underwrite the commonality between a picture and a proposition is that a
mental element corresponding to reality is taken to correspond to an individual element in
each of them:
I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such
constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again, the kind of relation of the
constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of
psychology to find out. … [A thought consists] of psychical constituents that have the same
sort of relation to reality as words. (Wittgenstein 1961a-130)

In virtue of the relation between mental elements and reality, a proposition (expressive
thought) and a picture (what can be understood as an “expressive image”) are both the
same model of reality. A model is thus mental, and what is common between a picture
and a proposition is the form that imaginative thought shares with reality.153 This form is
their “common logical pattern” and presents a rule or “law of projection” (4.0141).
Driving Wittgenstein seems to be the intuition that just as geometrical analysis (or, more
generally, analysis in the physical sciences) reveals elements of pictures, logical analysis
will reveal the elements of propositions (4.221), and these analyses are essentially the
same because psychological analysis will reveal common elements of imaginative
thought relating to reality as the basis of both sorts of representational elements.
It is important to recognize that Wittgenstein does not share Hertz’s concern to
discipline the imagination in our choice of a scientific image, nor is he hamstrung by
monadic logic. Wanting more generally to understand the nature of the new polyadic
logic Frege and Russell developed, Wittgenstein brings into his notion of a picture a
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general feature from each of the Hertzian image and dynamical model. Although he does
not take a picture mechanistically to be a material system of rigidly connected material
points, it seems Wittgenstein does conceive the content of a picture to be a point or a
collection of points simpliciter.154

And while he rejects a notion of a model as a

convenient mathematical form to express the logical form of an image, Wittgenstein
adopts the form of a multi-dimensional coordinate system as part of the form of a picture.
The form of a Wittgensteinian picture is not exclusively mathematical, however.
“Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture is,
for example, a spatial one.)” (2.182). What makes a picture logical is not that it has the
form of a syllogistic inference, but that it is constructed through the iterative operation of
a “general propositional form” (4.5).

This iterative operation also makes a picture

mathematical (6.02f)155 and, moreover, occurs within a multi-dimensional coordinate
system of sensible properties. Together the general propositional form and the coordinate
system constitute a picture’s “logico-pictorial” (2.2) form or “pictorial form” (2.15) for
short. In the case of an elementary picture we might call this form an elementary logical
space. The remaining part of this section will focus on an elementary coordinate system,
leaving the general propositional form for the section that follows.
To understand this aspect of the form of the Wittgensteinian picture we need to
bring together a few more propositions:
2.12

A picture is a model of reality.

2.2

A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.

2.201
A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and nonexistence of states of affairs.
2.202

A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.

2.203

A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.

4.04
In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the
situation that it represents. The two must possess the same logical (mathematical
multiplicity). (Compare Hertz’s Mechanics on dynamical models.)

As the last proposition tells us, a central connection to Hertz is found in the notion of
multiplicity.

In general, Wittgenstein conceives “multiplicity” to be the number of
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independent measurements needed to specify a configuration of elements.156 In its two
related sentences, proposition 4.04 captures this notion in subtly different ways. The
sense of multiplicity in the second sentence is one where “a particular mathematical
multiplicity” is equivalent to “a particular number of dimensions” (5.475). This signifies
the adoption of Hertz’s implicit view found in his definition of a dynamical model that a
model represents only if what it is represented shares the same number of dimensions. To
understand how this sense of multiplicity is related to the number of “distinguishable
parts” in the first sentence of proposition 4.04, we must first recognize how propositions
2.202 and 2.203 capture pictorial form from two points of view.
We can think of a picture as “representing a possible situation in logical space”, in
which case the number of independent measurements needed to specify the picture simply
refers to the number of dimensions of the coordinate space. But we can also think of a
picture as “containing the possibility of the situation it represents” in which case the
number of independent measurements needed to specify the picture refers to the number
of “distinguishable parts” in a picture that constitute its essence (cf. 3.34). Since “part” of
a picture is a representational element, and since a part is “distinguishable” if it has
unique internal properties (2.0233f), the number of independent measurements needed to
specify a picture comes down to the number of different kinds of representational
elements in the picture. The two points of view are equivalent: a picture in logical space
displays the internal properties in a picture. Proposition 4.04 amounts to the claim that
the number of different kinds of representational elements that configure into a picture
must be the same as the number of different kinds of simple objects that configure into
the state of affairs pictured.157 That this can only be shown (cf. 4.041) is captured by a
picture in logical space that displays this shared essence by means of the dimensionality
of the space.
As I understand Wittgenstein, what such a display amounts to can be illustrated
using a simple mirror. Imagine two different kinds of simple objects (i.e., simple objects
that have distinguishable internal properties) that “fit into one another like links of a
chain”. Imagine further that the real existence of this state of affairs is reflected as
“speck” of light in an otherwise dark mirror. Now suppose two yardsticks make up the
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left and bottom edges of the mirror. If we take the left edge of the mirror as the y axis and
the bottom edge as the x axis, the speck of light is a point of reflection of the mirrorsurface, say point x = 2, y = 3.
representational elements.

This point is an elementary configuration of

The coordinate value x = 2 constitutes one link of the

configuration, while the coordinate value y = 3 constitutes the other link.158 The form of
the representational element x = 2 is expressed (in part) by coordinate axis y since it can
combine with any object represented by any value of the y axis; the form of
representational element y = 3 is expressed (in part) by coordinate axis x since it can
combine with any object represented by any value of the x axis. We could do away with
the mirror and think of these coordinate values as having essences that constitute the
essence of point x = 2, y = 3. But the mirror is a space of a kind of possibility that
“displays” (2.172) pictorial form by expressing the essences of its representational
elements, without which we cannot imagine them at all.
In displaying the essential form of its representational elements, the mirror also
shows the essential form of the two linked objects it reflects. The value x = 2 corresponds
to one simple object, while the value y = 3 corresponds to the other. This is why, I
suggest, Wittgenstein gave “three knocks” and “6 feet” as examples of simple objects.159
The mirror expresses the potential of each object to combine with the other kind of object
as a complete two-dimensional space of possibility. Thus the mirror is also a space that
represents a kind of real possibility: “[a] picture can picture any reality whose form it
has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc.”
(2.171) But proposition 4.04 tells us that a picture can represent a configuration of simple
objects only if its dimensionality is equal to the number of different kinds of simple
objects that are linked together. And so even if the potential of the simple objects were
infinite so that the mirror displaying their form is infinitely large, shared multiplicity
between the representation and what is represented is nonetheless a bound of what can be
shown.
In this example, a two-dimensional coordinate system is the “means” (2.22) by
which a representational point “depicts” (2.201) the elementary configuration of simple
objects. The point x = 2, y = 3 on the mirror’s surface is an elementary picture that
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reflects an existing state of affairs. Not only does the state of affairs exist, however, so
does the point:
If a point in space does not exist, then its coordinates do not exist either, and if the
coordinates exist the point exists too. That is how it is in logic. (Wittgenstein 1961a,
21.6.15; 69)
3.032

It is impossible … to give the coordinates of point that does not exist

In other words, a point exists if it is the configuration of specific coordinate values;
specific coordinate values exist if they configure into a point.
For the sake of explanatory simplicity, I have used a mirror to illustrate an
elementary logical space in a way that may be misleading. One might be left with a
Helmholtzian “bottom-up” point of view that (like a mirror) a configuration of simple
objects gives rise to a picture in an elementary logical space, generating a representation
that is ipso facto true. The opposite is the case. More like Hertz’s “top-down” approach,
a picture is constructed in an imaginative act and compared with reality. The constructive
process is what Wittgenstein refers to as the “method of projection” involved in the
expression of thought: “[t]he method of projection is to think the sense of a proposition”
(3.11). It is the method by which the content of a picture is constructed in logical space
(cf. 3.12, 3.41). By means of the form of a multi-dimensional coordinate system, pictorial
content arises in the relation of “elements” (2.14), i.e., coordinate values, into a “nexus”
or “concatenation” (4.22) that is a “structure” (2.15). The way this structure arises is
expressed by a “law of projection” (cf. 4.0141).
Once constructed through the method of projection the picture has a “sense”
(2.221) or truth-possibility (4.3). It “presents a situation in logical space” (2.11) and
thereby presents its sense; it also “represents a possible [real] situation in logical space”
(2.202) and thereby “represents … its sense” (2.221). In this way a picture both “shows
how things stand if it is true” and “says that they do so stand” (4.022) serving as a vehicle
of information:
4.024
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. (One
can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.) It is understood by anyone
who understands its constituents.
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Even though a picture may not be true, as noted already its pictorial elements exist and,
moreover, have objects that correspond to them (2.13).
another, pictorial elements have no meaning.

Yet independent from one

Their meaning comes from their

configuration with other pictorial elements into a structure (3.3) when the sense of the
picture is thought.
In a picture “a situation is, as it were, constructed by way of experiment” (4.031)
to be compared with existing states of affairs. In making this comparison the picture is
“laid against reality like a measure” (2.1512). Through “feelers of the picture’s elements”
(2.1515), coordinate values are correlated with simple objects: “[o]nly the end-points of
the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be measured” (2.15121). In virtue
of these feelers a picture is a “tableau vivant” (4.0311) that “can be perceived by the
senses” (3.1). What is perceived by the senses are “material properties” “produced” “by
the configuration of objects” (2.0231). If the same configuration of objects obtains, the
picture is felt as “true”; if not, it is felt as “false” (2.21). A picture in its “projective
relation to the world” (3.12) is thus an “argument-place” (2.0131), and experience is the
measurement of its truth or falsity. A picture is meaningful precisely because it is an
attempt to measure the world in logical space (3.4).
It was indicated already that in this attempt each pictorial element of a
representational configuration must correspond to a simple object whose real
configuration is being assessed through the senses, otherwise it would not be the case that
“one can understand [a picture] … without knowing whether it is true a false”. But notice
that the possibility of such a correspondence must be prior to the construction of the
picture:
2.151
Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the
same way as the elements of the picture.
2.1511

That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.

Wittgenstein is saying is that prior to the construction of a picture, i.e. prior to the
projection of a configuration of mental elements common to both a proposition and a
picture, there is already shared form between mind and reality. Moreover, this shared
form is transcendental in character: it is a condition for the possibility of expressive
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imaginative thought. What will be established later is that the method of projection
presupposes that the “self” is “co-ordinated” (5.64) with reality.

Wittgenstein is not

specific about what he means by “coordination”, but implies that it pertains to shared
form displayed in logical space (cf. 3.42).160 It seems that it is in virtue of such prior
coordination that “feelers” from pictorial elements (coordinate values) will reach out and
“touch” only certain simple objects.
Wittgenstein’s radical development and generalization of Hertz’s image and
model was probably influenced by and through Boltzmann.161 As Janik and Toumin
(1993) summarize:
Boltzmann took Hertz’s account of mechanics as defining a system of “possible sequences
of observed events,” and made it the starting point for a general method of theoretical
analysis in physics itself. He did so by treating each independent property of a physical
system as defining a separate coordinate in a multi-dimensional system of geometrical
coordinates. (143)

Boltzmann’s method of physical analysis as an extension of geometrical analysis appears
to have had an impact on how Wittgenstein understood logical analysis:
Only when we analyze phenomena logically shall we know what form elementary
propositions have. Here is an area where there is no hypothesis. The logical structure of
elementary propositions need not have the slightest similarity with the logical structure of
propositions. Just think of the equations of physics – how tremendously complex their
structure is. Elementary propositions, too, will have this degree of complexity. (December
22, 1929, as recorded in Waismann (1979, 42)

(By “degree of complexity” Wittgenstein likely means multiplicity, since this is
determined by the number of independent variables in the equations of physics.) And in a
limited way Boltzmann’s idea that analysis can reveal different observable properties
corresponding to different dimensions of a form of representation seems to have
influenced Wittgenstein’s characterization of elementary logical spaces.
“Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects” (2.0251), and so
there are “spatial objects” and “temporal objects” (2.0121) and (presumably) “colour
objects” whose form is displayed in elementary logical spaces. In addition to space, time
and colour, Wittgenstein presents elementary logical spaces for sound and touch (2.0131)
even stomach-ache.162 Notice that all these spaces are associated with sensation, some of
which are private and not all of which are involved in the physical sciences. Moreover,
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notice there is no mention of spaces associated with measurable properties gathered
through instrumentation, such as temperature and pressure that occupied Boltzmann.
This suggests Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space has one foot in the Kantian tradition
exemplified by Helmholtz and Hertz that concerns itself primarily with representations in
relation to ordinary and unmediated sensation.163
As emphasized already, Wittgenstein takes the imaginative act of constructing a
picture to be a propositional act of expressive thought.

His account of elementary

propositions is thus a linguistic elaboration of this account of elementary pictures. An
elementary proposition “contains the form, but not the content, of its sense” (3.12-3.13),
i.e., it is not a mere “set of names” (3.142) introduced as a matter of convention (4.002),
but also an “essence” (4.013). In the method of projection the following arises: 1) the
names “stand in a determinate relation to one another” (3.14) forming a “nexus” (3.3) or
“concatenation” (4.22) constituting the content of sense, i.e., a “propositional sign” (3.12)
that is “perceptible” (3.11) and that stands in a “projective relation to the world” (3.12);
2) in virtue of feelers, “elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the
thought” (3.2f); 3) a simple object is the “meaning” of a name (3.203) (now a “simple
sign” (3.202) or “primitive sign” (3.26)); and 4) the propositional sign has “logical coordinates” (3.41) that “determines a place in logical space” (3.4). Logical is space thus
the means by which a proposition says “how things are, not what they are” (3.221).
Wittgenstein makes a direct appeal to the idea of logical space in his account of
the meaning of negated propositions. “The propositions ‘p’ and ‘~p’ have opposite sense,
but there corresponds to them one and the same reality” (4.0621). Yet the negation of an
elementary proposition is not an elementary proposition (4.211). Rather, negating a
proposition “determines a logical place different from that of the negated proposition” by
describing “it as lying outside the latter’s logical place” (4.0641).
Let us end this section with a careful examination of the relation between an
elementary logical space and reality. The form of a kind of object is displayed in an
elementary space:
2.013
Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I
can imagine as empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space.

121
2.0131
A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an
argument – place.) A speck in a visual field, though it need not be red, must have some
colour; it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects
of the sense of touch some degree of hardness, and so on.

It is not that each thing is in a “space of possible things”, but in a “space of possible states
of affairs”, i.e., a space of possible configured things. A coloured speck, a spatial point,
etc. are not things, but configurations of things:

“objects are colourless” (2.0232),

spaceless, etc. in that colour, position, etc. are material properties produced in
configuration of certain kinds of objects. And these configurations are represented as true
pictures by means of a kind of elementary logical space.
Since by definition a Hertzian model represents another model that represents it,
one might be inclined to take proposition 2.013 as saying that an imaginative logical
space represents a real logical space that, in turn, represents it. The proposition, “[t]he
facts in logical space are the world” (1.13) might be cited in support.164 Even if this were
the way Wittgenstein understood reality, the claims made in this chapter would still stand
with only minor qualifications. This interpretation, however, should be resisted for at
least three reasons. The “as it were” in proposition 2.013 suggests that a thing “in a space
of possible states of affairs” is simply a projection onto reality. In addition, while logical
space is associated with the method of projection in which the sense of a proposition is
thought, nowhere does Wittgenstein mention such a constructive process for reality. And
the third reason is that Wittgenstein seems only to be saying that an elementary logical
space of things is how we imagine the potentiality of reality:
2.0121
… Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or
temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from
the possibility of combining with others …

What proposition 2.013 is saying, I suggest, is that I can imagine an elementary space as
“empty” because I can imagine it without a picture in virtue of my prior coordination with
reality. That I cannot imagine a thing without the elementary space is because I cannot
imagine its essential properties apart from a space of possibility that displays them.
As I understand Wittgenstein, the method of projection involved in thinking the
sense of a proposition is a projection by virtue of displaying the form of reality in the
imagination and extending feelers from elements of the proposition to simple objects of a
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certain kind. While we might regard the picture as containing an essence (just as we
might regard a configuration of simple objects to be in real logical space), it is
nonetheless the case that we think a picture in logical space (just as the configuration of
simple objects contains an essence). It is the method of projecting or constructing a
picture in logical space that makes an imaginative thought an act of expression.

3.5 Molecular Logical Space
It would seem that elementary pictures in elementary logical spaces are connected
into composite pictures in combined logical spaces through the iterative operation of a
general propositional form. This form is represented by a generalized version of the
Sheffer stroke (cf. 5.1311) that takes elementary propositions as base, and connects them
into composite propositions through “a finite number of truth-operations” (5.32). It
applies even in the case of an elementary proposition, which “is a truth function of itself”
(5). It is a structural component, in addition to a multi-dimensional coordinate system,
constituting pictorial form that operates in the method of projection when the sense of a
proposition is thought.
The general propositional form has a number of interesting features. Like the
points it connects in the coordinate system, Wittgenstein attributes “existence” (4.5) to it.
As we shall see later on, this is related to the timelessness of its iterative operation: “[i]n
logic process and result are equivalent” (6.1261). The iterative operation of the general
propositional form presupposes a multi-dimensional coordinate system:
5.475
All that is required [for logical operations] is that we should construct a
system of signs with a particular number of dimensions – with a particular mathematical
multiplicity.

And the coordinate system (as mentioned already and discussed more fully below)
presupposes coordination between the self and reality. So when Wittgenstein denies that
“negation, logical sum, logical product, etc. … introduce more and more new elements –
in coordination” (3.42), we should take him to mean that the addition of structure to a
coordinate system by the general propositional form simply expresses the prior
coordination between the self and reality.
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With the general propositional form we understand why the Wittgensteinian
picture integrates certain features from the otherwise distinct Hertzian notions of an
image and model. Frege and Russell’s development of polyadic logic enabled logic to
express the infinity Kant thought necessary to relegate to forms of intuition, and so there
no longer remained a compelling reason to keep mathematics separate from logic. While
Kant had sought to distinguish mathematics from logic on the basis of temporal iterative
operations of the imagination, Wittgenstein brings them together with the atemporal
iterative operations of the general propositional form.165 His idea is that “[a] number is
the exponent of an operation” (6.021) and refers to a stage in the application of the
iterative operation to a base. Understood this way, “[m]athematics is a method of logic”
(6.234) shown to be an aspect of the general propositional form through the method of
projection. Having been projected in a finite number of operations, a picture is thus a
logico-mathematical integration presenting a certain number in logical space.
Following the terminology of a molecular proposition, let us call a composite
picture a molecular picture, the essence of which is displayed in a molecular logical
space.

Whether a molecular picture is true or false – i.e., whether it represents a

composite “fact” or “the existence of states of affairs” (2) – is a function of the truth of
the elementary pictures that constitute it. A truth-function specifies a set of “truthgrounds” that “determine a range that it leaves open to the facts” (4.463). A “place” in
molecular logical space shows the operation of the general propositional form as a truth
table, which in turn shows the sense of a molecular proposition through its truth
possibilities.
In the case of an elementary picture in elementary logical space, I maintain, a
place is a point. Since a molecular picture is a truth function of elementary pictures, a
molecular logical space is a truth function of elementary logical spaces. In the case of a
molecular picture, a conjunction say, composed from different kinds of elementary
pictures, a place would be single point in a composite molecular logical space (e.g., a
speck of red dust is a point in a molecular logical space combined from the elementary
logical spaces for colour and space). In the case of molecular picture composed from
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elementary pictures of the same kind, a place must be a truth-functional connection of a
set of points, i.e., a region, within the elementary logical space.
“My fundamental idea”, Wittgenstein says, “is that ‘logical constants’ are not
representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts” (4.0312).
Instead “[t]he propositions of logic are tautologies” (6.1), “analytic propositions” (6.11)
that reflect the “logical form” (4.12, 6.12) of simple objects and show how propositions
are interrelated.

They describe the truth-functional structure of logical space, what

Wittgenstein refers to as “scaffolding” in his claim that “scaffolding surrounding a
picture” (3.42) represents the “scaffolding of the world” (6.124). It should be clear by
now why he adds that these representations “presuppose that names have meaning and
that elementary propositions have sense; and that is their connection with the world”
(Ibid.):

not only does operation of the general propositional form presuppose prior

coordination between self and reality, it presupposes that its infusion of truth-functional
structure occur within the structure of a multi-dimensional coordinate system in a method
of projection.
That truth functional structure presupposes coordinate structure throws light on
Wittgenstein’s view of time, one worth canvassing as a development of Kant’s pure
sensible schema time and as a prelude to van Fraassen’s early view that time is a logical
space. As mentioned Wittgenstein took time to be the form of a kind of simple object.
Inasmuch as colour objects are “colourless”, temporal objects are be timeless. Since
timelessness is not infinite temporal duration, but the eternal present (6.4311), temporal
objects (in fact all simple objects) are sempiternalia.166 A measurable present must be
produced by a configuration of temporal objects, for it is the possibility of producing the
sensible property of time that sets objects apart as essentially “temporal”. Given that that
these temporal configurations are independent of each other, they are not ordered into
past or future; they are too are sempiternalia. Now one can surmise that the form of
temporal objects is displayed in an elementary one-dimensional logical space.

In

measuring a measurable present I construct a point in a one-dimensional line where
feelers correlate two coordinate values of the line to two temporal objects. That more
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than one coordinate value must be involved is implicit in this passage from Wittgenstein’s
Notebooks:
Having only one direction is a logical property of time.
For if one were to ask someone how he imagines having only one direction he would say:
Time would not be confined to one direction if an event could be repeated.
But the impossibility of an event’s being repeated, like that of a body’s being in two places
at once, is involved in the logical nature of the event. (Wittgenstein 1961a, 12.10.16; 84)

It seems Wittgenstein is saying that the direction of time expresses a structural property
shown in a one-dimensional coordinate system. This would be the case if an elementary
picture – a temporal point or instant – represented the configuration of two temporal
objects, for then a ‘<’ relation between two coordinate numbers would be the property of
any elementary picture. At the time of the Tractatus the idea seems to have been that
elementary temporal pictures are ordered in relation to one another in virtue of the ‘<’
relation between the two representational elements. So ordered, a temporal instant exists,
not as an eternal present, but as an immediate present in relation to a past and future
present.
The obvious problem is that if elementary temporal pictures are independent of
one another, there cannot be an a priori order among them either. A number of years later
Wittgenstein amended his approach, claiming that the entire elementary logical space,
rather than just the elementary picture, served as the “yardstick” that measured reality.
This allowed certain inferences to be made not based on tautological form.167 Laying
down the entire time-scale now meant that in each case there is only one state of affairs
that can exist as the immediate present, not several (simultaneous) ones. All this is, of
course, a blow to the claim that elementary propositions are independent, for only
elementary propositions of different kinds could now be said to be independent. Still it
reveals something telling about what Wittgenstein had in mind when he wrote the
Tractatus: in the method of projection elementary pictures are constructed in logical
space.
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3.6 The “Whole of Logical Space”
The idea of the “whole of logical space” (3.42, 4.463) is the idea of a general
logico-mathematical form of all possible worlds given Wittgenstein’s understanding of
“world”.

It is the general form of imaginative representation, the boundary of our

expressive thought:
3.02
A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is thought. What
is thinkable is possible too.
3.03
Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to
think illogically.
3.031
It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be
contrary to the laws of logic. – The truth is that we could not say what an ‘illogical’ world
would look like.

We cannot express what an illogical world would look like because the form in which we
express thoughts is the logical space of all possible worlds. The whole of logical space
accounts for the a priori character of logic:

“[w]hat makes logic a priori is the

impossibility of illogical thought” (5.4731). And (as we shall soon see) it accounts for its
transcendental character as well.
When Wittgenstein speaks of “the whole – the infinite whole – of logical space”
(4.463) he has in mind is a completed space of all possible pictures. The infinite whole of
logical space does not commit Wittgenstein to an infinite number of (distinguishable)
simple objects, and thus an infinite number of names with different meanings and
(equivalently) an infinite number of elementary propositions. Because he appears to be
agnostic about all three (4.2211, 5.5), it seems that he allows the possibility that more
than one representational element can refer to a simple object.168 What it does commit
him to is the view that the number of coordinate values of any dimension is a completed
infinity, one that displays the potentially infinite number of combinatorial possibilities
that constitutes the essence of a kind of simple object.
Wittgenstein asserts that “[t]he logical scaffolding surrounding a picture
determines logical space. The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical
space” (3.42). What he seems to have in mind can be illustrated with an elementary
proposition. That an elementary proposition is a truth function of itself “alludes to the
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fact that in the truth-table notation every elementary proposition is expressed as a truthfunction (conjunction) of itself and a tautology involving all other elementary
propositions (e.g. ‘p. (q v ~q), etc.’)” (Glock 1996, 141). In this sense “[i]f elementary
propositions are given, then at the same time all elementary propositions are given”
(5.524). But if all elementary propositions are given, then all elementary logical spaces
are given, and so too are molecular propositions and molecular logical spaces. This is
why Wittgenstein claims that “the whole of logical space must already be given by” “one
place in logical space” (3.42).169 In adding parenthetically that if it were otherwise
“negation, logical sum, logical product, etc., would introduce more and more new
elements – in coordination”, by “force of a proposition” Wittgenstein intends to capture a
realization of the prior coordination between the self and reality through the
determination of the whole of logical space. (As we will see, “force” refers to the wilful
power of self-projection as the whole of logical space.)
The force of a proposition in determining the whole of logical space is
underwritten by the timeless iterative operation of the general propositional form that
constructs an elementary proposition. But the operation constructs more than this. The
general propositional form is “[t]his is how things stand” (4.5) and alludes to the fact that
“[a] proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, so that one can
actually see from the proposition how everything stands logically if it is true” (4.023).
While a constructed proposition is “given” in the sense discussed last paragraph, it cannot
be the case that every “given” proposition is constructed, for then a proposition would not
only construct a possible world, but all possible worlds.

How “everything stands

logically if it is true” would be, trivially, how everything stands logically if any
proposition is true.

3.7 Logical Space and Objects
One may have the impression that Wittgenstein presents simple objects as a
metaphysical postulate, claiming their form is displays in logical space. The opposite is
the case: elementary logical spaces are revealed by physical analysis and simple objects
that contain the form of these spaces are established as a matter of reductio
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argumentation. An example of the kind of analysis Wittgenstein has in mind is revealed
in a recorded conversation with Waismann in 1929:170
Sign for a colour:

white

blue

red

black

Every statement about colours can be represented by means of such symbols. If we say that four elementary
colours [i.e., red, yellow, green, blue] would suffice [to generate all colours], I call such symbols of equal status
elements of representation. These elements of representation are the ‘objects’.
The following question now has no sense: Are objects something thing-like, something that stands in subjectposition, or something property-like, or are they relations, and so forth? It is simply where we have elements of
representation of equal status that we speak of objects.

Figure 3.3: Physical Analysis and Simple Objects

Although Waismann’s notes are not all that clear, their gist is that the colour signified by
the line intersecting the white-black axis is a shade of the elementary colour yellow. The
point of intersection stands for an elementary picture in colour-space that is the
configuration of two elements of representation: the coordinate value “yellow” and the
coordinate value of the particular shade. In this conversation each coordinate value is
simply taken to be correlated to a simple object, the configuration of which is represented
by the elementary picture.
That the two elements of representation are indeed correlated to two simple
objects is established through the following set of propositions:
2.02

Objects are simple.
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2.021
Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be
composite.
2.0211
If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would
depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212

In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).

2.022
It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real
one, must have something – a form – in common with it.
2.023

Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.

The argument found in these propositions is actually three sub-arguments that build upon
one another.
The first establishes substance and occurs in propositions 2.0211 and 2.0212. It
can be reconstructed as follows:
P1:
P2:
P3:
P4:
P5:
P6:

P7:
P8:
C:

The whole of logical space is a multi-dimensional form of all possible worlds.
A picture presents a situation in the whole of logical space.
A picture represents a possible situation.
A picture has sense only if the situation it represents is structure that 1) is
isomorphic; and 2) can make the picture true.
Assume there is no substance that could produce a situation in the world.
It follows that a picture can only represent an isomorphic situation presented by
another picture, which can only represent an isomorphic situation presented by
another picture, and so on in infinite regress.
But since no situation can make a picture true, no picture has sense.
Yet we routinely sketch pictures in multi-dimensional space that convey information.
P5 is false.

What this first argument establishes is that there must be isomorphic situations in the
world that can make a picture true and a supporting substrate that produces them.
The second argument found in propositions 2.022 and 2.023 builds upon the first
and concerns the form of substance. We picture all situations of the real world as located
in a form of all possible worlds, i.e., the whole of logical space. Given this form, there is
a possible world that agrees with a particular picture.

Since a picture represents a

possible situation in the real world that can make it true, the real world must share the
form of this possible world. Since substance is what produces a situation in the world,
substance must also have the same form of the possible world.
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The third argument concerns ontology and is mentioned in 2.021 and 2.023. That
the form of substance must be a constitution of simple objects follows straightforwardly.
If, as physical analysis shows, one elementary logical space is independent of another
(e.g., the logical space for touch is independent of the logical space for sound), then it
follows that the form of substance must be divided into kinds of substance. And if, as
physical analysis also shows, there are elementary logical spaces that have more than one
coordinate dimension, then substance must be divided (at most) into objects
corresponding to individual coordinate values of a certain axis with an essence that can be
represented by another a coordinate axis.
Note that nothing in the forgoing arguments establishes that there are simple
objects that are bachelors. They merely establish simple objects insofar as they configure
with other simple objects to produce material properties that can make a picture true.
This is probably why Wittgenstein is uncommitted one way or the other to their existence
or non-existence apart from these configurations. Furthermore, nothing establishes that
elementary logical spaces we imagine simple objects to be situated in are real, only that
reality shares its form.

Finally note that if we combine these arguments with the

argument that if elementary propositions are given we are given all elementary
propositions or, equivalently, that if names with different meanings are given we are
given all names with different meanings, then it follows that “[i]f all objects are given,
then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given” (2.0124) or,
equivalently, that “[i]f objects are given, then at the same time we are given all objects”
(5.524).

3.8 Logical Space and Science
The Tractatus was motivated by problems concerning the nature of logic with the
overall the goal of solving all philosophical problems.

Compared to the logic of

language, philosophy of science does not seem to preoccupy Wittgenstein any more than
ethics or aesthetics. Still natural science does occupy a special place in the Tractatus:
“[t]he totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of
the natural sciences”) (4.11).

It is difficult to deny that Wittgenstein’s overall
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philosophical orientation might have been influenced by the view we find in the
Principles (1900/1956) that certain problems in philosophy of science arise from
“illegitimate questions” (8). And there is a strong Hertzian sway in Wittgenstein’s own
philosophy of science evident in his inductive view of laws, schematic and
conventionalist approach to mechanics, and the proposal of simplicity as a criterion of
theory choice. Although the second area of influence will be briefly outlined in what
follows, the real significance of Hertz’s influence will become clear in the next section.
Wittgenstein presents a view of science only to meet certain objections to the preeminence he places on the idea of logical space.

The proposition that opens the

discussion of science points out his concern:
6.3 The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to law.
And outside logic everything is accidental.

Wittgenstein’s central claim that elementary propositions are independent requires
supporting the position that the existence of a state of affairs is independent of the
existence and non-existence of other state of affairs. This involves establishing that “[t]he
only necessity that exists is logical necessity” (6.37). In other words, the only necessity is
in virtue of the real form displayed in the whole of logical space.
Wittgenstein sees his challenge as one of explaining away the so-called laws of
induction and causality.

The law of induction is the proposition that inductive

generalizations that have accommodated facts in the past will continue to do so in the
future. “The procedure of induction”, Wittgenstein says, “consists in accepting as true the
simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences” (6.363).

However, this

procedure has “only a psychological” justification (6.3631). The law of induction “is
obviously a proposition with sense” (6.31), for it is an a posteriori generalization of
psychological facts. But this is to say that it does not have the status of necessity, unlike
an a priori law of logic.
The law of causality, on the other hand, is “the form of a law” (6.32). What this
means is that the rule that all that happens has a cause is a structural feature of our form
of expressing of thoughts; in particular, it falls out of the specific multiplicity of the
logical space of space:
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6.361
One might say, using Hertz’s terminology, that only connexions that are
subject to law are thinkable.
6.3611
We cannot compare a process with ‘the passage of time’ – there is no such
thing – but only with another process (such as the working of a chronometer). Hence we
can describe the lapse of time only by relying on some other process. Something exactly
analogous applies to space: e.g. when people say that neither of two events (which exclude
one another) can occur, because there is nothing to cause the one to occur rather than the
other, it is really a matter of our being unable to describe one of the two events unless there
is some sort of asymmetry to be found. And if such an asymmetry is found, we can regard
it as the cause of the occurrence of the one and the non-occurrence of the other.
6.36111
Kant’s problem about the right hand and the left hand, which cannot be made
to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. Indeed, it exists in one dimensional space
- - - o–––x - - x–––o - - - a

b

in which the two congruent figures, a and b, cannot be made to coincide unless they are
moved out of this space. The right hand and the left hand are in fact completely congruent.
It is quite irrelevant that they cannot be made to coincide. A right-hand glove could be put
on the left hand, if it could be turned round in four-dimensional space.
6.362
What can be described can happen too: and what the law of causality is meant
to exclude cannot even be described.

Wittgenstein’s point is that the law of causality captures asymmetries that arise from the
dimensional boundary of the logical space of space that places limits on expressive
thought. The bound of dimensionality precludes thought from “stepping outside” the
logical space of time through which a temporal process is measured in order to compare
that process with the logical space itself. Analogously in the case of the logical space of
space, the boundary of dimensionality precludes thought from “stepping outside” the
logical space to imagine the right and left hand as coinciding.

More generally, it

precludes thought from describing the occurrence of one event and the non-occurrence of
another event as coinciding through a common cause, which is why we think only that the
occurring event is caused.
Like geometrical laws, causal laws presuppose the logical space of space. The
law of causality is a form of a law because it captures the boundary of the expression of
spatial thought; equivalently, it is a limit to spatial language presupposed by any law of
physics. As a feature of the dimensionality of a coordinate system, the law of causality is
not an “an inner necessity like that of logical inference” (5.1362) that allows for
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deductions to be made from what is known to what is unknown, but an “outer” necessity
in virtue of circumscribing the possibility of spatial language. As such it does not
derogate from the contingency of a state of affairs.
Wittgenstein describes mechanics as follows:
6.343
Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true
propositions that we need for the description of the world.
6.3431
The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, will speak, however
indirectly, about the objects of the world.

The characterization of mechanics as an attempt to construct true pictures from a single
plan obviously follows Hertz’s characterization of mechanics as an attempt to construct
images of things from a schematic scientific image. Wittgenstein appears also to be
influenced by Hertz’s position that mechanics involves conventional elements.

He

mentions both Hertzian (6.3432) and Newtonian mechanics (6.341) but does not commit
to either view; rather, he sees both as imposing “unified forms” or “nets” that “correspond
to different systems for describing the world” (6.341). In addition to the law of causality,
each net imposes additional forms of laws. Wittgenstein mentions “minimum-principles”
(6.321), the form of a law of conservation (6.33), and forms for the principle of sufficient
reason and laws of continuity (6.34). As a result laws of mechanics “are about the net
and not about what the net describes” (6.35); i.e., they are not explanations of natural
phenomena (6.371), but “a priori insights about the forms in which the propositions of
science can be cast” (6.34) that allow us to derive “axioms of mechanics” (6.341). To the
latter Hertzian point Wittgenstein adds another: though different systems of mechanics
may be empirically adequate, “we are told something about the world by the fact that it
can be described more simply with one system of mechanics than with another” (6.342),
i.e., certain structures are products of the mind.
It should be emphasized that although a “net” of mechanics can be understood as
constituted in part by elementary logical spaces, one should not confuse this attempt to
recover the whole of logical space with the whole of logical space itself. Wittgenstein
says that a “state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can be represented
by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of geometry cannot” (3.0321) (and
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one that contravenes the law of causality cannot either). Although the laws of geometry
(and the law of causality) are constitutive of physical laws, the laws of physics are also
constituted by conventional elements. It is because of these elements that violation of
laws of physics may still be represented spatially.
Although a strong Hertzian influence is evident in Wittgenstein’s view of science,
it pales in comparison to the impact upon the Tractatus of the idea that the mind and
nature share the same form. What will become clear in the next section is that Hertz’s
idea of a thought schema having the form of real potentiality inspires the unifying idea of
the Tractatus.

3.9 Logical Space as the Metaphysical Self
In this section I will motivate the claim that the whole of logical space is
Wittgenstein’s metaphysical subject, leaving its justification for the section that follows.
The place to begin is with Wittgenstein’s appraisal of his own philosophical efforts. “A
philosophical work”, he says, “consists essentially of elucidations”; “its task is to make
[thoughts] clear and to give them sharp boundaries” (4.112). The elucidations in the
Tractatus that give sharp boundary to all thoughts is the proposition “[t]he facts in logical
space are the world” (1.13) and, indirectly, the proposition “the world is the totality of
facts” (1.1). However, Wittgenstein also states:
6.54
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as
steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has
climbed it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
7

What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

The central exegetical task of the Tractatus, therefore, is to determine how it is that “the
facts in logical space are the world” and “the world is the totality of facts” serve as final
steps towards understanding the Tractatus and seeing the world aright.
The metaphor of throwing away the ladder one has climbed is used by
Schopenhauer in a slightly different way: “the man who studies to gain insight, books and
studies are merely rungs of the ladder on which he climbs to the summit of knowledge.
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As soon as a rung has raised him one step, he leaves it behind” (vol II, 80).171
Schopenhauer’s influence on early Wittgenstein is now generally acknowledged. G. E.
M. Anscombe writes:
As a boy of sixteen Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer and had been greatly impressed by
Schopenhauer’s theory of the ‘world as idea’ (though not of the ‘world as will’);
Schopenhauer then struck him as fundamentally right, if only a few adjustments and
clarifications were made. … If we look for Wittgenstein’s philosophical ancestry, we
should … look to Schopenhauer; especially his ‘solipsism’, his conception of ‘the limit’
and his ideas on value will better be understood in light of Schopenhauer than of any other
philosopher. (1959, 11-12)

However, the extent of Schopenhauer’s influence is also generally understated. A notable
exception is Weiner’s Genius and Talent (1992), a book devoted to drawing out
connections between Schopenhauer’s work and the Tractatus.172
Schopenhauer’s theory of ‘world as idea’ or ‘world as representation’ is a version
of transcendental idealism found in the first book of The World as Will and
Representation (1966). Weiner summarizes:
Schopenhauer, like Kant, believes that the world is structured by the subject’s a priori
forms of cognition, including time, space, and causality. But in contrast to Kant,
Schopenhauer reduces all a priori categories and forms of intuition to one overarching
structure, which he calls “the principle of sufficient reason”. … In other words, each
representation is the necessary consequence of another, which in turn is the necessary
consequence of another. (1992, 48-49)173

Schopenhauer’s more radical theory of ‘world as will’ is found in the second book.
Based on the idea that the external body correlates with the subject’s internal will, it
develops Kant’s philosophy into an immanent metaphysics whereby the phenomenal
world is said to be a manifestation of noumenal will:
Schopenhauer thinks he can show “what the world is” by elaborating man’s immediate
perception of his own inner nature. Through inner experience, man “already knows” that
he is a blind, striving will objectified as a physical body. My intuition tells me that,
internally I am a will, and externally, I am a bodily representation. (Ibid., 56-57)
The dead, mechanistic view of nature expressed in natural science gives way to a very
different picture. Nature is animated by a multitude of wills, each striving blindly to live
and reproduce. Each species or natural kind has its own character, that is, its own
characteristic will; but there is also a family resemblance among the various wills in nature.
All the different wills in nature participate in an unindividuated world-will, a formless,
aimless, insatiable energy that infuses the universe as a whole. Consequently, the various
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forces and species in nature are variations on a single theme, the noumenal will-to-life.
(Ibid., 58)

Schopenhauer’s motivation for this second book is captured in the following passages:
If we summarize Kant’s utterances, we shall find that what he understands by the synthetic
unity of apperception is, so to speak, the extensionless centre of the sphere of all our
representations, whose radii converge on it. It is what I call the subject of knowing, the
correlative of all representations. (1966, vol. I, 451-452)
Kant’s proposition: “The I think must accompany all our representations,” is insufficient;
for the “I” is an unknown quantity, in other words, it is itself a mystery and secret. What
gives unity and sequence to consciousness, since, by pervading all the representations of
consciousness, it is its substratum, its permanent supporter [i.e., the will]. … Without it the
intellect would have no more unity of consciousness than a mirror, in which now one thing
now another presents itself in succession, or at most only as much as a convex mirror has,
whose rays converge at an imaginary point behind its surface. … Fundamentally it is the
will that is spoken of whenever “I” occurs in judgement. Therefore the will is the true and
ultimate point of unity of consciousness, and the bond of all its functions and acts. It does
not, however, itself belong to the intellect, but is only its root, origin, and controller. (1966,
vol II, 139-140)

His analogy of Kant’s transcendental self to the focal point of a spherical convex mirror is
insightful, and was justified in the first chapter of this thesis as recovering Kant’s
structure of the imagination. Although Schopenhauer’s reasons for rejecting Kant need
not concern us, what is important for present purposes is his proposal that knowing
consciousness is an activity stimulated by willing consciousness.
Wittgenstein’s Notebooks reveal an active engagement with Schopenhauer,174 and
even suggests he may have been studying him again.175 Here we find a crucial passage:
The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists.
If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I,
and which is the bearer of ethics. (Wittgenstein 1961a, 4.8.16; 80)

But for the explicit claim that the transcendental subject “exists”, the entire content of the
passage is found in the Tractatus. There we find “[t]here is no such thing as the subject
that thinks or entertains ideas” along with the implication that the subject is “my will”
(5.631), a bearer of ethics (6.43) that is (sometimes) at the centre of the world (5.64). Yet
the Tractatus also shows a marked departure from Schopenhauer in its rejection of the
objectification of the will: “[t]he subject does not belong to the world” (5.632).
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An interesting claim Schopenhauer makes is that genius has the ability to separate
knowing from willing consciousness whereby “the knowing part of consciousness
becomes purely objective and the clear mirror of the world” (1966, vol. II, 206). In its
rejection of the objectification of the will, the Tractatus does not intimate any such
separation of consciousness. What it does state is that logic is “a mirror-image of the
world” (6.13). If as suggested willing consciousness is knowing consciousness, then
perhaps in the Tractatus willing consciousness, i.e., the self, is “the clear mirror of the
world”. Indeed, there is much to motivate such a view.
If logic is “a mirror image of the world” then thought and the world share
structure. If we think of structure the way Kant does as a boundary or limit to chaos,176
then the idea of shared structure between thought and the world is captured through the
idea of a shared “boundary” or “limit”.

This seems to have been Schopenhauer’s

position:
[The forms of representation] belong only to the object, yet because they are essential to the
object as such, they can be found also from the subject, in other words, they can be known
a priori, and to this extent are to be regarded as the boundary common to both. (1966, vol.
I, 25)

Rather than appeal directly to a shared limit between the self and object, Wittgenstein
concerns himself in the first instance with shared limits between the whole of logical
space and the world. His position is that the limits of the whole of logical space are
boundaries of the world can be unpacked from the following proposition:
5.5561
Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The limit also makes
itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions. …

The totality of (distinguishable) simple objects correlates to the totality of names with
different meanings. Since a name does not have meaning apart from its nexus with other
names, the totality of simple objects is a boundary shown in the totality of elementary
propositions. (If elementary propositions are independent they must have names with
different meanings.) But this is not the totality of the world, for “[t]he world is the
totality of facts, not of things” (1.1). The totality of facts is a boundary of real actuality,
while the totality of things is a boundary of real potentiality. In saying “empirical reality
is limited by the totality of objects”, Wittgenstein is claiming that real actuality is limited
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by real potentiality.

Since the whole of logical space (the totality of elementary

propositions) displays real potentiality, Wittgenstein is claiming that actuality is limited
by the whole of logical space. This is obviously so, for if the whole of logical space is the
form of all possible worlds through its dimensionality and its general propositional form,
then real actuality, the “world” according to Wittgenstein, must be limited by this form if
it is to be a possible world at all.
Wittgenstein’s claim that the limits of the world are boundaries of the whole of
logical space arises as follows.

The limits of the world also include the limit of

contingent actuality, i.e., the world conceived as “the whole sphere of what happens and
is the case” where “all that happens and is the case is accidental” (italics added, 6.41). On
this point Wittgenstein writes:
5.61
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we
cannot say in logic, “The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’ For that would appear
to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case,
since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that
way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot
think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

He is saying that just because actuality is a possibility, the form of all possible worlds
must allow for the actual contingencies of the world. Thus, the limits of the whole of
logical space are threefold: 1) dimensionality; 2) general propositional form; and 3) the
independence of elementary propositions. The limits of the world are the same, though
we can describe them in different terms:

1) multiplicity; 2) logical form; and 3)

independence of elementary states of affairs.
When Wittgenstein says logic is “a mirror-image of the world” his assertions
concerning contradiction and tautology tell us that this mirror has an outer and an inner
limit.

“Contradiction, one might say, vanishes outside all propositions:

tautology

vanishes inside them. Contradiction is the outer limit of propositions: tautology is the
unsubstantial point at their centre” (5.143).

There are two parts to this claim.

A

contradiction “vanishes outside all propositions” in the sense that every proposition
follows from it, but it does not follow from any proposition; a tautology “vanishes inside”
all propositions in the sense no proposition follows from it, but it follows from every
proposition (Wittgenstein 1961a, 3.6.15; 54). More significantly, a “contradiction is the
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outer limit of propositions” in the sense that “a contradiction fills the whole of logical
space leaving no point of it for reality” (4.463); a “tautology is the unsubstantial point at
their centre” in that “[a] tautology leaves open the reality to the whole – the infinite whole
of logical space” (Ibid.). Altogether this suggests that the outer limit of the whole of
logical space is the limit of a contradiction, while the inner limit of the general
propositional form is the limit of a tautology. In other words, the dimensionality of the
whole of logical space serves as the limit of a contradiction (since a contradiction cannot
fill a space of greater dimension than that of the whole of logical space) and the general
propositional form the serves as the limit of a tautology (since a tautology arises from the
iterative operations of the general propositional form).177
How does this notion of an outer and inner limit of a mirror image of the world fit
with the claim that the whole of logical space and the world share the same limits? If we
think of the whole of logical space as the surface of a spherical concave mirror within
which is “the whole sphere of what happens and is the case”, then we can imagine it as an
outer boundary of expressive thought and thereby an outer limit of meaningful language,
while we can imagine the world that shares this limit as the inner boundary of expressive
thought and thereby the inner limit of meaningful language. Now Wittgenstein also
writes “[t]he middle point of a circle can be conceived as its inner boundary” (1961a,
3.6.15; 54). Presumably this is because equal radii projected from the middle point of a
circle delimit the points of the circle; equivalently, the radii from points of the circle
converge towards the middle point. If we replace the circle with our spherical concave
mirror, then the middle point is its focus imaginarius. If our mirror were to collapse into
the focus imaginarius, then the whole of logical space would be an inner limit and the
world would be an outer limit. What does logical space as an inner limit then have to do
with the general propositional form?

Since the iterative operations of the general

propositional form accompany the method of projection, the inner limit can be taken as
the point where the projection begins. As an inner limit the whole of logical space can be
understood as a thought schema, a form of potentiality out of which the completed whole
of logical space is projected.
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In light of Wittgenstein’s claim that the willing self exists at the “centre of the
world” we can regard the projection of the completed whole of logical space as an act of
the self in relation to this thought schema.

“One cannot will without acting”

(Wittgenstein 1961a, 4.11.16; 87) and one cannot express thought without an act of
projecting a proposition with sense onto the world, which suggests expressive thought is a
projective act of will. If our notion of force is that of a wilful power it would follow that
one can not (as Wittgenstein says) express a thought without the force of a proposition.
Since “[t]he force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space” (3.42), it
would then follow (as Wittgenstein also says) that one cannot express a thought without
an act of projecting a proposition situated in the whole of logical space. What the
Tractatus seems to be telling us is that in thinking the sense of a proposition the whole of
logical space is projected through the timeless iterative operations of the general
propositional form, operations underwritten by a wilful act of self.
In the projection of the whole of logical space pictorial form mirrors the form of
reality and, if true, pictorial content mirrors the content of reality.

Knowing

consciousness can thus be thought of as a “clear mirror of the world”, as Schopenhauer
would say. The mirrored form and content of reality would be reflected back towards a
focus imaginarius at the centre of the world from which the act of self originates. This is
a picture of logical space, one represented in Figure 3.4:

Whole of logical space

Projection
(expressive thought)

World

Focus imaginarius

Figure 3.4: Picture of Logical Space as Concave Mirror
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I argued above that what Wittgenstein means by “the facts in logical space are the world”
is not that existing states of affairs are contained in a real multi-dimensional coordinate
system. This picture of logical space shows us what this proposition does mean. “A
logical picture of facts is a thought” (3) and “[t]he totality of true thoughts is a picture of
the world” (3.01). If “[a] picture is a model of reality” (2.12) then the totality of true
thoughts is also a true model of the world. And if “[a] picture presents a situation in
logical space” (2.11) then a true model of the world presents a true situation in the whole
of logical space. Since a true model of the world is a set of representational facts
identical to the represented facts of the world, “[t]he facts in logical space are the world”
just because in any projection the world ipso facto embeds in logical space, the form of
all possible worlds. What the proposition really means, then, is that in expressing thought
we surround the world in an imaginative “halo of possible worlds” that is the whole of
logical space.
So far I have motivated a picture of logical space where the whole of logical space
is a mirroring projection by the self, not one where the whole of logical space is the self.
Perhaps the self is correlated to the focus imaginarius existing throughout as an inner
limit to the expression of thought and logical space is a mere mental projection.
However, such a view is at odds with what Wittgenstein says elsewhere. We are told in
proposition 5.64 that when the self is “a point without extension” that “reality [is]
coordinated with it”. As noted above, this seems to mean that reality and the self share
the same form, one attributable to the internal properties of simple objects. But we are
also given a principle of identity by which simple objects with indiscernible internal
properties are the same (2.0233f), the implication being that only discernible properties
are displayed in logical space. If both the self and the projected whole of logical space
share the same form as reality, then by this principle the self is indiscernible from the
projected whole of logical space, i.e., the self is the same as logical space.
One might reply that Wittgenstein distinguishes between the self and reality by
rejecting the objectification of the will. Perhaps, then, the projected whole of logical
space is not will, i.e., it is discernible from the self but not from reality. However, this
would introduce a Schopenhauerian distinction between knowing and willing
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consciousness, one at odds with the statement in the Tractatus that “[t]here is no such
thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas”. Furthermore, the Tractatus speaks of
a self that “shrinks to a point without extension (5.64), suggesting that the self also exists
as an outer limit, oscillating between the two. One might add that without the existence
of the self as the whole of logical space Wittgenstein’s notion of representational
existence is a mystery.
The picture of logical space that is now motivated can be summarized as follows.
The completed whole of logical space is the willing self that projects itself in expressing
thought, leaving behind a focus imaginarius as an “echo” of its alternative mode of
existing as the potential whole of logical space. In just the same way the potential whole
of logical space is the willing self that “shrinks” itself in an act of silence leaving behind a
“shadow” of its alternative mode of existing as the completed whole of logical space.
Here the self exists as the centre of the world, not as the bearer of thought, but “as the
bearer of ethics”. The sense in which the self exists as outer or inner limit is just the
sense in which two different perspectives of the world are possible: one where the world
is viewed as an inner limit and one where it is viewed as an outer limit. (See Figures 3.1
and 3.2.)
Where could this picture of logical space have come from? It seems to be the
result of a synthesis of Hertz with Schopenhauer. Last chapter we saw Hertz speculate
that the conformity between mind and nature can be explained through the shared
structure of a thought schema and the form of reality, taking both to determine
potentialities from which, respectively, mathematical models are constructed (and
organized logically) and reality is actualized. In adopting Schopenhauer’s conception of
the self as will and denying his distinction between willing and knowing consciousness, it
seems Wittgenstein equates the willing self with Hertz’s thought schema and with the
knowledge product wilfully constructed from it.
Motivating a picture of logical space is one thing, justifying it is quite another. It
might be objected that figurative language intended to be taken metaphorically is being
given too literal an interpretation. Indeed, what I am proposing is that the propositions of
the Tractatus are, in effect, describing a picture of logical space, and that it is this
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“picture” that confers “sense” upon them sufficient to communicate something of value.
The best way to justify this picture of logical space, therefore, is to demonstrate how it
unifies propositions of the Tractatus and how it brings to light its ethical goal.

3.10 Unifying the Tractatus
The strength of the picture of logical space just presented comes from its ability to
make sense of some of Wittgenstein’s most obscure claims, i.e., those concerning
solipsism, realism, ethics, aesthetics and mysticism.

It is from the adaptation of

Schopenhauer’s notion of a limit to the common boundary between the whole of logical
space and the world that we approach the infamous solipsism of the Tractatus:
5.62
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in
solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said but makes
itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of
language (of the only language that I understand)178 mean the limits of my world.

What the solipsist means – “the world is my world” – cannot be said; rather, it is shown in
the “fact” that “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (5.6). The most
natural reading of this proposition is that it refers to proposition 5.61 that builds upon
proposition 5.5561 (quoted last section) to establish that the limits of the world and
logical space are one and the same. The claim seems to be that the fact that the limits of
my language refer (“what the solipsist means is quite correct”) to the limits of my world
shows that the world is my world.
But prior to proposition 5.62 the claims have only concerned the limits of the
world and the limits of language. The hurdle to overcome is that it appears neither that
the limits of the world are the limits of my world nor that the limits of language are the
limits of my language, for “[t]he world is independent of my will” (6.373)179 and so
independent of my self, and the limits of language – the whole of logical space – is
common to all languages (cf. 5.512). The former is the most difficult to see, for the
Notebooks reveals an inherent tension in Wittgenstein’s conception of the willing self in
relation to the world. On the one hand there is the muscular feeling that accompanies acts
of will in relation to movement of the body:
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Does not the willed movement of the body happen just like any unwilled movement in the
world, but that it is accompanied by the will? Yet it is not accompanied by a wish! But by
will. We feel, so to speak, responsible for movement. My will fastens on to the world
somewhere, and does not fasten on to other things. Wishing is not acting. But willing is
acting. (My wish relates, e.g., to the movement of the chair, my will to a muscular feeling.)
(Wittgenstein 1961a, 4.11.16; 88)

On the other hand all bodies in the world must be equivalent if elementary states of affairs
are independent:
For the consideration of willing makes it look as if one part of the world were closer to me
than another (which would be intolerable). But of course, it is undeniable that in a popular
sense there are things that I do, and other things not done by me. In this way then the will
would not confront the world as its equivalent, which must be impossible. (Ibid.)

This tension surfaces in the Tractatus with the claim that the world includes “my body”
constituted by parts “subordinate to my will” (5.631)180 together with the claim that “the
world is independent of my will”.
The best approach, its seems to me, is to tackle this problem second after first
reconciling Wittgenstein’s claim that the limits of language are the limits of my language
or, equivalently, his claim that the limits of the whole of logical space are the limits of my
whole of logical space.

How to do so is suggested in the following recorded

conversation:
Now it is possible to construct many different languages, each of which has a different man
at its centre. Imagine for instance you were a despot in the Orient. All men were
compelled to speak the language whose centre you are. If I spoke this language, I should
say, ‘Wittgenstein has toothache. But Waismann is behaving as Wittgenstein does when he
has a toothache. In the language whose centre you are it would be expressed just the other
way around, ‘Waismann has toothache, Wittgenstein is behaving like Waismann when he
has a toothache.’ All these languages can be translated into one another. Only what they
have in common mirrors anything. Now it is noteworthy that one of these languages has a
distinctive status, namely that one in which I can as it were say that I feel real pain[,] …
namely the language whose centre I am. The distinctiveness of this language lies in its
application. It is not expressed. (December 22, 1929, as recorded by Waismann (1979, 4950))

Wittgenstein’s point can be captured as follows. Any whole of logical space has the same
limits, i.e., dimensionality, general propositional form and independence of elementary
propositions. By means of the whole of logical space both you and I measure the pain of
parts of the world. This involves measuring symptoms of pain such as wincing, but also
aches. Concerning the former, you measure pain of parts of the world subordinate to my
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will as I measure the pain of parts of the world subordinate to your will. Concerning the
latter, however, both you and I have private elementary logical spaces, e.g., an
elementary logical space for stomach-ache or toothache, that make the whole of logical
space unique to each of us. By means of my elementary logical space for tooth-ache I do
not measure configurations of objects that constitute parts of the world subordinate to
your will and vice versa. Accordingly I cannot say I experience or do not experience the
stomach-ache you experience; by the same token, you cannot say that you experience or
do not experience the stomach-ache I experience (Ibid.). This difference is a difference in
language. Strictly speaking, language is not our language, but “my language”, i.e., “the
only language that I understand”, for my language is our language only in the sense that
my language includes our language. Thus it is the limits of my language that limit the
world and it is the limits of the world that limit of my language. The limits of my
language and the limits of the world are common boundaries.
However, Wittgenstein’s claim is that the limits of my language refer to the limits
of my world. This follows. Any world has the same limits, i.e., multiplicity, logical form
and independence of elementary states of affairs. However, there are states of affairs that
obtain that I can measure, which you cannot; there are states of affairs that obtain that you
can measure, which I cannot not. Although these states of affairs are correlated to private
mental elements, they do not derogate from the general independence of elementary states
of affairs. Strictly speaking, then, the world is not our world, but my world. My world is
our world only in the sense that my world includes our world. The limits of my language
therefore refer to the limits of my world, which shows that the world is my world. We
thus see how much truth there is in solipsism.
I argued that the proposition “the facts in logical space are the world” is elliptical
for the claim that the world embeds in the projection of logical space by the metaphysical
self. From what has just been established, one sees that “facts in logical space are the
world” means that “the facts in my logical space are my world”, which is elliptical for the
claim that my world embeds in the projection of my logical space by me.

Now

Wittgenstein makes an even stronger claim that “I am my world” (5.63) in the sense that
“[t]he subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world” (5.632).
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This is unintelligible unless it is also the case that I am my logical space, the outer limit of
the world into which the world embeds, and in this sense the subject is a limit of the
world.
This interpretation of Wittgenstein’s solipsism is borne out by his equally
infamous “pure realism”:
5.64
Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out
strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without
extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
5.641
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a
non-psychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is
my world’. The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the
human soul, which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the
world – not a part of it.

If the whole of logical space is the self of solipsism, then solipsism would indeed coincide
with pure realism when the self of solipsism “shrinks” from the outer limit to the inner
limit of the world. Like the self of solipsism, the self of realism is thus a limit of the
world. This occurs when the willing self acts in a way other than expressing thoughts. In
the absence of the operations of the general propositional form, the scaffolding
surrounding pictorial representation collapses and the multi-dimensional coordinate
system shrinks to a point. The transcendental subject would then be a potential whole of
logical space at the centre of the world.

Because there continues to be a shared

multiplicity and general propositional form, the reality remains “co-ordinated” with the
metaphysical self. But notice that with pure realism the world is not my world embedded
inside my completed whole of logical space, but the world outside my potential logical
space.181 The “whole sphere of what happens and is the case” is now the outer limit of
the world and the metaphysical self is its inner limit. Notice also that as both an outer or
inner limit the metaphysical subject is “the limit” of the world referred to in proposition
5.641.
If the self of pure realism is a “point without extension”, i.e., a spaceless inner
limit, then it is also a timeless inner limit. It is from the vantage of the self of pure
realism that Wittgenstein makes the following claims concerning our existence:
6.431

So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.
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6.4311
Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take
eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to
those who live in the present. Our life has no end in just the way which our visual field has
no limits.
6.4312
… Is not this eternal life [i.e., the eternal survival of the human soul after
death] itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in
space and time lies outside space and time. (It is certainly not the solution of any problems
of natural science that is required.)
6.521

The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. …

As the self of solipsism I am my whole of logical space in which my world embeds. And
as the outer limit of the world “I want to report how I found the world”, and so “I have to
judge the world, to measure things” (Wittgenstein 1961a, 2.9.16; 82). I judge the world,
including those parts subordinate to my will, as positions in a three-dimensional
coordinate system and as a succession of immediate presents in a one-dimensional
coordinate system. As measured, my life is part of the world inside the forms of objects
that are space and time, i.e., my life is part of the world embedded within elementary
logical spaces that display such forms and through which I perceive it. With the collapse
of the self of solipsism I am the spaceless and timeless centre of the “whole sphere” of the
world. My life is now outside the forms of objects that are space and time. No longer a
succession of instants perceived through a one-dimensional coordinate system, “[my] life
has no end”. It has no end “in just the way which our visual field has no limits” because
my perspective of it is one of looking outwards from inside a “whole sphere”.
Accordingly, the problem of life is thus not answered through expressive thought, but in
its very abeyance.
There is more to this passage.

The iterative operations of the general

propositional form in the method of projecting a picture in the whole of logical space are
timeless and, for the same reasons, spaceless. If the self of pure realism is the spaceless
and timeless inner limit of the world, then the projected self of solipsism must also be a
spaceless and timeless outer limit of the world. Wittgenstein’s pure realism is not the
position that “only the world exists”, nor is his solipsism the position that “only I exist”.
Rather, they are two sides the general position that existence is eternal present:182 “What
has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world!” (Wittgenstein 1961a,
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2.9.16; 82). It is because eternal present is undifferentiated present that “the world and
life are one” (5.621). If I cease (or the world ceases) then existence ceases: “at death the
world … comes to an end”.
In his Notebooks Wittgenstein makes the transcendental claim that “the subject is
not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence” (1961a, 2.8.16, 79). This
even stronger claim arises because the metaphysical self shares the same form as reality
presupposed by real content or states of affairs. In the Tractatus logic (6.13), ethics and
aesthetics (6.421) are transcendental because their basic notions are made possible by this
fundamental coordination between reality and the metaphysical.

Like the relation

between solipsism and pure realism, ethics and aesthetics involve shifting between the
metaphysical self as outer and inner limit.
Let us begin with ethics:
6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the
limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language. In
short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak,
wax and wane as a whole. The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the
unhappy man.

In its acts the will expresses “an attitude of the subject to the world” (Wittgenstein 1961a,
4.11.16; 87). The unhappy man looks at the world from the outer limit of the world as his
world. He sees the world through logical space as one among possible worlds of his will,
viewing it as a source that can satisfy the wants of his unique self. The happy man, by
contrast, sees the world from the inner limit of the world as the world. He sees it “sub
specie aeternitatis … together with the whole logical space” and thus “together with
space and time instead of in space and time” (Wittgenstein 1961a, 7.10.16; 83). The
world is no longer viewed as “the facts in logical space” (1.13), but as the “totality of
facts” (1.1) against a timeless “shadow” of projected logical space. Concomitant with
this shift of the metaphysical self from outer to inner limit of the world, the world no
longer wanes as the reciprocal limit inside a halo of possible worlds but waxes to the fore
as the reciprocal limit outside a central point. Hence, the world is no longer viewed as a
one among others, but “as a whole sphere of what happens and is the case”, i.e., a unique
world that satisfies wants by “favour granted by fate” (6.374). The happy life thus

149
involves adopting a stoic attitude of equanimity183 by “renouncing any influence on
happenings” (Wittgenstein 1961a, 11.6.16; 73), foregoing “the amenities of the world”
and accepting “the life of knowledge” (Ibid., 13.8.16; 81).
The shift that sees the world wax from inner to outer limit is even more dramatic
in aesthetics. Ethics and aesthetics are “one and the same” (6.421), for “the good life is
the world seen sub specie aeternitatis” and “[t]he good work of art is the object seen sub
specie aeternitatis” (Wittgenstein 1961a, 7.10.16; 83). In “good art” (Ibid.) an object
waxes to the fore:
As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally
significant. If I have been contemplating the stove and then am told: but now all you know
is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had
studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating
the stove it was my world, and everything else colourless by contrast with it. (Something
good about the whole, but bad in details.) For it is equally possible to take the bare image
as the worthless momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world
among shadows.184 (italics added, Ibid.)

Hence, objects “acquire “significance” only through their relation to my will” (Ibid.,
15.10.16; 84), which collapses from outer to inner limit of the world and even further to
inner limit of a particular object in the shifting attitude of the transcendental subject.
A pleasant feeling is the reward for the good exercise of the will (6.422). This is
the mystical feeling that accompanies willing as inner limit of the world:
6.432
How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is
higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
6.4321

The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.

6.44

It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

6.45
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a limited
whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical.
6.522
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves
manifest. They are what is mystical.

If I am right, to view the world as a limited whole is to orientate a potential whole of
logical space that is I as inner limit of the world together with the world as outer limit. To
feel the world as a limited whole is to experience its existence together with the existence
of the self as eternal present. And this seems to be a development via Schopenhauer of
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Kant’s position that as a formal limit the transcendental self “is nothing more than a
feeling of an existence without the least concept” (Ak. IV: 334 n.).
To feel the world as a limited whole would arise in virtue of the prior coordination
between the metaphysical self and reality. If so, this belies the common claim that
Wittgenstein presents a sophisticated version of the correspondence theory of truth.185 In
addition to representational truth there is also existential truth.

The basis of

representational truth is the correspondence between the content of my representation and
the content of reality, but the basis of existential truth is my prior co-ordination with the
form of reality. Since coordination is a condition for the possibility of representation,
existential truth is constitutive of representational truth.
In summary, the aim of the Tractatus is achieved by first guiding the reader to the
solipsistic viewpoint that “the facts in logical space are the world”. By altering the limit
of the world from inner to outer limit, it then guides the reader to the realistic viewpoint
that “the world is the totality of facts”, which is the proper ethical and aesthetic
orientation. From here it tells the reader that, unlike the propositions of science, its
philosophical expressions of thought are nonsense because they are said without the
means of logical space, leaving the final step to the reader’s own volition. For the reader
to then “throw away” the Tractatus and “see the world aright”, to grasp “the truth of the
thoughts” it expresses as “unassailable and definitive”, is not to express thought but to
wilfully feel the world in silence as existing sub specie aeternitatis. In the end all that
truly matters in the Tractatus is an ineffable act of philosophical wisdom that I must
do.186

3.11 Conclusion: A Reflection of Ourselves
This chapter has attempted to motivate and, as Wittgenstein suggests in his
preface, “draw” the picture of logical space described by the propositions of the Tractatus
that can be said to give them their “whole sense”. This picture appears to be patterned on
a spherical concave mirror where the metaphysical self wilfully exists as either the
completed whole of logical space reflecting the world in imaginative representation

151
towards a focus imaginarius, or as the potential whole of logical space looking outwards
from this point onto the world. The potential whole of logical space represents an
intellectual development of Hertz’s notion of a thought schema, while the completed
whole of logical space represents an intellectual development of Kant’s logical space
when the mirror structure shifts from convex to concave. By adopting Schopenhauer’s
view of the self as will and denying that willing consciousness is separate from knowing
consciousness, Wittgenstein naturally associates the self with both potential and
completed logical space. The picture of logical space is thus the picture of the self.
This picture of the self is justified through its ability to capture in a clear way the
“elusive unity” underlying the propositions of the Tractatus, bringing together
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning with his solipsism, realism, ethics, aesthetics
and mysticism. Logical space is the imaginative form of all possible worlds in virtue of
which we project in representational thought the potentiality of the world we feel in
silence.

Only what is said by means of logical space has sense, for we convey

information through the prior coordination between the self and reality displayed in
logical space. Yet the ethical point of the Tractatus is not the value of what we say. It is
the significance of silence where we do not attempt to measure the world, but experience
it instead as an existing whole in the eternal present with the self.
Wittgenstein, I suggest, is to discover this for our selves.

To understand
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Chapter 4: From Mysticism to Myth
Myth has a strong grip on the human imagination; it supplies the
classification and the categories, the pigeon-holes and concepts, the
categorical framework within which every subject is placed and
understood. So does science.
(van Fraassen 1994b, 129)

4.1 Introduction
Van Fraassen’s striking claim “[s]cience is bridled superstition” (1999, 11) is built
upon an empiricist adaptation of Wittgenstein’s metaphysical idea of logical space.
Committed to the conceptualist and nominalist traditions of the middle ages that take the
common properties and relations of things to be human creations, van Fraassen develops
the thesis that these creations are imaginative logical spaces, categorical frameworks of
possibility representing actuality located within them. His general orientation is that the
logical spaces of our mythical world-picture have been replaced by ones within which
accepted mathematical models of are mapped, allowing them to more adequately save the
phenomena and giving rise to a “theoretical world-picture” that is, at times, equally
bewitching (1980, 81).187
To my knowledge, no one has explored and evaluated this thesis. Yet it is the idea
of logical space that underwrites van Fraassen’s empiricist view of structure, bringing
together his semantic view of scientific theories with his equally important views of
language and experience. The final chapter of this dissertation is an attempt to rectify this
deficiency. After providing an overview of van Fraassen’s idea of logical space and key
features of his early philosophical method, it presents a brief synopsis of the relation
between his semantic view of scientific theories and his views of science known as
constructive empiricism and empiricist structuralism. This sets the stage for an exegesis
of van Fraassen’s idea of logical space as it progressed through these views. After
bringing together its interpretive motivation, the problem of coordination it encountered
and the solution of self-location proposed, the last section evaluates his idea of logical
space against the backdrop of three unities traditionally associated with it: the unity of all
possible worlds, the unity of existence and the unity of divine consciousness.

The

conclusion will be that van Fraassen’s use of the idea of logical space is inconsistent with
his empirical stance.
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4.2 Overview
4.2.1 What is a Logical Space?
Like Kant and Wittgenstein before him, van Fraassen’s idea of logical space is a
somewhat elusive. Following Wittgenstein he takes a logical space to be “a general form
of any possible world” (1970a, 100) that imagination presents as a form of representation.
However, he dramatically liberalizes the idea of logical space, almost to the point of
trivialization. A logical space need not be a multi-dimensional set of n-tuples of real
numbers. It may also be “an algebra, a lattice, or even more rudimentary, a posit” (2008,
172). It need not even be a mathematical object. “The kinds of things which make up the
membership of logical space is essentially arbitrary: they may be chairs, points, vectors,
cabbages, kings, or bits of sealing wax” (1967, 175). This is because the space represents
simply through the possibility that a member will correspond to an individual entity. He
provides the following examples:
The color spectrum is the logical space for colored things. … Porphyry’s tree is the logical
space of everything, the Library of Congress classification is the logical space of all books.
We conceive of any extended opaque object as determinately located in the color spectrum
and of any possible book that might eventually be published as somehow placed in our
beloved LC classification. (1991b, 34)

These examples suggest that in its most general sense a logical space for van Fraassen is
an array of possibilities that functions for us as a classification framework organizing
reality according to our interests. It is a “space” only in the sense that it is a bounded
form “open” to actuality it organizes.188 He is not invoking the metaphor of, or even
analogy to, physical space, for we shall see that space (as well as time and space-time) is
also a logical space. Van Fraassen’s idea of logical space is, generally speaking, an
extension of our idea of physical space.
Invariably it seems that in science a logical space is mathematical.

To

characterize its role as a representation, van Fraassen invokes the metaphor of a concrete
model. What we saw characterized in Wittgenstein as elementary logical spaces, i.e.,
forms of representation mirroring basic forms of reality such as time, space and colour,
van Fraassen identifies as representations or “models”189. Here the idea of logical space
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is easier to understand as a form of imagination. Moving in the direction of Boltzmann,
van Fraassen takes these spaces to concern not only the perception of everyday entities,
but also perceptions involving instrumentation. Here the idea of logical space is easier to
grasp as a form of representation. Basic logical spaces combine into more complex
spaces within which a “model”, understood as a solution to mathematical equations,190 is
mapped. A logical space such as phase space or Hilbert space is “a space common to a
whole family of models provided by that theory” (van Fraassen 2008, 164). As a model
or as a form common to models, use of a logical space in science extends beyond simple
classification to research design, prediction and explanation.
To characterize its conditions of representational use, van Fraassen has as of late
shifted the base of the metaphor to a concrete map. He introduces his idea of selfascription of location or simply self-location by analogy: to use a model I must locate the
reality of my situation through measurable properties in the relevant logical space just as I
have to in order to use a map. Self-location in relation to logical spaces used in science is
distinctive in that it is in accord with a set of operational rules that yield a genuine
measurement relative to the theory (van Fraassen 2008, 165-166).
As an entity, a logical space (of models) is sui generis in being characterized
variously as an “abstract entity”, an “artifact”, and an “ideal entity”. Considered apart
from what it represents, a logical space (in science) is an abstract mathematical object.
As an abstract entity, a logical space is described through – or, as we shall see later, can
be thought of as governing our expression of – a structure of universal concepts of
measurable properties such as red, green, position, momentum, etc. This intimate relation
between a logical space and a conceptual framework of universals is the basis upon which
van Fraassen provides an account of universals to rival traditional in re and ante rem
interpretations:
… the colour spectrum is a mathematical structure – part of the real line – in which we
postulate all colored entities to be locatable in a away that reflects their color relations and
which thus provides the picture that guides our thinking and discourse about colors. (van
Fraassen 1985a)
… an abstract entity such as the color spectrum is not one of the things in the world, nor is
the whale, nor the fall of night – although there are colored things, which match or clash
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with each other, and individual whales, which give birth to other whales, and the
paradoxical deepening and fading of colors at sunset. (van Fraassen 1991b, 24)
The color spectrum is the logical space for colored things. There is no need to add: and the
color spectrum exists, eternally and at peace, in its own transcendent beauty, and so forth.
(Ibid., 34)

Early on van Fraassen (1975) characterized his view of abstract entities as one of
conceptualism, though without elaboration. If we understand conceptualism as a theory
of universals that “sees them as shadows of our grasp of concepts” (Blackburn 2005),
then it is useful to think of a logical space as just this shadow. If my “concept of radio,
the sense of my word “radio”, is such that nothing can instantiate it unless there are
electromagnetic waves” (van Fraassen 2006a, 126), the reason is that I do not classify
something as a radio unless I locate it in a logical space of a scientific theory that guides a
structure of universal predicates implicit within my concept radio.
Van Fraassen also characterizes a logical space (of models) as a “cultural object”
(1970a, 107) or “artifact”. He takes an artifact to be any entity upon which we bestow a
role and function. For example, a stone is an artifact once given use as a hammer. Apart
from this bestowal by us, the stone has no representational content, for we bestow a
representational role upon it by giving it “about-ness” (van Fraassen 2008, 25). Similarly,
van Fraassen is of the view that “theories are artefacts” (Ibid., 238) in that we give
“about-ness” to an abstract entity. But in order to bestow a representational role, we must
first classify the entity as capable of carrying out this function. To avoid the obvious
regress of classifying an entity as a logical space by locating it in another logical space,
van Fraassen appeals to a “space of reasons”:
… to call, classify, something as a map or a model is to locate it in what Wilfrid Sellars
called “the space of reasons” – at least as this phrase is now broadly understood. By itself
this is not yet self-location. It is just to classify the item as having semantic content, and as
having a role in reasoned discourse and in practices subject to norms of rationality. We can
to some extent separate our understanding of the item, in the sense of grasping its semantic
content, from the understanding of our own situation that comes with locating oneself ‘in’
or ‘with respect to’ the item. But the latter comes in train, so to speak. (Ibid., 84)

(As we saw in Chapter 1, this idea of locating a mathematical space within a conceptual
framework is prefigured in Kant’s location of pure sensible schemata within a potential
classificatory space of reasons.) It is significant that for van Fraassen more than one
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abstract entity can play the representational role of a particular logical space; apart from
this element of convention, no abstract entity is a logical space.
As an artifact, van Fraassen also refers to logical space an “ideal entity”, alluding
specifically to Leibniz’s phrase (1991b, 34). What Leibniz meant by “ideal entity”,
however, is not without controversy. According to Friedman (1992), Leibniz saw time
and space as ideal phenomena representing the pre-established harmony. In particular,
… space is ideal because relations between substances are ideal: each substance mirrors
the entire universe internally due to its own inner principle, and space is an ideal
representation of the underlying order of monads expressed in the pre-established harmony.
Indeed, since each simple substance by itself already expresses completely the order of the
entire universe, nothing but the mere existence of substances is necessary to constitute
phenomenal space. (Ibid., 7-8)

Following Leibniz, Wolffians reconciled monadic reality with the infinite divisibility of
space by claiming geometry deals only with “creatures of the imagination by which we
confusedly represent phenomenally the true monadic reality” (Ibid., 4, n.6). Where van
Fraassen differs from the Wolffians is not in denying that an ideal entity is a “confused”
representation, but in refusing to make the further claim that it represents the form of
reality. In saying logical space is an “ideal entity” it seems he means only that it is a form
of imaginative representation that accommodates all possibilities of a certain sort
including real actuality (cf. 1970a, 102). As an ideal entity, a logical space (of models) is
completed structure:

it is an image or “picture” (1985a, 276) that “outstrips its

fundamentum in re” (1972, 329).
It is important to recognize that van Fraassen’s notion of an ideal entity differs
from Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space in that it is not an entity of private imagination
associated with mental elements. A “mental representation”, van Fraassen claims, is an
“oxymoron” (2008, 345, n.1), for one cannot bestow a representational role on mental
entities. “There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made,
or taken, to represent things as thus or so” (Ibid., 23), and here “use” “implies
community: there is no such thing as an essentially private representation any more than
private language, except in the sense in which private uses can exist as derived or
parasitic on communal practices” (Ibid., 248, n. 24).

As we shall see shortly, van

Fraassen’s rejection of logical space as a private image is related to his rejection of
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private language in that he introduces the idea of logical space within a project of
analyzing our common linguistic framework. An ideal entity is thus an entity of public
imagination enshrined in certain “coding conventions extant in the community” (Ibid.,
23).
A logical space of models constituting our “theoretical world picture” is probably
what van Fraassen refers to in the title of his book The Scientific Image (1980). It is
instructive, therefore, to explore what kind of image it is. Reminiscent of the Wolffians’
view of an ideal entity as a confused representation, a basic claim of van Fraassen’s later
empiricist structuralism is that a picture is a type of image that trades for success in use
by us on selective similarity and distortion: the similarity is empirical structure (Ibid., 3435); the distortion is surplus structure (Ibid, 30), abstraction and idealization (Ibid., 3949). This accounts for van Fraassen’s view of science “that accepts the appearances alone
as real, and all the rest as a unifying myth to light up our path” (van Fraassen 1994b,
133). It also accounts for our metaphysical impulse: “[o]ur language and reasoning is
guided by a picture, a picture which bewitches us, the picture described by extreme
realism” (1978, 15). Scientific realists make the mistake of projecting conventional
elements of the scientific image into reality much like a confused observer makes the
mistake of projecting a mirage, rainbow or fata morgana onto reality as a material thing.
The latter are types images van Fraassen characterizes as “public hallucinations” (2008,
104). Since both the scientific image and a public hallucination are inter-subjective, bear
a diffuse relation to reality, and bewitch us into projecting more onto reality than there is,
I suggest that for van Fraassen the scientific image is a sort of conventionally produced
public hallucination.

4.2.2 This is Who We Are
Van Fraassen’s appeal to the idea of logical space is in the context of questions
not about what there is in reality, but “of how things are for us, of what it is to exist in this
world in the way we are there” (2009, 471). His general philosophical approach appears
to emerge from a synthesis of insights gathered through the method of phenomenology as
exemplified in both continental and analytic traditions.
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The term “phenomenology” emerged in the 18th century in the writings of
Lambert and Kant to denote the description of experience or consciousness apart from
considerations of intentional content (Blackburn 2005). The former is found in van
Fraassen’s embrace of Hume’s “world of empiricism”:
… it is a world in which anything is possible, and whatever happens merely happens, and
not because some thing greater is making it happen. … There are no necessary connections
in nature, no laws of nature, no real bounds on possibility. Those ideas all resulted when
philosophers projected familiar models on the natural world. Really, nothing is necessary,
and everything is possible.
I mean this. All of the above is true. (1994b, 123-124)

To embrace Hume’s world of empiricism is to fully appreciate the phenomenology of
uninterpreted experience, i.e., experience as reflectively deconstructed from its
classificatory, lawful and modal implications.191 This is, he tells us, the bare experience
of Antoine Roquentin in Sartre’s novel Nausea (1964):
I went to the window and glanced out … I murmured: Anything can happen, anything. …
Frightened, I looked at these unstable beings which, in an hour, in a minute, were perhaps
going to crumble: yes, I was there, living in the midst of these books full of knowledge
describing the immutable forms of the animal species, explaining that the right quantity of
energy is kept integral in the universe; I was there, standing in front of a window whose
panes had a definite refraction index. But what feeble barriers! I suppose it is out of
laziness that the world is the same day after day. Today it seemed to want to change. And
then, anything, anything could happen. (77)

The objects, events and processes that happen to us have properties and relations, and the
properties of such properties and relations are concrete structures. But our experience of
structure is not how we conceive structure in experience: concrete structure is indefinite,
whereas we conceive structure as definite.
This is evident in our disinclination to even use the word “structure” for properties
and relations mutable from one moment to the next; indeed, the potential for chaos is
antithetical to our common-sense meaning of the term.

At the very least what we

normally mean by “structure” in experience are properties of universal properties and
relations that particulars of bare experience instantiate. As Goodman’s (1955) new riddle
of induction shows, it seems we spontaneously project not only relations (e.g., A happens
after B) but also properties (e.g., green) of experience into the future, making definite the
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properties of these relations (A will always happen after B) and properties (e.g., green is
exclusive of blue).
To explicate what we normally mean by “structure” in relation to experience,192
van Fraassen turns from the phenomenology of bare experience to “how we conceive the
world” (1985b, 206), invoking the method of conceptual phenomenology he observes in
Kant. A general and “very simple-minded presentation of the method”, he claims, is one
that amounts to
… accepting the principle that what we can and cannot imagine are indications of
conceptual interconnections – put more grandiosely, of the structure of our conceptual
framework. And this does not seem unreasonable so long as we are merely inquiring into
our own conceptual framework. For one can hardly be said to have a concept of X unless
one can imagine X or think about X; conversely, if I can imagine X and think of X, then I
have a concept of X. (1970a, 44)

Kant’s insight in the Critique (1781-1787/1998), van Fraassen tells us, is that the
principles of understanding determine a conceptual framework indicated by “a certain
general form that any possible world must have; a possible world is just this necessary
general form filled out by certain contingent contents” (1970a, 99). But whereas for Kant
conceptual phenomenology serves to illuminate “the phenomenology of consciousness”
(1985b, 206) facilitating description of cognitive faculties and their representations, for
van Fraassen it serves “to elucidate and further articulate the conceptual scheme of
accepted scientific theories” (1970a, 105).193
Citing Carnap’s Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages (1956a), he sees
the phenomenological method discussed in the analytic tradition as “primarily in
connection with the subject of intension” (1970a, 45). In this paper Carnap responds to
criticisms levelled by Quine, arguing for a viable theory of intension in addition to that of
extension.

Here “intension” is understood to be the undefined meaning component

relevant for truth:
The technical term ‘intension’, which I use here instead of the ambiguous word ‘meaning’,
is meant to apply only to the cognitive or designative meaning component. I shall not try to
define this component. It was mentioned earlier that determination of truth presupposes
knowledge of meaning (in addition to knowledge of facts); now cognitive meaning may be
roughly characterized as that meaning component which is relevant for the determination of
truth. (Carnap 1956a, 236-237)
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To account for Kant’s insight into our conceptual phenomenology it appears van Fraassen
ventures further than Carnap and takes the cognitive meaning component to be the
imaginative form of all possible worlds Wittgenstein identifies as (the whole of) logical
space (1970a, 100-101). Notice that its semantic function in cognition is less like Kant’s
principles of the understanding derived from transcendental schemata, and more like the
structure of schemata identified in chapter 1 as Kant’s logical space.
To factor in Sartre’s insight, van Fraassen presents a logical space (of models) as
the “intentional correlate” of a conventional conceptual framework through which we
perceive and conceive real entities and their concrete relations:
After all, what is this world in which I live, breathe and have my being, and which my
ancestors of two centuries ago could not enter? It is the intentional correlate of the
conceptual framework through which I perceive and conceive the world. But our
conceptual framework changes, hence the intentional correlate of our conceptual
framework changes – but the real world remains the same world. (1980, 81)

As I understand van Fraassen, our spontaneous experience of structure is a synthesis of
actual relations that happen to us with imaginative forms of possible relations through
which we conceive the relations as having definite structural properties.194
Perhaps the best way to understand this idea is through the eyes of Helmholtz and
Hertz. For Helmholtz our experience of structure reflects our belief that what is actual
and observed is actual and observable. Although van Fraassen agrees, he does not take
the position that this belief gives rise to a regulative idea. He rejects “recourse to a
metaphysics pretending to knowledge beyond the reach of experience” (1985b, 206) by
drawing from the traditions of nominalism and conceptualism that take universals to be
human creations rather than transcendental conditions. In creating a logical space of
models we create universals as sets of elements representing possible entities, and our
acceptance of them involves our belief that they correspond to entities that are actual and
observable.

And so when we locate entities delivered in experience within these

universals, we conceive the indefinite structure of properties and relations among what is
actual and observed to be the definite structure of properties and relations among what is
actual and observable. This is to say that the self represents itself as having located in a
logical space concrete structure in a definite way, then projects this structure back onto
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reality. This projection need not be thought of as unconstrained, for while fulfilled
predictions instantiate the common properties and relations, disappointed expectations
bite back. But if we allow leeway for choice among universals as van Fraassen does, then
the element of convention precludes the metaphysical position that in creating universals
we are just “carving nature at its joints”. All this echoes Hertz: a logical space of models
is a representation, and to assert that it is similar in empirical structure to what it
represents is to say that it involves a projection onto reality defeasible by later experience.

4.2.3 A View of Scientific Theories Between Two Views of Science
For van Fraassen the question “What is Science?” elicits several responses, due
mainly to the fact that “[t]he word “science” displays a typical ambiguity between activity
and product” (2002a, 155). This ambiguity finds expression in his two views of science
known as constructive empiricism and empiricist structuralism as presented, respectively,
in The Scientific Image (1980) and in Scientific Representation (2008). Constructive
empiricism construes the question “What is Science?” “as asking what is the point, the
telos, of that activity” (2007a, 342), while empiricist structuralism takes it to be asking
“how a science relates to its domain of application” (2008, 2). Constructive empiricism is
the view that, as activity, science aims primarily to produce theories that “save the
phenomena” (1980, 12), i.e., real entities that are observable objects, events and
processes.

Empiricist structuralism is the view that, as product, science represents

phenomena as embeddable in abstract structures that can only be described up to
isomorphism (2008, 238).

These two views of science are related:

empiricist

structuralism tells us what “saving the phenomena” amounts to in constructive
empiricism if one adopts a structuralist account of scientific theories.
It is important to recognize that constructive empiricism and empiricist
structuralism, though obviously designed to work together, are fundamentally different
kinds of philosophical theories. Constructive empiricism is formulated to contrast with
scientific realism, if scientific realism is formulated as a doctrine of aim:195
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Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and
acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. This is the correct
statement of scientific realism. (1980, 8)
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and the acceptance of a
theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. This is the statement of the
anti-realist position I advocate; I shall call it constructive empiricism. (Ibid., 12)

In both positions van Fraassen uses “belief” in a descriptive not a normative sense, i.e., in
the sense that “the only belief that is ipso facto involved in acceptance is that the active
criterion of success is met” (2007a, 342). In contrast to truth in toto (truth of what is
observable, unobservable and possible), a theory is empirically adequate if, roughly
speaking, “what it says about the observable things and events in this world, is true –
exactly if the ‘saves the phenomena’ (van Fraassen 1980, 12). In addition, acceptance
involves a pragmatic commitment to use the resources of the theory to describe
phenomena, answer why or how questions, and design a research programme (Ibid.).
Notwithstanding frequent misunderstanding, constructive empiricism is not a
theory of scientific knowledge: “Constructive empiricism is not a doctrine about
epistemology, but about the aim of science” (Monton and van Fraassen 2003, 419-420);
“It is not part of constructive empiricism to dictate a particular epistemic position” (Ibid.,
407-408).
… I see core realist and anti-realist views of science as answers to “What is science?”
which are logically independent of any epistemology. In this sense one could have an antirealist view of science while believing in the complete literal truth of currently accepted
science. And similarly one could have a realist view of science while maintaining that
success in the scientific enterprise so far has been mainly illusory and is perhaps forever
beyond human reach. (van Fraassen 2003, 481)

Hence constructive empiricism does not purport to justify agnosticism regarding
unobservable entities.196 In a move unnoticed by many scientific realists, van Fraassen
shifts the debate from the rationality of scientific belief to the rationality of scientific
activity: “[b]y taking them as central ingredients of our view of science we place
ourselves in a position to make sense of those activities which we all agree are part of
science” (1994a, 190).
As I understand van Fraassen’s formulations of them, scientific realism and
constructive empiricism proffer rational reconstructions of scientific activity.197 The
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intentional activity philosophers classify as scientific is presumed to have an internally
defined central or “basic” criterion of success. Both scientific realism and constructive
empiricism postulate what this criterion is. They attempt to recover this activity within a
framework that preserves characteristic features and distinctions agreed upon by
philosophers198 as relevant and significant. They try to show how in principle intentional
activities classified as scientific can be made intelligible when understood as
exemplifications of a strategy that best promotes the central aim identified.
Accordingly, van Fraassen’s realism is not epistemic. Rather, it is semantic: “[t]o
say what is true is to say, of what is, that it is, and, of what is not, that it is not” (2003,
482). Beyond the strict deliverances of experience, i.e., beyond what is actual and
observed, past and present:
[t]he question whether anything exists has to be replaced by the question: does the status
we accord our best theories require its existence?. It is not true that the former question is
unintelligible or does not arise, it just does not arise for us directly: we can only sidle up to
it via the latter question. (van Fraassen 1995, 142)

From its characterization of the belief involved in acceptance, constructive empiricism
tells us that the status we accord our best theories requires the existence of what it says to
be actual and observable past, present and future. Constructive empiricism contrasts with
scientific realism in its claim that the rationality of scientific activity gives us “no reason
to assert that our descriptive terms have determinate reference behind the phenomena”
(van Fraassen 2010a, 470).
Why reject scientific realism in favour of constructive empiricism? For those who
adopt an empirical stance, van Fraassen maintains, science “is a paradigm of rationality”
(2002a, 63), and so “regarding how to best make sense of science … one finds a central
motivation, arguably the main motivation, for constructive empiricism” (Monton and van
Fraassen 2003, 421). Moreover, “[e]mpiricists … wish for epistemic modesty in their
paradigms of rational inquiry” (Ibid., 407), and therefore seek to identify the “bottom
line” (van Fraassen 1981, 673) aim of science that brings with it the least amount of belief
in theory acceptance. In so doing empiricists demonstrate that “as far as the enterprise of
science is concerned, belief in the truth of its theories is supererogatory” (van Fraassen
1985a, 255). Thus empiricists should adopt constructive empiricism rather than scientific
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realism because it makes as good, if not better sense of science with less de facto belief
about what there is.
One should recognize that as formulated, constructive empiricism does not
presuppose the semantic view of scientific theories: “[t]he choice between the semantic
approach and its rivals is entirely independent of the controversies between scientific
realism and anti-realism” (van Fraassen 1991a, 15).199

In addition to constructive

empiricism, van Fraassen is of the view that a theory consists of a theoretical definition
that presents a set of models and a theoretical hypothesis that asserts that certain types of
real systems are related to these models (1987, 109). “When the equations formulate a
scientific theory, their solutions are models of that theory” (van Fraassen 2008, 310)
mapped in logical spaces. Truth in toto and empirical adequacy are then explicated in
terms of correspondence between models.200

This is, of course, not to say that

constructive empiricism was not formulated with the semantic view in mind.
The semantic view of scientific theories presents only a vehicle for scientific
representation; it is not a view of what a scientific representation is (van Fraassen 2008,
348, n.26). Van Fraassen’s view of science known as empiricist structuralism is a theory
of scientific representation that presupposes a structuralist view of scientific theories such
as his semantic view. Constructive empiricism is only relevant to empiricist structuralism
in that use of structural representation involves purpose and aim (Ibid., 28), and by
identifying what an adequate structural representation amounts to, constructive
empiricism serves to “highlight” (Ibid., 23) the selective resemblance we bestow upon our
scientific representations.201 Accordingly, the antagonist of empiricist structuralism is not
scientific realism, but structural realism (Ibid., 3). Structural realism sees the depiction of
a scientific representation as one of simple resemblance (Ibid., 198), while empiricist
structuralism views it in terms of resemblance (in part) as well as distortion through
abstraction, idealization and surplus structure.
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4.3 Circa 1970: The Semantic View of Scientific Theories
4.3.1 The Causal Theory of Time
Van Fraassen introduced his conception of logical space in his dissertation under
Grunbaum; it was also the innovative contribution behind his first book, The Philosophy
of Time and Space (1970). The book’s general concern is the analytic one of elucidating
and articulating “the idea of time as it appears in our common conceptual framework and
in the conceptual framework of the physical sciences” (Ibid., 104). This involves taking
into account that “‘time’ is a singular term, purporting to carry singular reference”
(1985b, 207) and adopting the approach of a causal theory of time.
A causal theory of time is a variant of the relational theory of time. As van
Fraassen sees it, a relational theory of time views time, not the way Newton did as a real
entity of infinite temporal magnitude into which are placed “[a]ll things … as to order of
succession” ((Newton 1960, 8) as quoted in (van Fraassen 1991b, 24)), but as an order
“constituted by means of, or on the basis of, relations between the events and processes to
be so ordered” (Ibid.). In line with the relational theory, van Fraassen claims “[t]ime is
not real, time does not exist, there is no such thing as time” (Ibid.). He takes it instead
that “there do exist physical entities, events and processes, which stand in various
relations to each other, and thus constitute a complex relational structure” (1985b,
200).202 A causal theory of time goes beyond a relational theory in its claim that the
temporal order can be defined in terms of certain basic physical relations. Its basic task is
to correctly describe these relations in non-temporal terms, and then use these
descriptions to define the temporal order.
In proposing the first relational theory of time, Leibniz was also the first to
propose a causal theory of time.203

However there were difficulties, notably the

application of Hume’s critique to Leibniz’s rationalist theory of causation.204 With the
advent of the special theory of relativity, the causal theory of time resurfaced in the early
20th century in the work of Reichenbach and Grunbaum. Reichenbach’s hope was that if
the basic physical relations could be described in non-spatiotemporal terms, the causal
theory of time could be extended to a successful relational theory of Euclidean space and
space-time implicit in the special theory of relativity.

The term “causal” can be
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misleading in this new setting, for it does not involve any general notion of causality.
Rather, the physical relations are viewed pre-philosophically as the basic relations of
accepted scientific theories. Moreover, “theory” denotes a reconstruction of scientific
language. “The claim of the causal theory of time is not that spatiotemporal terms are
defined, but that they are definable, in terms of [physical relations]. … Formulations of
theories are, in a sense, artificial, since they must rely on a choice of primitive terms (and
of axioms) that is to some extent arbitrary” (van Fraassen 1970a, 195). One way or
another, however, the theories of Reichenbach and Grunbaum had relied upon spatial or
spatiotemporal concepts. To overcome this problem, van Fraassen sought to simplify the
theory by providing “intuitive content for its notions” (Ibid., 198).
He identifies the basic physical relations as that of genidentity and light signals
among events: two events are genidentical if they belong to the history of the same
object; two events are related by a light signal if they are the emission, absorption or
reflection of the same light signal. These relations of “causal connection”205 are taken as
primitive:
Genidentity and signal connection are relations too basic in the conceptual scheme of
physics and too empirical in their significance to be denied the status of physical relations,
it seems to me, even in the absence of necessary and sufficient criteria for the applicability
of the term “physical relation”. From this we draw the following conclusion: “causally
connected,” and hence “causally connectible,” have a meaning that is not specifically
spatiotemporal. Therefore, we are not guilty of the sleight of hand of developing a causal
theory of time by giving a new name to a basic spatiotemporal relation. (1970a, 194)

At this point it is helpful to note that for van Fraassen observable entities we classify as
“events” “processes” and “objects” (i.e., what he later refers to the “phenomena”) are
related to one another through physical relations of genidentity and signal connections.
An “event” is a “short-lived state” (Ibid., 32), a “process” is a “series of successive
events” (Ibid.) and an “object” is a process in relation to aggregates of simultaneous
events constituting a class of events that can be defined as a “world-line” (Ibid., 34-35;
183). Following Reichenbach he claims that it is a matter of preference whether we adopt
event or object language (1991a, 454).
As the foregoing passage suggests, van Fraassen relies first and foremost upon
relations of causal connectibility in order to define the temporal order. The reason is,

167
[t]o put it baldly, the structure of actual physical connections does not determine, as far as
we can see, the spatiotemporal relations among actual events – as these are usually
conceived.206 (van Fraassen 1970a, 197)

This point of our conceptual phenomenology is attributed to Kant:
… we conceive of time as one, as an individual, in which we conceive all events, possible
as well as actual, as being located. If we think of different world histories, we think of
them as unfolding in the same time. And when we chart different courses of events we
chart them in our own time: Hugo could have murdered Hoederer this morning, he may do
so tonight. We conceive of all events as necessarily located in time, as necessarily having
some definite location there, whatever it may be. (van Fraassen 1985b, 206)

In a move that will define his empiricism, van Fraassen honours our pre-analytic intuition
of structure over the strict deliverances of experience. But the challenge then becomes
one of explicating the modality of causal connectibility without appealing to
spatiotemporal terms: “two individual events e and e' are connectible, is, in the absence
of information about their relative spatio-temporal location, not deducible from any
general fact” (van Fraassen 1985b, 207). It is in order to meet this challenge van Fraassen
appeals to the idea of logical space. Let us look at this move more closely.
To simplify the causal theory of time developed by Reichenbach and Grunbaum
van Fraassen’s strategy was to turn their approach on its head. Generally speaking, both
had attempted to first define the temporal order on each world line individually, and then
explicate the temporal order of all events by using the relation of not being causally
connectible to correlate the separate orderings. In this context connectibility refers to the
finite velocity of light, and such a correlation concerns events connected by signals faster
than light. Van Fraassen, on the other hand, explicates the time order of events on any
world line (defined as a class of events, any two of which are genidentical) in part
through relations of non-connectibility to events on other world lines. These relations are
used to define “simultaneity classes” and then “continuous parts” of a world line,
followed by relations of “temporal separation” among events and then the basic temporal
relations simultaneous, before and between (1970a, 182-186; cf. 66-69).
Effectively, the relation of causal connectibility is being used to induce a
continuum isomorphic to the real or extended real number system:
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So we use a relation of connectibility to define [spatiotemporal relations as we conceive
them], after having laid down suitable postulates on the relational structure of
connectibility. But these postulates are calculated to make the structure of temporal
relations, as defined, isomorphic to the (extended) real number system, for example. (van
Fraassen 1970a, 197)

A function t can then be defined in such a way as to map all events onto either real
number systems, preserving (inter alia) temporal separation and recovering the temporal
order within a coordinate system (Ibid., 188). Either coordinate system can be thought as
a structure of all possible events representing all actual events by embedding their
structure (cf. Ibid., 104). But the possibility of both of these coordinate systems means
that the temporal order of all possible events may be topologically open with or without
beginning, or topologically closed. Yet we conceive time as topologically open and
without a beginning. This feature of our conceptual phenomenology noted already by
Kant was explained (at this time) by appeal to the conceptual framework of our accepted
scientific theories:
The necessity, which Kant perceived, of time having the structure of the real line is only the
necessity of a conceptual scheme that developed with the success of Newtonian physics.
But this necessity is still with us in the sense that we have not accepted an alternative; only,
recent cosmological speculation, and the violent demise of the classical framework (in
some important respects) have greatly increased our tolerance of ambiguity at this point.
(van Fraassen 1970a, 107)

Van Fraassen’s basic idea was that our conceptual framework “schools” the form of our
imagination (cf. Ibid., 45), and the relation of causal connectibility recovers this schooling
(in part) in relation to how we imagine time.
Here it is helpful to recognize that van Fraassen had yet to reject the syntactic
view that scientific theories are formal axiomatic systems, and that acceptance of a theory
“consists in believing that the axioms and all their consequences are true” (van Fraassen
1985b, 200). In reconstructing the temporal language of our conceptual framework, it
seems his causal theory of time was taken to be at the heart of accepted scientific theories.
Accordingly, the notion of causal connectibility can also be understood to correlate
reconstructed temporal relations with physical relations among events, accounting for the
theory’s interpretation. The theory’s postulates on causal connectibility can be thought as
constituting a coordinative definition by which the notion causal connectibility interprets
a relational theory of time.
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But if it is to bestow sense on a theory, the notion of causal connectibility must be
meaningful. “From an empiricist point of view, there are besides relations among actual
matters of fact, only relations among words and ideas” (van Fraassen 1987, 122), and so
the challenge is to explicate the meaningfulness of causal connectibility without
appealing to more than actual physical relations. It is interesting and perhaps telling that
van Fraassen did not face this challenge head-on at this time. The notion of causal
connectibility was simply put forth as a counterfactual conditional that met standards for
linguistic austerity in the philosophical use of language provided by Quine (van Fraassen
1970a, 196-197). Van Fraassen’s real thoughts were left to an obiter dictum:
It seems to me, therefore, that, as presently formulated, the causal theory of time meets the
standards of clarity currently imposed. But after having said this, I would like to argue that
we can look upon the use of the counterfactual notion of causal connectibility as a
dispensable convenience rather than as a necessity. … My proposal is … that we look
upon the use of the connectibility relation as simply having the purpose of describing the
logical space in which, we assert, all relational structures of actual connections can be
embedded. This means that we think that the relation of connectibility is not needed to
describe the actual world. It means also that the postulates on connectibility that we lay
down just express a belief concerning the actual connections we may encounter, and
nothing more. … The postulates on connectibility only helped to single out the
mathematical structure in question in a heuristic manner. (Ibid., 197-198)

His idea is that the notion of causal connectibility has “intuitive content” (Ibid.) in that it
describes a pre-analytic structure through which we imagine the concrete structure of
causal connections to be embedded. The structure that it describes is a logical space, the
real line in this case, that arises from our immersion in a conceptual framework. Logical
space thus serves as an ideal referent in a reconstruction of natural language, some
elements of which correlate to individual real entities.
Van Fraassen had understood Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space very generally
as the idea of a form of all possible worlds.207 He interpreted relevant provisions of his
Tractatus (1961b) as follows:
Thus the assertion that something is of a certain kind entails that there is a set of families of
properties such that this thing is characterized by one member of each family:
X is a medium-large physical object entails that X is somewhere in space, has some
colour, some texture, some shape and…. X is an event entails X is somewhere in time,
and….
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The collection of these families of properties determines the logical space of that kind of
thing. (Each family by itself, or each subcollection of these families, determines a subspace
of that logical space, which may itself be called a logical space. Thus, Wittgenstein speaks
of the “colour-space”.) (1970a, 100)

Since “members of a single family are mutually incompatible” and jointly exhaustive
predicates of any degree that form a kind (Ibid., 13), van Fraassen associated the idea of
logical space with a structure of conceptual interconnections.

But Wittgenstein

understood logical space to be a form of imaginative and linguistic thought, while van
Fraassen had introduced the idea into an analytic project that takes it to be a form of
imagination representing a form of linguistic thought:
We characterize the notion of logical space by saying that a logical space is a certain
mathematical construct used to represent certain conceptual interconnections. By
representing real things (instances of those concepts) by means of elements of this
mathematical construct (their “locations”) we also represent relations among those things.
(Ibid., 104) 208

By directly representing our language in use (which is interpreted, if anything is) it seems
van Fraassen considered logical space to be interpreted, which allowed it to provide
meaningful intuitive content to modal notions in a reconstruction of language.
In providing intuitive content to the notion of causal connectibility in the causal
theory of time, logical space gave van Fraassen a Kantian answer to the question “What is
time?” Unlike Wittgenstein for whom time is a form of simple objects and more like
Kant for whom time is a form of intuition, van Fraassen claims
… time is a logical space, a subspace of the total logical space of events[;] (1970a, 101)
… logical space (time) is the real line being used to represent all possible temporal relations
among events and the conceptual interconnections among these relations. (Thus
simultaneity is represented by identity of location on the real line, and the fact that temporal
precedence is incompatible with simultaneity is reflected by the incompatibility of < and
=.) (Ibid., 102)

In rejecting the Newtonian claim that time is real van Fraassen clings to the view that
time is a “container” of sorts, only it is an “ideal frame” (1991b, 23) that can change with
revolutionary shifts to our conceptual framework. As it stands, time is the real line. It
represents conceptual interconnections among temporal relations by representing the
mutual incompatibility of these relations. In virtue of the irreflexivity of < and the
reflexivity of =, the real line represents structural properties of relations of temporal
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precedence and simultaneity. The statement “no event is earlier than itself” can thus be
said to analytic because it concerns the meaning structure of natural language explicated
in the causal theory of time; it can be said to be synthetic a priori because, in
encompassing all possible events, it is about what is actually the case.209 Once a metric is
introduced, time serves as a universal to classify entities according to the measurable
property duration.
The innovation behind van Fraassen’s adaptation of Wittgenstein’s idea of logical
space is his view of it as synthesis of existing indefinite concrete structure with nonexisting definite abstract structure.

Duns Scotus argued that time is an aspect of

movement and a measure, thus both mind-independent and mind-dependent, and van
Fraassen makes a very similar claim:
… the view that time is a logical space allows a “Scotist” synthesis on the question
whether time is a mind-dependent entity. A logical space is a mathematical construct used
to represent …; and that means, of course, used by us. If we users and representators did
not exist, neither would there be something being used to represent. The real line cannot be
used to represent the actual temporal structure of events unless the latter can be embedded
in it. This is purely and entirely an objective question of empirical fact. But neither can the
real line thus be used unless there are those capable of using it. Hence, in that case the
logical space time (which is something used to represent something else) could not then
exist.210 (1970a, 107)

Time is a logical space, which is to say that it is a representation. In representing certain
conceptual interconnections time is an idealized “model” (Ibid., 192) representing real
events by embedding their structure. If we abstract from this use by us, there is just a set
of real numbers, an abstract entity with no greater claim to existence than any other in
nominalist eyes. This is behind van Fraassen’s cryptic conclusion “that it is not necessary
to say that there is such a thing as time, but that if we do, the best possible answer to the
further question what kind of thing it is, is that it is a logical space” (Ibid., 106). If what
we refer to by “time” is taken de dicto then it does not exist; if what we refer to by “time”
is taken de re then it does. Hence, it is not necessary to say that time exists, but if we do
say that it exists then it is an imaginative structure embedding concrete structure (cf. van
Fraassen 2010a, 464).
This view of time dovetails with van Fraassen’s Sartrean view of the
phenomenology of bare experience. Unlike the order of all possible events, the order of
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actual events is not settled in one way or another: “the definiteness of the relation
between the order [of events] and what is ordered resides mainly in how the matter is to
be conceived, and is underdetermined by the facts” (van Fraassen 1991b, 19). But in
claiming time is a form of all possible worlds, van Fraassen must pay a price: “I have, I
suppose, given up that demarcation between the real and the imagined worlds in terms of
determinacy” (Ibid., 34). He argues, accordingly, that imaginative construction of the
definite structure of real events that happen to us and that we are aware cannot be
distinguished from that of the construction of the definite structure of fictional events
encountered reading a novel.211
After introducing a time metric and the Euclidean space metric van Fraassen
transitions from the causal theory of time to a theory of Euclidean space and a theory of
the space-time implicit in the special theory of relativity (1970a, 188-191). Inasmuch as
he claims time is a representation through the set of real numbers (the real number
system), he claims space is a representation through “the set of all triples of real numbers”
(the Cartesian coordinate system) and space-time is a representation through “the set of
all quadruples of real numbers” (Minkowsi space-time) (Ibid., 167); in other words, space
and space-time are also logical spaces. Van Fraassen’s obiter dictum extends here as
well, and becomes perspicuous in the context of his theory of Euclidean space.
Reichenbach identified principles he called “coordinative definitions” to transform
a mathematical geometry – understood as “a purely abstract, deductive system, with
nothing to say about physical relations” (van Fraassen 1970a, 132) – into a physical
geometry:
(1) The path of a light ray in vacuo is a straight line.
(2) A rigid body free of distorting influences remains the same size when transported.

However, in addition to the fact that these principles are not in proper definitional form,
van Fraassen claims they are also not in proper modal form:
… the question which is the correct geometry has no answer unless the interpretation
through coordinative definitions is a total interpretation: since there is quite possibly a
certain paucity of actual lightrays and other physical connections, there would in principle
be infinitely many geometries that fit the actual facts equally well. Hence it is necessary to
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say, for example, that the geodesics are the possible lightray paths. (van Fraassen 1972,
325)

His point is that if there is to be an interpretation of mathematical geometry, then
principles purporting to connect theoretical relations with physical correlates must single
out a structure. A problem in singling out Euclidean geometry, for example, is that “any
two points lie on a straight line, but not necessarily on a light ray” (van Fraassen 1991a,
6); i.e., Euclidean geometry gives us more straight lines than there are actual light ray
paths because the latter are absent in the dark and do not pass through opaque objects.
And so we cannot say a coordinative definition interprets Euclidean mathematical
geometry unless correlates for straight lines in the dark and straight lines passing through
opaque objects are identified in a “complete” (Ibid.) translation.
Van Fraassen concludes that to do the interpretive job Reichenbach presupposes
them to do, principles (1) and (2) must be amended to the following:212
(1a) The path ABC is a straight line if and only if it could be the path of a light ray.
(2a) An object is 1-meter long if and only if it could be brought into exact coincidence with
the meter standard kept in Paris.

But now it appears a complete interpretation presupposes modal realism. Since “an
empiricist position must entail that the philosophical exploration of modality, even where
it occurs in science, is to be part of the theory of meaning” (van Fraassen 1987, 122), the
challenge in rejecting modal realism is to substitute a meaningful extension of e.g., actual
light ray paths to all possible light ray paths, that can be stated without recourse to the
geometrical language to be interpreted through this extension. This is where van Fraassen
thinks the idea of logical space can do work in the syntactic view:

Euclidean

mathematical geometry interpreted through proper coordinative definitions has “intuitive
content” in that it describes a representation of a conceptual framework of natural
language, i.e., the Cartesian coordinate system presenting a structure of all possible light
ray paths embedding the structure of actual light ray paths.
This appeal to the Cartesian coordinate system to solve an interpretive problem is
not ad hoc. It is justified as a matter of conceptual phenomenology. We do not imagine
space as possibly having been different from what it is, but only the order of positions in
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space as having been possibly different (van Fraassen 1970a, 99). We thus imagine
actual entities through a logical space.
Tentatively we may conclude the following: A mathematical geometry [construed as an
axiomatic deductive system] describes what we have previously called a logical space. The
coordinative definitions place or map physical objects and relations into this space. But
they cannot do this with complete definiteness unless we allow them to rely on
counterfactual assertions. (van Fraassen 1970a, 132-133)

The tentative conclusion is that our imagining of actual entities in space can be
reconstructed as the mapping of real entities onto points of the Cartesian coordinate
system in a way that preserves their spatial relations. This mapping relation is described
by principles (1) and (2).213 Definitions (1a) and (2a) merge principles (1) and (2) with
counterfactual conditionals that, in addition, describe elements of the coordinate system
to which non-actual but possible entities would be mapped if counter to the fact
conditions obtain.

By “filling-in” the Cartesian coordinate system in this way the

structure of Euclidean space is singled out and the mapping of actual physical correlates
occurs to definite regions. Definitions (1a) and (2a) thus effect a “total interpretation”
without modal realism, since interpreted Euclidean mathematical geometry can then be
taken to describe an embedding structure that is part ideal and part real and that represents
a conceptual framework of natural language. See Figure 4.1:
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(Euclidean Geometry)

complete translation

describes

Logical Space
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embeds

“Proper” Coordinative
Definitions
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Figure 4.1: Proper Coordinative Definitions and Logical Space
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Since he took physical geometry (and the causal theory of time) to be a
“rudimentary physical theory” (1970a, 132) and Reichenbach’s coordinative definitions
as the “paradigm … case of correspondence rules linking a theory to physical facts”
(1972, 325), it seems van Fraassen thought this account of interpretation extended to
scientific theories in general.214 But it was only “tentatively” presented in the form of
obiter comments at this time because without “a tenable theory of counterfactuals in
general” (Ibid., 198) it was regarded as “somewhat audacious” (Ibid, 197).

4.3.2 The Semantic Approach to Scientific Theories
Apparently motivated by considerations of quantum logic,215 van Fraassen’s
causal theory of time was part of a larger and more ambitious enterprise of retrenching
the formal semantics of scientific language in logical space. His starting position for this
project was Carnap’s general view of scientific language in Meaning and Synonymy:216
It is today still mainly a natural language (except for its mathematical part), with only a few
explicitly made conventions for some special words or symbols. It is a variant of the prescientific language, caused by special professional needs. (1956a, 241)

In this paper, Carnap wanted to provide “a practical motivation and justification for the
introduction of corresponding concepts in pure semantics with respect to constructed
languages” (Ibid., 247).

He argued that pure semantical concepts like intension,

synonymy, and analyticity are explicata for corresponding pragmatic concepts that can be
determined by a linguist, and thus have a “good scientific status” (Ibid.). Relevant for our
purposes is that he defined the intension of a predicate “as its range, which comprehends
those possible kinds of objects for which the predicate holds” (Ibid., 238), claiming that
“[t]he intension of a predicate for a speaker X is, roughly speaking, the general condition
which an object must fulfil for X to be willing to apply the predicate to it” (Ibid., 246).
This is determined by a linguist who conducts an interview of the speaker by presenting a
range of possible cases to apply or not apply the predicate.
Van Fraassen’s retrenchment of formal semantics in logical space is based on
Carnap’s concept of the intension of a predicate insofar as it appears in connection with
meaning relations, what van Fraassen calls “relations of intent”217 (1967, 163). Earlier we
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saw the meaning relation “no event is earlier than itself”. In general, relations of intent
are relations of exclusion, inclusion and equivalence among the range of predicates: e.g.,
“red excludes green”; “red includes scarlet”; “red matches red”.

Although these

examples appeal to the range of monadic predicates, relations of intent extend to
predicates of various degrees. Like Carnap, van Fraassen claims that to be significant and
relevant to the study of language relations of intent must have a pragmatic counterpart
that is not abstracted from user and context of use, but determined with less intervention
through a questionnaire assessing linguistic commitment (Ibid., 168-170).
Van Fraassen describes his semantic approach to the language of science as
follows:
Our view, to put it succinctly, is that in natural and scientific language, there are meaning
relations among the terms which are not merely relations of extension. When a particular
part of natural language is adapted for a technical role in the language of science, it is
because its meaning structure is especially suited for this role. And this meaning structure
has a representation in terms of a model (always a mathematical structure, and most usually
some mathematical space). This language game then has a natural formal reconstruction as
an artificial language the semantics of which is given with reference to this mathematical
structure (called a “semi-interpreted language”…). … [T]he meaning relations referred to
above are such that certain logically contingent statements will always be true, in virtue of
the meanings of the terms which occur in them. In other words, the mathematical structure
with reference to which the language is partly interpreted plays a role in determining
validity, and we may say in such a case that a statement is analytic or holds a priori in a
broad sense. (1970b, 327)

Here we see the idea of logical space generalized to such spaces as PVT space in
elementary gas theory, phase space in classical mechanics, and Hilbert space in quantum
mechanics. In these sophisticated cases a logical space is usually not a model. Here a
“model” is a solution to equations that formulate a theory mapped in a logical space. The
logical space is the form of representation that serves to classify phenomena according to
their measurable properties. Even so, van Fraassen’s claims concerning logical space as
model extend to a logical space of models.
It is important to recognize the distinction being made at this point between a
logical space as a representation of meaning relations in natural language and a logical
space as a reconstruction of these relations in formal semantics. The latter is abstracted
from the user and involves the transformation of a mathematical entity218 into to a
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linguistic one. Typically in formal semantics an artificial language comprises syntax
(vocabulary and grammar) and models (a family of interpretations of the syntax). In van
Fraassen’s formal semantics, reconstructive logical space adds structure to syntax through
a function mapping the grammar of the language to regions of logical space in a way that
recovers the topological structure219 of representative logical space and thereby the
meaning relations of the natural language it represents. See Figure 4.2:
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Figure 4.2: Logical Space as Reconstruction and Representation

In reconstructive logical space, explication of meaning relations of natural
language is based on three functions. The first is an interpretation function f that maps
predicates to regions of a nonempty set of elements H. Given H and f, a reconstructive
logical space is “identified with the couple <H, { f(P): P a predicate}>” (van Fraassen
1969, 160). A satisfaction function h maps a grammar attributing states or values to
regions of logical space structured by the interpretation function.220 The grammar is a set
of well formed formulas called “elementary statements”, sentences about measurable
physical magnitudes that are reconstructions of observation reports.

In virtue of

describing logical space the language is said to be “semi-interpreted” (van Fraassen 1967,
173). A function loc maps a physical system X via its state to points in these regions.221
In the context of reconstructive logical space, a “model” is a couple M = <loc, X>. There
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arises a truth-definition of an elementary statement: an elementary statement is true in the
model if and only if loc(X) belongs to the region of the elementary statement. Van
Fraassen calls this region of reconstructive logical space the “proposition” of the
statement (1991a, 30). A “model structure” is the logical space together with a domain of
physical systems and a function assigning a location in logical space to each system,
while a family of such model structures comprises the “possible world model structures”
of a theory formulated in that language (van Fraassen 1980, 198-201).
“The family of propositions in general inherits a certain amount of structure from
the geometric character of the state-space. To explore that structure is ipso facto to
explore the logic of elementary statements” (van Fraassen 1991a, 30). A reconstructive
logical space is thus a propositional framework constituted by reconstructions of natural
meaning relations as reflected in certain of the valid (true in every model) statements of
the artificial language. Since meaning relations are relations among the intension of
predicates, i.e., their range which comprehends those possible kinds of real entities for
which the predicate holds, the framework concerns universal properties and relations that
can also recover the laws222 of the theory as well as its taxonomy.
Van Fraassen’s semantic approach “gives a formal representation to a certain view
of analyticity and synthetic a priori (essentially that of W. Sellars…)” (1967, 156).223 The
meaning relations are expressed by synthetic a priori propositions such as “whatever is
red is not green”; “whatever is scarlet is red”; “whatever is red matches whatever is red”.
It seems he regards these propositions as a priori because they are descriptive of our
conceptual framework and synthetic because what they describe is a form of all possible
worlds defeasible with experience.

It should be emphasized that with his formal

semantics van Fraassen is not (at this point) rejecting the syntactic approach, only hoping
to analyze the structure of physical theories in a way that “will also prove fruitful”
(1970b, 338; cf. 326).
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4.4 Circa 1980: Constructive Empiricism
4.4.1 Carving-Up Logical Space
The 1970’s appears to have been a particularly creative time for van Fraassen as
he was realizing the full implications of his semantic approach to scientific theories and
battling the new onslaught of scientific realism.

As he recalls (1985b, 199-203),

absolutism had re-emerged in the philosophy of space and time with advances in
understanding the general theory of relativity. He had not specifically considered the
theory in his early work, but it had became clear that “[t]he models of this theory do not
have a common space-time; they are space-times” (Ibid., 209).

His continued

commitment to the idea of logical space in space-time became more or less an article of
philosophical faith.224
Ongoing problems with the syntactic view of theories prompted van Fraassen to
reject it altogether and to move towards adopting the obiter dictum he had included in his
first book:

“the causal theory should say only that the structure of actual causal

connections can be embedded in the relevant logical space” (van Fraassen 1985b, 207).
But his philosophical narrative also shifted noticeably from talk of logical spaces to talk
of models simpliciter. This was likely due to having replaced the syntactic view with
Suppes’ semantic view that “to present a theory, we define the class of its models
directly” (van Fraassen 1987, 109).225
While models took to the centre, the idea of logical space still set the stage for van
Fraassen’s overall approach to philosophy of science.

One might surmise that

reconstructive logical space provided an intuitive clue how the debate with scientific
realism could be recast. Suppe summarizes:
Ontological commitments are left unconstrained, being a matter of which logical space
points one wishes to ontologically commit. Such commitments are via individual mapping
functions (Loc functions) from real-world objects to points in logical space … [A] realist
has Loc functions onto every state variable and maintains that a theory is empirically true
just in case theory-structure-allowed state transitions are identical to those possibly
occurring in the actual world. Antirealists do not commit ontologically to all state
variables. They only require countenancing Loc functions from observables and that
theories be empirically adequate: If W is that portion of reality to which one attaches Loc
functions, the image M* of W is among the models comprising the theory. ... Antirealism
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thus is just realism attenuated to the range of one’s ontological commitment. (2000, S106S107)

Shifting back to representative logical space involves recognizing that M* corresponds to
a set of points M** satisfying the measurable parameters of a set of equations. Since the
class of mathematical models that a theory presents satisfies all parameters of the
equations, M** is the “empirical substructure” of at least one these models. The debate
with anti-realists can simply be re-cast as disagreement over which set of points in
representational logical space corresponds to real entities or, in other words, what an
adequate representation amounts to.

The realist maintains it amounts to “an exact

correspondence between reality and one of its models” (van Fraassen 1980, 197), while
the anti-realist takes it that the total representation “has some model such that all
appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model” (Ibid., 64).226 For
van Fraassen this difference in representational adequacy is just a difference between
truth in toto and empirical adequacy in the semantic view of theories.
With this clue in mind, perhaps, van Fraassen saw his task as one of distinguishing
realism and anti-realism other than by fiat. His first step was to point out that science
itself carves up logical space: “theory draws a picture of the world. But science itself
designates certain areas in this picture as observable” (1980, 57). This is because science
describes the human organism as “a certain kind of measuring apparatus” (Ibid., 17):
… science itself delineates, at least to some extent, the observable parts of the world it
describes. Measurement interactions are a special subclass of physical interactions in
general. The structures definable from measurement data are a subclass of the physical
structures described. It is in this way that science itself distinguishes the observable which
it postulates from the whole it postulates. The distinction, being in part a function of the
limits science discloses on human observation, is an anthropocentric one. But science
displays human observers among the physical systems it means to describe, it also gives
itself the task of describing anthropocentric distinctions. (Ibid., 59)

His second step was to highlight only the observable area of logical space as relevant to
representational adequacy. Ingeniously he does this through a doctrine of the aim of
science:
If I say, without qualification, that I accept a theory, I certainly convey my belief that it is
successful. But what counts as success depends on the aim; indeed, the aim of an
enterprise is to be identified through the relevant criteria of success. And I take the aim of
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science to be empirical success – success in the representation of empirical phenomena.
(1985b, 201)

As discussed already, to “convey my belief” does not mean to justify or warrant it. It only
means to assert that the representation is adequate: “[t]he scientist, in accepting the
theory, is asserting the picture to be accurate in those areas” (van Fraassen 1980, 57).
Constructive empiricism simply claims that the aim of accurately representing the
phenomena is sufficient to recover the intentional activity of science as rational, which is
to say that the aim of science is to correlate all actual and observable entities with a set of
points within a logical space of models. To say the activity of science aims for anything
more is not irrational, just supererogatory to answering the question “What is science?”.

4.4.2 A New Theory of Natural Language
Constructive empiricism brought with it a different perspective on the relationship
between logical space and natural language. It could no longer be said that a logical
space represents the conceptual framework of a scientific language. A logical space is
accepted along with a class of models in the acceptance of a scientific theory, and must
therefore be understood as somehow determining the conceptual framework. This marks
a return towards the Wittgensteinian conception. Van Fraassen responds accordingly by
attributing to representational logical space features of his reconstructive logical space,
namely the feature of a propositional framework.
“I cannot pretend that we have a theory of language which is satisfactory or
anywhere near complete” (van Fraassen 1980, 199),227 van Fraassen admits, but the
general idea behind it is fairly clear. A key to understanding it is to realize that if we
equate imagining and conceiving as van Fraassen does, we can think of the relation
between a representational logical space of models and the conceptual framework of
scientific language in two equivalent ways: an interpretive framework and an imaginative
guide. See Figure 4.3:
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Figure 4.3: Logical Space as Interpretive Framework and Imaginative Guide

The new notion of a logical space of models as an interpretive framework is evident in the
following passage:
The idea of logical space: that our language is governed by certain models, and that
primary interpretation of language is in these models (with reference sometimes established
via further relations of these models to reality)…. (van Fraassen 1985b, 207)

More perspicuously:
If the link between language and reality is mediated by models, it may be a very incomplete
link – without depriving the language of a complete semantic structure. The idea is that the
interpretation of language is not simply an association of a real denotata with grammatical
expressions. Instead, the interpretation proceeds in two steps. First, expressions are
assigned values in the family of models and their logical relations derive from relations
among these values. Next, reference or denotation is gained indirectly because those model
elements may correspond to elements of reality. (1987, 122)

What van Fraassen is suggesting is that the truth conditions of a natural scientific
language are regions of ideal representational elements in a logical space of models.
These regions are propositions in the sense that to understand the language is ipso facto to
imaginatively grasp these regions. In the case of a true observation report an element in
its proposition corresponds to the real entity actually observed. Whether elements in
other types of propositions are taken to correspond to elements of reality (e.g., to
dinosaurs, distant galaxies, electrons, and possible universes) depends on whether the
status we accord accepted theories requires it. Constructive empiricism tells us that the
rationality of scientific activity requires only that elements representing the actual and
observable be taken as corresponding to elements of reality. In a remarkably Hertzian
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way it also tells us that scientific realists make the mistake of projecting additional
elements onto the world.
The idea of a logical space of models as an interpretive framework is behind van
Fraassen’s position that the language of science is to be literally construed (1980, 10).
This position has a number of interesting characteristics. We see that in the case of an
observation report the meaning of the sentence is determined by truth conditions through
a region of the logical space in which what is meant is located if and only if the sentence
is true. This illustrates how the meaning of a true statement is a “Scotist synthesis” of
elements that are both conventional and real.228 But while an object, event or process “is
logically implied by a direct report of the seeing that” (van Fraassen 2011a, 438), it
appears that in the case of a statement that is not an observation report but nonetheless
expresses a proposition concerning what is actual and observable, an object, event or
process is rationally implied by virtue of the status we accord the proposition itself.
Constructive empiricism also illuminates that our discourse about unobservable entities
concern fictions,229 expressing propositions under the supposition of the adequacy of their
representation.230 Similarly, “it as typical of modal and causal discourse that it receives
its full interpretation only in the logical space (or somewhat more sophisticated models)
and need not be understood in terms of reference and extension” (1985b, 207).231
The other way to think of the relation between a logical space of models and the
conceptual framework of scientific language is as an imaginative guide. This is a view of
language in which “discourse is guided by models or pictures, and … the logic of
discourse is constituted by guidance” (van Fraassen 1987, 122). Van Fraassen probably
owes the most to Sellars (1963) for this position.

Rejecting his earlier traditional

empiricist view that concepts are formed from particulars, Sellars proposes an alternative
account of concept formation in terms of learning a conceptual framework. This involves
becoming habituated to conform to a conceptual structure (learning “intra-linguistic
moves”) (Ibid., 314). It also involves being conditioned to respond to kinds of situations
with specific kinds of verbal structures (learning “language entry transitions”) (Ibid.),
incorporating his earlier view that our concepts capture our belief in natural regularities
by carrying general propositions as presuppositions.232 Since he takes our conceptual
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framework to be guided by a logical space of models, van Fraassen views Sellarsian
conditioning generally as one of our “immersion in the theoretical world-picture” (1980,
81) informing assumptions and suppositions in our use of language (see Ibid., 200). Our
concepts are laden with predictions and classifications of observable properties in virtue
of the epistemic dimension of theory acceptance, while the pragmatic dimension of
acceptance accounts for our commitment to theoretical explanations appealing to
unobservable entities as well as counterfactual, causal and modal locutions (see Ibid.,
202).233
Because a logical space of models is taken to be an imaginative guide, its
topological structure is thought to determine (in part at least) the logical structure of a
language. This is evident from van Fraassen’s understanding of logic as a philosophical
discipline:
The phenomena, for us, are patterns of assertion and inference. This means that we do not
have the task of representing the way the world is, but only the way it is thought of: the
picture that guides reasoning. If this point is ignored, then we find ourselves doing a
particularly naïve sort of pre-Kantian metaphysics, trying to correlate all aspects of our
models to reality. … What we should hold is only that we can save the common
phenomena of inference, if we regard the agents as thinking of the world as surrounded by
a halo of possible alternative worlds, actuality but an arbitrary fragment of an intricately
woven web of possibilities …. (1978, 19-20)

To “regard the agents as thinking of the world as surrounded by a halo of possible
alternative worlds” is just to look upon our cognition of reality as structured through
logical spaces of models, accounting for the “form” (van Fraassen 1980, 198) or “shape”
(van Fraassen 1992, 13) of natural language that can be recovered in the formal semantics
of a reconstructive logical space.

4.4.3 Literate Experience and Our Knowledge of Structure
The idea of a logical space of models as an imaginative guide to discourse is
behind van Fraassen’s view that experience is literate and his account of how perception
is theory laden. His view of experience involves distinguishing between observing an
entity and observing that something or other is the case (1980, 15). He later explains it
this way:
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As I see it, the main ambiguity in the philosophical notion of experience is between, on the
one hand, what happens to us that we are aware of, and on the other hand, our immediate
and spontaneous response to what happens to us. What happens to us, and which of the
events that happen to us are noticed by us, those are factual questions whose answers
depend on theory-independent factors. But how we respond – and here I include the very
first, spontaneous response to those events, prior to any discursive thought – is clearly
conditioned by the language in which we live. Any judgement involved in that response
(such as “Lo! phlogiston escaping!”) always involves some implicit description of the
event. This description is historically conditioned – and in general, theory-laden – to a very
large extent. (van Fraassen 2000, 1658)

From the phenomenology of experience van Fraassen argues that experience is “Janusfaced” (2002a, 134)234 in the sense that it is constituted by both by a real aspect, i.e., what
happens to us and that we are aware, and a textual aspect, i.e., our perceptual judgment of
what befalls us.235 In this way experience is said to be literate. Seeing is not believing;236
“seeing is reading”: if a person “sees a rat, he also ‘reads’ the word “rat” – the natural
object has become for him a different inscription of that same word. He has been
conditioned to respond to his experience of a rat with the observation report “Lo, a rat!”
(2002b, 6).

But the conditioning may such as to involve concepts laden with

“implications that go far beyond the immediate deliverances of experience” as when I
judge something I fall over to be a radio and spontaneously infer electromagnetic waves
(van Fraassen 2006a, 126). A perceptual judgement is expressible as an observation
report (“language entry transition”)237 that carries these implications (“intra-linguistic
move”).
This multi-faceted view of experience allows for “a quite sharp separation
between epistemology and semantics” (van Fraassen 2000, 1658).

Our theory-

independent awareness of what happens to us is the subject of semantics where we
encounter empirical realism and a deflationary conception of truth.

Van Fraassen

subscribes to a “common sense realism in which reference to observable phenomena is
unproblematic:

rocks, seas, stars, persons, bicycles …” (2008, 3).238

Adopting the

Tarskian equivalence “‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white”, whether a
statement is true depends on what the entities it describes are like.239 This conception of
truth does not imply the existence of in re structure. Following Quine, “all that is needed
for ‘Snow is white’ to be true is that snow be white, and that does not imply the existence
of anything but snow” (Ibid., 248). “I do not see properties” (1993, 440), van Fraassen
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asserts, and “[a]pplying the predicate to a subject is simple attribution or predication, and
does not bring along an extraneous existential commitment” (2010b, 553).
But since the determination of truth presupposes knowledge of meaning, what is
implied for “Snow is white” to be true is that the statement is assigned a region of colourspace corresponding to the predicate “white”. This just follows from van Fraassen’s view
of colour space as an interpretive framework. The truth of the assertion becomes a
correct classification of a real entity by “assigning it a location in that [region of the
colour] spectrum” (van Fraassen 1980, 201). (Note that at this early stage “assigning a
location” was not described as in virtue of the self.)
By contrast, the subject of epistemology is our theory-laden response to what
happens where we attribute properties and relations to real entities and acquire knowledge
of their structure. But the knowledge we acquire is not what it seems:
What nature is like does not depend on what our experience or representation of nature is
like. But we must not confuse this point with naïve realism about how we ourselves exist in
this world. As for us, we discern structure in nature; but the structure we discern there, we
discern in the same way as we discern a story when looking at ink marks on a page. (van
Fraassen 2002b, 16)

Recall, for example, that we discern the temporal structure of events in nature in the same
way that we discern the temporal order of events reading a novel:
… only the structure of all events taken as a whole is set in time, since correct “placing” of
events is determined by their mutual relations. And there may remain in principle more
than one way to determine the placing. Rather than postulate some transcendent criterion
of correctness – whether through counterfactual facts or in any other way – I suggest we
accept the same imminent vagueness for the order of real events, as we do for the order of
narrated events, underdetermined by the text. In both cases the world is conceived as
determinate, but the necessity in how things are to be conceived does not engender a
necessity in how they must be. (van Fraassen 1991b, 34)

Unlike Antoine Roquentin’s reflective deconstruction of the textual aspect of experience
that reveals the structure of bare experience as indefinite, our spontaneous experience of
concrete structure is an interpretation of reality in virtue of locating it in a determinate
structure guiding perceptual judgement. But for van Fraassen to claim as Antoine would
that the “reality of which I have a robust sense need not itself be all that robust, solid,
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definite” (Ibid.) is not to claim as Kant would that we are the source of empirical
structure:
If I know, as I do, that snow is white, that many apples are red, that there are nine planets
orbiting our sun, does it not follow that I know something about the structure of the world?
In saying these things are true, I attribute structure to the world, but my attributing does not
make them true. … We can say that we attribute structure to nature whenever we describe
something in nature – that is innocuous, if all we mean by “attribute structure” is that we
say that some things are thus or so, and related to other things in such or such manner. To
attribute structure in this sense – which seems quite in order to me – is not to create
structure, nor to be the source of structure – it is simply to describe. (van Fraassen 2006a,
157)

The attribution of empirical structure involves a Scotist synthesis of mind-dependent and
mind-independent entities that comes close to the Hertzian projection of empirical
structure we saw in the second chapter. Our attribution of structure – equivalently, our
knowledge of structure – is “built up” from properties and relations delivered in
experience and “built down” from a logical space of models that extrapolates them to
properties and relations of all possible worlds. To the extent that we take our attributions
of empirical structure to be definite or determinate, the ultimate source of structure is our
value-based decisions to privilege certain properties and relations through acceptance of a
logical space of models:
No wonder our nouns and adjectives speak loudly of what is pertinent to our tasks – our
language grew up in praxis. In that sense we furnish the grounds for how our descriptions
are structured. Even the words “world” and “nature” and “thing” belong to the vocabulary
that grew up with us in this way. Therefore all we can really say is that there is structure in
our descriptions of what we describe – nothing new is added of we replace “what we
describe” by “world” or “nature”. The divisions marked in our descriptions – and what
other divisions are you asking about? – are those which are important to us. This
importance is entirely summarized by saying ‘they are ours’ – ‘a poor thing but our own’.
(van Fraassen 2009, 470-471)

But having been built up from experience our attribution structure is constrained by
reality, for it is always possible that our expectations will disappoint us.
From the historical content of van Fraassen’s writing it appears his epistemology
developed around his idea of logical space and doctrine of the aim of science.240 In
claiming that “[r]ationality is only bridled irrationality” in that “what is rational to believe
includes anything that one is not rationally compelled to disbelieve (1989, 173), our
privileging of properties and relations in the determination of structure is not taken to be a
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matter of justification or warrant, but only coherence (2009, 469-470). Until there is
reliable evidence to tell us otherwise, it is rational to allow a logical space of models to
condition our perceptual judgements:
An accepted theory may be wrong. If we attend critically to our experience and we have
the proper ration of epistemic luck, this falsity will manifest itself in the disappointment of
expectations shaped by that theory. Until that happens, however, all those expectations
may well be legitimate, warranted, entitled, rational, reasonable, what have you. The
grounds adduced for them will be reports on our experience themselves shaped by that very
theory, couched in its terms, and implying counterfactuals and predictions via that theory.
(2000, 1658)

In the practice of science disappointed expectations arise through observation reports
expressing perceptual judgement, serving as “evidence that a certain phenomenon
occurred” (2004a, 3). Although they are non-representational,241 these reports are used to
construct data models242 that are. A logical space of models is taken to be empirically
inadequate if it lacks an empirical substructure that is isomorphic to a relevant and
(presumably) accepted data model.243

4.5 Circa 1990: Empiricist Structuralism
4.5.1 The Problem of Coordination and the “Wittgensteinian Turn"
Recall that one of van Fraassen’s insights from his causal theory of time was that
the syntactic view of theories cannot account for the interpretation of theoretical terms
without proper coordinative definitions that single (or at least significantly narrow down)
out a structure. But if modal realism is to be rejected, proper coordinative definitions can
bestow meaning only through “intuitive content” understood as ideal elements of a
representational mathematical structure some of which correspond to real entities. It
seems that because this intuitive content was thought in the first instance to represent
natural language, van Fraassen simply took the position that “coordinates are assigned to
entities in such a way that the mathematical relations among the coordinates reflect those
relations among the entities that we mean to describe (van Fraassen 1970a, 5-6).
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Along with the advent of constructive empiricism the syntactic view of theories
was rejected, and van Fraassen’s concern over proper coordinative definitions was castoff as a pseudo-problem:
If … we translate ‘straight line’ as ‘possible light ray path’ the theoretical element is not
absent, and the criteria of application are indefinite; is this possibility relative to laws and
circumstances which could be stated without recourse to geometric language? The
opposite view is to consider mathematics in use an abstraction from the science that uses it,
and to leave the reconstruction of language along formalist lines to a different philosophical
enterprise. (van Fraassen 1991a, 6)

But just like the loc function in van Fraassen’s formal semantics, the mathematical
function assigning coordinates to real entities now stood naked, abstracted from the user
and context of use. Without knowing it van Fraassen fell squarely within the scope of a
devastating objection Newman had levelled against Russell’s structuralist program.
In The Analysis of Matter (1927) Russell presented a causal theory of perception
that claimed our knowledge of the external world is only structural, i.e., we know only the
properties of the properties and relations of external causes that stand in a one-one
correspondence with our individual percepts. Newman (1928) objected that on this view
all we know about the external world is the cardinality of causes, for given any number of
individual percepts we can always impose a structure on the external world compatible
with that number. In other words, the same cardinality of percepts and causes implies the
existence of a correspondence whereby there is an implicit transfer of the relations among
the percepts to among those causes.

Under Russell’s program, our knowledge of

structure of the external world is therefore trivial: but for cardinality, a structure of
percepts cannot pick out anything in the causes.

Unfortunately for van Fraassen

Newman’s objection lay dormant for many years, resurfacing much later in philosophy of
science in a paper by Demopoulos and Friedman (1984).
If we replace individual percepts and external causes with individual points in
logical space and real entities then the objection will obviously apply to van Fraassen’s
idea of logical space. An assertion that a structural representation is adequate is only an
assertion that there are properties and relations instantiating certain general properties.
But the latter leave the former unspecified, and so the assertion is trivial. But for an
empirical assumption concerning cardinality, embedding is a logical fact,244 one leaving a
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representative logical space of models practically devoid of empirical content. Given the
centrality of the idea of logical space the consequences overwhelm van Fraassen’s view
of science: 1) the notion theoretical truth, whether in toto or in part, is trivial; 2) the aim
of constructing an adequate structural representation is too easy to achieve to make sense
of the scientific activity such as theory-testing; and 3) how theoretical terms receive
empirical reference is left unexplained.
Before examining van Fraassen’s general response, it is instructive to compare
him against Wittgenstein in the case of an elementary logical space. For Wittgenstein,
recall, a coordinate value correlates to an essential simple object, i.e., an object that can
potentially combine with other objects of the same kind. Whether it does or does not is a
contingent matter, but if it does there arises an elementary state of affairs.

In

propositional thought the self projects itself as the whole of logical space where a point of
the space is an elementary proposition representing a possible state of affairs. In virtue of
“feelers” reaching out from its coordinate values to simple objects, the point may or may
not correspond to a state of affairs.

But coordination with reality is prior to this

determination of truth or falsity and, I have argued, is the prior coordination of the self
with reality. For van Fraassen logical space is not projected; it is just “there”. An
elementary proposition is a set of points in logical space, each of which can serve as an
element onto which an inessential real entity is mapped. In and of itself, a coordinate
value does not correlate with anything real. The mapping is thought to exist simply as a
matter of representational adequacy highlighted by a doctrine of aim. What Newman’s
objection shows is that shared cardinality alone is sufficient for this mapping to exist.
From the point of view of van Fraassen’s idea of logical space the problem of
coordination is just one of assigning locations to real observable entities in a way that
preserves their properties and relations without presupposing a description guided by that
space. But in Scientific Representation van Fraassen sees the problem manifested in a
cluster of interrelated issues plaguing structural representation since the Bildtheorie view
of science exemplified by Hertz.

One problem he identifies Wittgenstein already

canvassed: limited to representational content alone, the application of structure leads to
infinite regress.

Wittgenstein made use of this to justify his claim that there is an
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essential reality that shares the same form as pictures. Van Fraassen’s (1992) response is
to shift the base of the metaphor for logical space from a concrete model to a concrete
map. He turns to Kant for insight into what this regress is telling us:
… the most precise map of the heavens … would not enable me… to infer … on which
side of the horizon I ought to expect the sun to rise if it did not, in addition to specifying the
positions of the stars relative to each other, also specify the direction by reference to the
position of the chart relative to my hands. ((Kant 1992), as quoted in (van Fraassen 2008,
80))

Van Fraassen takes Kant to pointing out the “inevitable indexicality of application”
(Ibid.) and that pertinent information for application cannot be found in the content of a
structural representation:
It is not as if there is an object or event that is indescribable, ineffable, beyond the reach of
objective or impersonal description. This act of self-description too can be described and
the information can be included on a bigger map (with the label “location of vF’s mapreading at time t”). But then what I need to use this new map is still a self-ascription of
location with respect to it. … An attempt to replace or eliminate these self-ascriptions leads
to an infinite regress, using an infinite series of maps. (Ibid., 79)

Use of a map requires infusion of non-structural information expressible in an indexical
judgement such as “I am here” or “this is there” on a map. As a condition of use, selfascription of location, or simply “self-location”, is a condition of representation, for we
do not bestow the status of a representation upon maps we cannot use. But if I must be
able to locate the reality of my situation on a map for it to be a representation, then the
assertion that it is adequate to its domain of application cannot be said to be trivial, for we
bestow a representational status upon the map only if it respects the properties and
relations we discriminate when using it.
Claiming “[t]here is here a precise and perfect analogy between theory, model,
and map” (van Fraassen 2008, 80) here, the problem of infinite regress is taken to justify
self-location as a solution to the problem of coordination. To use a model that a scientific
theory presents, I must locate phenomena in the model’s logical space. A key move van
Fraassen makes is to say that self-location is involved in the theoretical classification of
entities in perceptual judgement and to make clear that this use of a theory is logically
independent of, and prior to, the assertion and assessment of the representational
adequacy of the theory.245 Thus the assertion that a theory is empirically adequate is not
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trivial. The only relevant models in relation to which such an assertion is made must
respect properties and relations I can discriminate among phenomena when I locate them
in the logical space common to these models. Except for the special role given to the self,
this solution is, in the main, just a pragmatic elaboration of a position already found in
The Scientific Image.246

More precisely, it is the identification of the pragmatic

counterpart to the semantic concept of a loc function suggested in van Fraassen’s formal
semantics,247 but determined by philosophical reflection rather than questionnaire.
Self-location is a “linguistic act” (van Fraassen 1992, 10) of perceptual judgement
through which I can describe real entities I am presently witnessing, the relevant parts of
mathematical models, and how they are related to each other (see van Fraassen 2008, 388,
n. 28). It is something I know to be case that is not part of the representational content of
a scientific theory, and it is expressible in an indexical judgment in such terms as “I am
now here in the space of possible states” (van Fraassen 2008, 78) or, more generally,
“this, in front of me, is there in the [logical] space” (Ibid., 212). Van Fraassen refers to
his response to the problem of coordination as an “indexical turn” (2009, 470) in his
philosophy of science. He also refers to it as a “Wittgensteinian turn” “that focuses on us,
on our use of theories and representations, and brings to light the impasses we reach when
we abstract obliviously from the use to use-independent concepts” (2008, 235). As irony
would have it, however, what van Fraassen seems to have done is to recover early
Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space as inextricably connected with the self.

4.5.2 Constructing a Logical Space
Van Fraassen’s early view appears to have been that a logical space of models is
constructed through a conventional elevation in status of attributes and regularities:
To make sense of our world in a convenient fashion … we raise certain regularities to the
status of laws248 and (not independently!) certain attributes to the status of natures. In the
formal mode, this means that some statements assume the office of assumptions which may
be tacitly used in all reasoning, and certain predicates are chosen to form a classificatory
scheme. (1978, 14)

Rather than simple convenience, van Fraassen would now characterize this elevation
more generally in terms of values and coherence:
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Privileging relative to us involves value judgement as well as factual judgement. … [A]ny
privileged status which a property has it receives in our value judgements. It is true that
forming opinions that go beyond our evidence typically involves selective attention to some
properties rather than others – but the rationality of this practice will consist in its
coherence (including coherence with the rest of our practices). (van Fraassen 2009, 469470)

It appears that our privileging is captured in conventions of theoretical form, which are
enshrined in norms evident in the guarding activity of journal editors and peer review
(2007b, 416).
Concomitant with construction of a new logical space is the introduction of at
least one theoretical term to be interpreted by way of this space. Here we encounter van
Fraassen “hermeneutic circle” (2008, 116) in which “the measured parameter – or at the
very least its concept – is constituted in the course of [its] historical development” (Ibid.,
138). Viewed from within the historical process, a measurement procedure is introduced
by an emerging theory within a background of prior theory and measurement. There is
“no presuppositionless starting point for coordination” (Ibid., 137) – “prior meaningful
discourse relating to what will eventually be delineated within the theory’s domain”
(Ibid., 184) is required to construct a new logical space.

Initially the measurement

procedure identifies new (unstable) empirical regularities in the interaction between the
measuring instrument and measured phenomena as a measured parameter. Although the
procedure is required to satisfy certain coherence conditions, there remains much leeway
for choice based on “a cluster of pragmatic desiderata” (Ibid., 134). Idealization is
involved in both the stabilization of regularities (i.e., when judgements guided by the
measurement procedure become well-calibrated) and the choice made (Ibid., 116). When
accepted, the new theory presents a view from above the historical process. At this point
the theory is taken to describe the measurement procedure, providing “operational rules”
of measurement (Ibid., 165-166) and identifying the measured parameter with a new
theoretical term. More specifically, “the parameter, identified by the eventually stabilized
procedures for its measurement, is now classified by the theory as one aspect of the
logical space that the theory provides for location of items in its domain” (Ibid., 128).
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4.5.3 Logical Space as Map
In relation to the inevitable indexicality of application van Fraassen proposes that
the analogy of a logical space of models to a concrete map is “precise and perfect”. He
pushes the analogy even further, arguing that just like a concrete map it bears a certain
relation to perspectivity. Abstracted from a specific context of use, a logical space of
models presents what observable entities are like from a “Gods-eye-view” (2008, 70).249
Perspectivity enters in its use “in practical applications or even to test it or use it to
explain something, or add to it through research” (Ibid., 82). It enters, that is, through the
user’s identification of certain regions of its representational elements with specific
phenomena. At this point there is a lawful translation from what the phenomena are like
to what they look like in the observation or measurement set-up. Nonetheless what is the
“most important in the concept of perspectivity” is the explicit or implicit reference to “a
‘horizon’ of other perspectives on the same objects” (Ibid., 39), for it is this invariant
information that underwrites the possibility of “God-like reflections” upon empirical
reality (Ibid, 71).250
An example of this type of reflection is taken from the special theory of relativity.
Here logical space is a set of four-tuples of real numbers that has been bestowed the status
of a form of representation. The theory presents a family of models mapped within this
space that displays the space-time interval (s2 = t2 – d2), a coordinate-free magnitude
invariant from one frame of reference to another. It thereby depicts what the phenomena
are like across frames of reference where magnitudes of time or distance differ. When an
observer uses this logical space of models “choice of a coordinate system correlated to a
defined physical frame of reference is required” (van Fraassen 2008, 71). This involves
assigning coordinates to user-specific content arising from measurements of time and
distance, and in a way that respects the space-time interval. In this manner “we introduce
a coordinate system, a frame of reference” (van Fraassen 2007c, 50). The special theory
of relativity thus describes what phenomena are like by showing in its use what they look
like in a lawful translation of the space-time interval to the perspectival measurement
information of a particular frame of reference.
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In this example the assignment of coordinate values to the content of the
measurements of time and distance can be thought of as an act of locating measured
phenomena in logical space expressible as “this is there”. The self thus bestows meaning
upon a logical space of models through an act of ostensive reference to real entities that is
meaningful.

The extra information – which region of the logical space of models

corresponds to the observed entity – is not included in the content of the representation,
but added in use. I know something not implied by a logical space of models, something
that arises when I measure empirical reality and classify it through the measured property:
I know where in logical space it is located.

4.5.4 Measuring as Self-Location
In the context of the semantic view of theories The Scientific Image holds that a
theory is empirically adequate “if has some model such that all appearances are
isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model” (64). Van Fraassen now admits to
having used “appearances” ambiguously, meaning both “concrete observable entities”
(2008, 386

n. 8) and abstract “data models” (Ibid., 391 n.24).251 In Scientific

Representation he disambiguates the term in two important steps. The first involves
separating the mapping of observable entities and data models into a logical space of
models by characterizing the former in terms of self-location and the latter in terms of an
embedding function. The second involves equating “appearance” with the information
content of perceptual judgment gathered in the context of an observation or measurement
set-up in which observable entities interact, i.e., in the context of phenomena together
with the human organism or, in addition, together with a measuring instrument.
Accordingly appearances are “the contents of observation or measurement outcomes”
(Ibid., 8). They are perspectival in that they are “what [phenomena] look like in given
measurement or observation set-ups” (284).

While self-location involves locating

phenomena in a logical space of models through their appearance, embedding involves
mapping of data models worked up from appearances into a logical space of models.
To understand measuring as self-location one should begin with an observation
outcome before turning to the more complex case of a measurement outcome.
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Unfortunately Scientific Representation does not say what an observation outcome is,
leaving the reader to piece it together from van Fraassen’s other writings. In general,
measurement is a case of grading that serves “to classify items as in a certain respect
greater, less, or equal” (Ibid., 172).

In making an observation we are “in effect

performing a measurement without instruments” (Ibid., 93).

The content of the

observation – i.e., the textual aspect of experience that constitutes perceptual judgement –
is an appearance, a mathematizable “datum” (Ibid., 376, fn.14) through which we classify
the observed entity – i.e., the real aspect of experience. What is particularly interesting is
that appearances do not reside in the body or mind as Galileo and Descartes placed them;
rather, they are as inter-subjectively accessible as reality:
“Appearance” does not refer here to subjectively experienced impressions. All those
colourful, noisy things are public, and so are the appearances: the dictate of repeatability
ensures that scientifically admissible experimental results are public. (Ibid., 276)

By “observation outcome” what van Fraassen has in mind, I believe, is what he refers to
elsewhere as a “real image” (1999, 10). As he describes it, a real image is a synthesis of
appearance and reality: it is a real entity we perceive as having the perspectival structure
of an image. Unlike “private images” (2008, Ibid., 104) such as after-images or dreams,
real images belong to public imagination. They are more like “graven images” (Ibid.)
such as paintings or photographs in that our common experience does not distinguish
them from real entities. But unlike a graven image, a real image does not represent real
entities, which probably explains its omission from Scientific Representation.
To explore the relation between the scientific image (logical space of models) and
a real image (observation outcome) is to attempt to grasp what seems to me to be the most
basic intuition at work in van Fraassen’s philosophical system. Unfortunately he is not all
that explicit about it. However his new account of appearances purports “to achieve a
synoptic vision in which the manifest and the scientific images both receive their due”
(2008, 276). From his other writings van Fraassen is clear that this vision is intended to
contrast the dichotomy Sellars (1963) had introduced.

Van Fraassen’s notion of a

“manifest image” appears to be just that of an image of bare experience, i.e., an image
deconstructed from theoretical implications:
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… theories depict the ideal extensions of the experienced world. I would sooner think of
the experienced ice cube that it is an incomplete object. … It seems to me that the manifest
pink ice cube, being itself neither definitely continuous nor definitely granular, can
consistently be identified with the objects of various alternative theories, including
aggregates of H2O molecules. (van Fraassen 1976, 340)

It seems that the “radical incompleteness” of the manifest image is related to the
indefinite structure of bare experience in that both the completeness of the image and the
definiteness of its structure arise in the locating of observed entities within the scientific
image. What the “synoptic vision in which the manifest and the scientific images both
receive their due” hints at is a constitutive relation in our immediate perception that
undermines any dichotomy. Because van Fraassen uses the phrase “synoptic vision”
elsewhere in the context of a view “from within” and “from above” (2008, 139), I suggest
that a real image is a perspectival view of what a real entity looks like “from within” a
scientific image, while a scientific image itself is an aperspectival view “from above” of
what the real entity is like.
Indeed, if to classify an observed entity with respect to its appearance is to ipso
facto locate it in a region of a logical space of models, then to perceive a real image is just
to perceive a real entity as located in the scientific image. (This is why when I classify an
object as a radio I may conceive – equivalently, imagine – electromagnetic waves.) The
Hertzian nature of this claim rings loudly (compare van Fraassen’s ice cube with Hertz’s
piece of iron).252 Like van Fraassen, Hertz recognizes that empirical structure is projected
onto the world together with a scientific image. In Hertz’s case, however, he undertook
the critical project of ameliorating negative effects accompanying this projection through
a philosophical project of perfecting an ideal scientific image. Van Fraassen, on the other
hand, seems to accept all aspects of this projection as part of our existential condition:
“to exist in this world in the way we are there” is to experience the world in the way we
understand it, in the way we imagine it to be.
It seems that the scientific image constitutes real images through what van
Fraassen refers to vaguely as “conditioning”. “By means of conditioning – whatever that
process may be, we don’t care – a correlation is established that makes the person in
effect a reliable measuring instrument or detector of the conditions to which he is
conditioned to react in that way” (van Fraassen 1992, 15). Being conditioned to react to
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reality in a certain way involves carrying along the implications of a conceptual
framework, what Sellars refers to as an “intra-linguistic move”, guided in part by a
scientific image.
Here is an illustration. Suppose I perceive what I judge to be a billiard ball.253 In
judging its appearance to be red and circular I classify the entity as a kind of colour and a
kind of shape by locating it in the region of colour-space assigned to “red” and the region
of the “logical space of shapes” (van Fraassen 2008, 179) assigned to “sphere”. The
reason that I locate it in these particular spaces is that, in having accepted them, they
imaginatively guide my conceptual framework for colours and shapes that condition my
perceptual judgment. The real image is the outcome of what the entity looks like in the
observation set-up viewed “from within” the composite logical space. In addition to the
real entity itself, part of what constitutes this real image is the implication that the world
is, as Roquentin says, “lazy”: the ball will not spontaneously turn green or cube-shaped
at any point in time since the ball is located in an exclusive region of logical space.
Abstracted from conditions of use, the composite logical space represents what the ball is
like: it appears red and circular from any point of view. See Figure 4.4:
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This illustration extends naturally to van Fraassen’s account of more theory-laden
perception of real entities such as phlogiston and radios (cf. van Fraassen 2006a, 125128).
Notice that the conception of logical space invoked here is that of an imaginative
guide. But the datum of the perceptual judgement can be expressed as the observation
report, “Lo! Red billiard ball”, what Sellars refers to as a “language-entry transition”.
Accordingly self-location is taken to be implicit in this assertion,254 one that serves as
evidence of the ball.255 In relation to the observation report we can also think of logical
space as an interpretive framework. On this view the truth of the report implies that
elements of regions of logical space attributed to “red” and “sphere” correspond to the
observed ball.
It seems, then, that a real image constituted by the scientific image is the
observation outcome of an observation set-up. The notion of an “observation set-up” is
new for van Fraassen, and points to an extension of the term “phenomenon”:
… “phenomenon” has both a generic and a specific use – a specific effect produced in a
laboratory at a particular time is a phenomenon, but so are oxidation, ebbing, planetary
motion, and so forth. In the generic use, as I understand the term, it refers to classes of
observable entities. (van Fraassen 2008, 392, n.26)

A “produced” phenomenon is the result of observable entities in physical interaction with
one another in an observation set-up: e.g., “the strange happening [a glowing sulphur
ball] that involved a relationship between luminescence, rotation, friction, and sulphur
was a new phenomenon” (Ibid., 95). An example outside of the laboratory is a rainbow.
Because of certain invariance in the relations between the sun, cloud, rain and the
observer in an observation set-up,256 a naturally produced phenomenon arises that the
observer (also a real entity in this relationship) experiences as an arch of multiple colours.
This observation outcome in this case, I take it, is the rainbow image, the content of
which is the perspectival appearance of a naturally produced phenomenon.257
Here things get complicated relative logical space and its relation to reality. Van
Fraassen wants to say that in appearing as an arch of multiple colours, my perceptual
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judgement classifies entities by locating them in logical space. But the entities I locate
are the entities I measure, i.e., the sun, cloud and rain. Hence, the rainbow image is what
these three entities look like in the observation set-up; it is a view of these entities “from
within” a scientific image. But because “rainbow” is a count noun we tend think what we
locate in logical space is the naturally produced phenomenon itself, i.e., we reify the result
of the physical interaction among real entities as a material thing. In addition to a
naturally produced phenomenon, therefore, the observation outcome is not a real image
but a “public hallucination” (van Fraassen 2008, 104).258 (Notice for later that the status
of a rainbow image as a public hallucination lies precisely in our propensity to construct
an individual entity out of appearances in logical space.)
What is significant about van Fraassen’s account of rainbows is that the human
observer can be replaced with another measuring instrument such as a camera. Here the
camera, not the observer, is a part of the physical interaction that produces the
phenomenon, and talk of “observation” now shifts to talk of “measurement”.

The

measurement outcome of the measurement set-up is a photograph. A photograph is itself
a real entity we perceive as a real image (we classify it as a photograph). However, it is
also a graven image, which is to say that it has representational content: we bestow upon
it the status of a representation of the measured entities, i.e., the sun, cloud and rain.
When I look upon the graven image and perceive what I classify as a rainbow, I perceive
what these phenomena look like in the measurement set-up. Once again, in measuring we
do not locate the produced phenomena in logical space; rather, “measuring locates the
target in a theoretically constructed logical space” (van Fraassen 2008, 2).
This is behind van Fraassen’s challenge to the common view that instrumentation
in physical interaction with observable entities extends our senses.

Typically a

measurement outcome is like the glowing sulphur ball in that it is an artificially produced
phenomenon:
The heart of an experiment is typically a sort of measurement: the set-up produces or lends
itself to a phenomenon that is meant to provide information about the character of some
target object, event or process. The artificially produced or isolated phenomenon is treated
as providing data about the target, to provide us with a view of it. (van Fraassen 2008, 66)

Here
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… the appearance is determined jointly by the measurement set-up (involving both
apparatus and system to which it is applied), the experimental practice, and the theoretical
conceptual framework in which the target and measurement procedure is classified,
characterized, and understood. (Ibid., 284)

The simplest case of instrumentation involved in measurement set-ups is the microscopic
lens.259 In general “images produced by lenses are themselves (artificially produced)
phenomena” (van Fraassen 2008, 97), and microscopes “imitate the ability of nature to
create public hallucinations” (Ibid, 104). He admits that, unlike a rainbow, all invariants
of an observable object are present so that “it is certainly the case that we can represent
the images produced by the microscope to ourselves as images of real things (with the
same structure as those images)” (Ibid., 108). However, he says that it is still possible to
represent to ourselves that what is being located in logical space guiding, say, the
classification of an image as a “paramecium” is not an unobservable entity, but the
measured phenomena (slide, water sample) with which the microscope is in interaction.260
His idea, I take it, is that constructive empiricism claims the status we accord our best
theories does not require that elements of logical space correspond to unobservable
entities, and so does not require we represent to ourselves that we are locating anything
but observable entities in logical space.261 (Again notice again for later that van Fraassen
must admit every microbiologist who believes she is looking through the lens of a
microscope at a real entity (which is probably all of them) is using logical space to
construct an individual entity out of appearances.)
Van Fraassen extends the microscopic case generally to all cases of measurements
involving instrumentation. “A measurement outcome is something physical:

an event,

the end-state of the apparatus, or an object (photo, graph, list of numbers) produced by the
measurement process” (van Fraassen 2008, 157). It is “most certainly real” (Ibid., 276).
At the same time, “measurement procedures produce representations – images” (van
Fraassen 2010b, 512).262

Unlike an observation outcome, however, a measurement

outcome is “a representation of what is measured” (van Fraassen 2008, 156):

it

represents “the object as it appears in that measurement set-up” (Ibid., 176) and “the
target as located in a certain logical space” (Ibid., 176). It is a pictorial representation that
trades for success in use by us on structural resemblance and distortion (Ibid., 182-183),
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the content of which is perspectival information expressible in an indexical judgement of
the form “this is how it is from here” (Ibid., 92).

4.5.4 Empirical Adequacy Clarified
Use of a logical space implies only the pragmatic commitment to use the theory’s
classificatory framework in perceptual judgement:
That a claim is theory-laden does not mean that it presupposes the truth of a theory, only
that theoretical terms are used in its formulation. For example, ‘this powder is classified in
chemistry as sodium nitrate’ is theory-laden but does not imply anything about whether the
chemical theory is true or false. (van Fraassen 2008, 371, n.3)263

Hence self-location does not usurp the kind of function referred to by “embedding”,
which van Fraassen invokes in order to explicate the notion of empirical adequacy in the
semantic view of theories. Compared to embedding, self-location is not mathematically
precise: “[i]n general, measurement of an item classified as being in the domain of a
particular theory will locate that item indefinitely” (Ibid., 164). More importantly, it is
prior to assessing a theory’s empirical adequacy (Ibid., 256-257).
A theory’s empirical adequacy is assessed through abstract measurement
outcomes constructed on the basis of appearances gathered through observation or, more
typically, measurement outcomes: “In practice, the level at which a theory confronts
experience is not that of raw data taken from individual measurement outcomes, but of
the ‘data models’ constructed on their basis, and further [surface models]” (van Fraassen
2008, 153-154). Data models are built up from the appearances (data) of observation
reports, i.e., they are built up from individual acts of self-location in logical space.264 A
data model “summarizes the relative frequencies found”, while a “surface model” further
“idealizes” “this summary … with a continuous range of values” (Ibid., 167). In the
progression from individual concrete measurement outcomes to a data, appearances are
presented “in progressively more abstract ‘outcomes’” (Ibid, 251).

In virtue of the

appearances from which it is constructed, a data (or surface) model is perspectival and
also contains information pertaining to invariances across perspectives. A data or surface
model is an “official measurement outcome” (Ibid., 166) that encounters the theory’s

203
abstract models. A theory’s empirical adequacy consists in the isomorphism of these
outcomes to parts of its models called “empirical substructures” (Ibid., 289).
A measurement model is an artefact representing both measured phenomena and
the appearances from which it is constructed (van Fraassen 2008, 252).

Like the

observation reports from which it is constructed, it is taken to be a “description” (Ibid.,
257) of the phenomena. Van Fraassen admits Newman’s trivialization objection applies
here: the model cannot be said to be “a unique, single way of representing” (Ibid., 244)
the measured phenomena. The objection’s significance, he takes it, is that we selectively
divide up the measured phenomena and “choose” (Ibid., 243) the structure of the model265
in virtue an accepted theory that guides its construction. Against the obvious reply that
the theory could then only be said to represent phenomena “as described” or “as
represented” and not the phenomena themselves, van Fraassen appeals to the prior acts of
self-location implicit in the observation reports to invoke a pragmatic tautology: the
claim that “the theory is adequate to the phenomena” is the same as the claim that “it is
adequate to the phenomena as represented by us” (Ibid., 259).
Van Fraassen understands a pragmatic tautology to be a statement that (as
understood by us) could be false, but cannot be denied: “paradigmatic examples” are
“‘cat’ denotes cats” and “‘Paul is a cat’ is true if and only if Paul is cat”.
They are undeniable by me, exactly because I acknowledge “cat” to be a word in my
language. The semantic content, however, of these (to me undeniable) assertions are not
necessary propositions, and most certainly not tautologies in the sense of semantics. If our
language had developed differently in a certain way, then “cat” would have denoted gnats,
rats or bats. Under such circumstances, uses of “cat” would not have been acts referring to
cats, and “Paul is a cat” would have been used to state that Paul is (not a cat but) a gnat, rat
or bat. (van Fraassen 1997, 23)266

A pragmatic tautology is illuminated through its correlation to a pragmatic incoherence,
i.e., a statement that (as understood by us) could be true, but cannot be coherently
asserted. The form of incoherence that illuminates these pragmatic tautologies is that of
Moore’s paradox: “It’s raining in Peking, but I don’t believe it”. Unlike the logical
contradiction “It is raining in Peking, but it is not raining in Peking”, both conjuncts of
Moore’s sentence could be true simultaneously: there is a logically possible world where
it is raining in Peking and I don’t know it. What is wrong in asserting it, however, is that
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“the expression of a judgement is immediately followed by the statement that I do not
have that judgement” (van Fraassen 2011b, 20). In other words, incoherence arises
because my second linguistic act (stating) undoes the content (having a certain
judgement) of my first act (expressing).
Although van Fraassen is not perspicuous on how self-location in logical space
can support a pragmatic tautology, we can illustrate what he probably has in mind with
our simple example of the billiard ball. For van Fraassen, the sentence “‘The ball is red’
is true if and only if the ball is red” is a pragmatic tautology. The possibility of its
falsehood trades on the distinction between mention and use (see van Fraassen 1997, 41
n.15). There is a logically possible world where language developed differently, where
part of the colour spectrum we label “blue” is labelled “red”. The word “red” we use to
describe that world in the second conditional of the sentence has its normal everyday
meaning, but the word “red” that is mentioned in the first conditional, we say, has a
different meaning in that world. However, if instead I acknowledge that the word “red”
mentioned in the first conditional is a word in my language, I cannot coherently deny the
sentence.
This tautology is illuminated by a pragmatic incoherence. Suppose I say that “The
ball is red, but the sentence ‘The ball is red’ is not true for all I know or believe”. Van
Fraassen would say this is a form of Moore’s Paradox (cf. 2008, 256). The possibility of
its truth trades on the difference between use and mention just discussed. There is a
logically possible world where language developed differently, where part of the colour
spectrum we label “blue” is labelled “red”. The word “red” we use to describe that world
in the first conjunct has its normal everyday meaning, but the word “red” that is
mentioned in the second conjunct, we say, has a different meaning in that world.
However, if instead I acknowledge that the word “red” mentioned is a word in my
language, I cannot coherently assert the sentence.

Why?

Van Fraassen points out

assertability or deniability “is a concept pertaining to use” and that “[a]ssertion, denial,
calling into question, and the like are actions by a language user” (2008, 259). The
content of my assertion “the ball is red” in the first conjunct is that the appearance of the
ball as red is to be taken seriously as veridical, but then my denial “the sentence ‘The ball
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is red’ is not true for all I know or believe” expresses my doubt that the appearance of the
ball as red is correct. I am pragmatically incoherent because the second act (denial)
undoes the content of the first act (assertion), both of which are mine.
Since it concerns actual and observed entities, this incoherence also has an
explanation in terms of logical space. My assertion that the ball is red describes a region
of colour space, gaining its reference through the correspondence of an element of this
region with the ball; equivalently, through its appearance I locate the ball in the red region
of colour space which guides my assertion that the ball is red. Van Fraassen claims that
self-location “is still properly called an assertion, it is a linguistic act” (1992, 10). This is
because the act of locating the ball in the red region of colour space is implicit in the act
of asserting that the ball is red. Hence, the content of my assertion is expressible by the
indexical judgement “this is there in colour-space” (2008, 212). When, after the act of
asserting the ball is red I immediately add “but the sentence ‘The ball is red’ is not true
for all I know or believe”, my denial is an act that also undoes the content of my act of
locating the ball in the red region of colour space.
As I understand him, van Fraassen’s position that a pragmatic tautology precludes
the objection that theories are only adequate to data models and not to the phenomena is
just an extension of this simple case. Clearly, the claim that “the theory is adequate to the
phenomena” is the same as the claim that “it is adequate to the phenomena as represented
by us” could be false: there is a logically possible world where the data model is
incorrect or inaccurate, in which case the theory could be adequate to the phenomena but
not adequate to the phenomena as represented by us. But why is it something I cannot
coherently deny? We have to turn to the pragmatic incoherence that illuminates it and its
explanation in terms of logical space.
Suppose that under the guidance of colour-theory I gather colour information from
a number of billiard balls by measuring the wavelength of reflections from their surface.
Suppose further that from the collection of appearances I construct a data model. “What I
cannot do is to both present [the data model] as representing [the objects] and then say
that perhaps it does not represent [them] at all” (van Fraassen 2008, 257).

My

presentation of the data model, van Fraassen tells us, is a linguistic act whose content is
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that the data model be taken seriously as veridical, for it was constructed from
measurement results I take seriously as veridical. These measurement results are acts of
classification whereby I locate the measured balls in colour space common to the
theoretical models (Ibid., 256). Because “the ability to self-attribute a position with
respect to the representation is the condition of possibility for use of that representation”
(van Fraassen 2008, 257), presentation of the data model is also an act of locating the
billiard balls in colour space: when I present it I am “saying ‘we are here’ in a logical
space” (Ibid., 257). My act of denial or doubt that the data model – or a theoretical model
that shares its structure – represents the billiard balls opposes the content of my act of
locating them in colour space expressible as “this is there in colour space”, landing me in
pragmatic incoherence.

4.6 Unities that Conspire
The transcendental and metaphysical history of the idea of logical space as a
relation among imaginative representation, reality and the self reveals at least three
unities. The first is the unity of possible worlds: a logical space is a form of all imagined
worlds that includes the real one. Kant achieves this unity through the identity of pure
and empirical synthesis, while Wittgenstein realizes it through shared forms of logical
space and reality. The second is more esoteric and might be called the unity of existence:
given a certain conception of existence, both reality and logical space exist. For Kant
pure sensible schemata and, derivatively, their organizing structure exist in virtue of
coming into being through the categories; for Wittgenstein our form of representation
exists though the self that is the eternal present. The third is what I call the unity of divine
consciousness: through logical space the self has a “God’s-eye” view of reality. For Kant
this falls out of the internalization of human schemata from a divine schema for the
structure of the universe. Wittgenstein’s claim that “[t]here are two godheads: the world
and my independent I” (1961a, 74) comes from shifting immanent and transcendent
perspectives of the world by the self of pure realism and the self of solipsism.
What I will establish in this section is that one way or another each of these unities
works against van Fraassen’s conception of logical space insofar as it is taken to be
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consistent with his empirical stance. We get an intuitive sense for why this is the case
when we compare his characterization of phenomena, logical space and the self:
Phenomenon

Self

Logical Space

Mind-Independent

Mind

Mind-Dependent

Existing

Existing

Non-Existing

Entity

Non-Entity

Entity

The unities implicit in the idea of logical space conspire to eradicate differences among
the columns. With logical space no longer a mirror of reality, the unity of all possible
worlds pushes against the mind-independence of phenomena and moves van Fraassen’s
philosophical system into phenomenalism.
267

platonic

The unity of existence gives rise to a

commitment to the status of logical space.

And the unity of divine

consciousness undermines the plausibility of the claim that the self is not a transcendent
entity.

4.6.1 The Unity of All Possible Worlds
The unity of all possible worlds inherent in the idea of logical space drives van
Fraassen’s claim that we discern structure in nature “in the same way as we discern a
story when looking at ink marks on a page”. His position that “seeing is reading” is based
on the presupposition that the same logical spaces are involved in our experience of the
actual world as in our imagining the possible world of a novel: e.g., “the constitution of
time in our construction of the real world is not different in essential character from the
constitution of time by the reader in his construction of the narrated world as he reads the
text” (van Fraassen 1991b, 24). This is so notwithstanding that the former involves real
events, while the latter involves merely fictional ones.
His claim that “this text is not so different in kind from other texts” (van Fraassen
1991b, 35), i.e., that the textual aspect of our experience of reality is not so different from
the text of a novel, betrays in its emphasis this point. For self-location, a linguistic act
expressible as “this is there in logical space”, to bestow meaning upon pure mathematical
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structure, “this” must refer to a real entity. But when I read a story it cannot be said that I
locate this fictional entity there in logical space for the simple fact that there is no entity
to be located. Suppose I am reading my novel and I come across the sentence “I hear
scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears”. As I
read the sentence I imagine a mouse (just as you did). The best that can be said is that I
locate information content from a set of letters I interpret, i.e., appearances, in the same
logical space I use to locate a real entity when I classify it as a mouse. But whereas it
may be the case that in seeing an actual mouse I locate a real entity in logical space via
appearances, in reading the sentence it can only be said that I construct a fictional entity
out of appearances in logical space to form a fictional image.
Now consider the following passage from The Scientific Image:
And surely there are many telling ‘ordinary’ cases [of inference to the best explanation]: I
hear scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears – and I
infer that a mouse has come to live with me. Not merely that these apparent signs of
mousely presence will continue, not merely that all the observable phenomena will be as if
there is a mouse; but that there really is a mouse. … [But] the mouse is an observable thing;
therefore ‘there is a mouse in the wainscoting’ and ‘All observable phenomena are as if
there is a mouse in the wainscoting’ are totally equivalent; each implies the other (given
what we know about mice). (van Fraassen 1980, 19-20, 21)

Van Fraassen would now update this passage by replacing “observable phenomena” with
“appearances”:
Very often, we do have to infer the reality of putative phenomena from the appearances in
measurement outcomes. But that does not mean that they are not observable entities. If I
see black droppings and infer the presence of a mouse, the mouse’s reality is inferred, but
the mouse is not unobservable. (2011a, 437)

With this later passage in mind, the point of the earlier one is to confront philosophers
who argue we infer real entities as the best explanation of ordinary appearances with an
equally compelling hypothesis: a real entity is implied from a complex of appearances
located in a logical space. But then why is it that are not simply constructing a real entity
(e.g., a real mouse in the wainscoting) out of the appearances just like we construct
fictional entities out of appearances when we read a story? If logical space is the form of
all possible worlds, prima facie there should be no difference in use in relation among
possible worlds. Van Fraassen thus has the burden of showing his conception of logical

209
space belongs to common sense realism (i.e., realism about observable entities existing
independently of ourselves) not phenomenalism.
I can envisage three possible responses one might try to make. The first would be
to say the possibility of fictional images is precluded in van Fraassen’s claim that “mental
images aren’t images at all” (1999, 10). Mental images, he argues, are a reification based
on an analogy to real images. But as Wittgenstein’s (2001, xi) duck-rabbit picture shows,
a real image can be seen in different ways, while the very idea of a mental image is that it
cannot.268 The analogy thus destroys itself: unlike mental images, real images are
irremediably ambiguous. One cannot simply dismiss this response with the reply that the
duck-rabbit image is atypical, for van Fraassen also claims real images are ambiguous
through misclassification: “[t]he item in front of us can be seen, so to speak, in different
ways. It is a candy wrapper; I see it as a flower” (van Fraassen 2002b, 7).269 The
problem is that van Fraassen also claims locating in logical space that occurs when
reading a book is equivocal,270 and so one can just as easily say fictional images are not
mental images because they are ambiguous too.
Rather than attempt to preclude the possibility of fictional images, another
response would to attempt to distinguish fictional images from real images. Van Fraassen
acknowledges the possibility of “private images” such as dreams or after-images (2008,
104), and so it might be said that, unlike real images, fictional images are private images.
The problem is that real images are not private because, according to van Fraassen, the
repeatability of appearances ensures their inter-subjectivity. Clearly fictional images that
arise from reading a book are repeatable simply by rereading the sentence, and thus
public as well.
The third and best response is as follows. Van Fraassen claims the text of our
spontaneous judgments “is already divided into dreaming, waking, thinking, musing, and
so on” (van Fraassen 2002a, 137), which suggests that perhaps spontaneous judgement
involved in reading a book is divided against spontaneous judgement involved in
experiencing the real world. How so? He claims that “the difference between [the real
and fictional worlds] we cannot formulate but only show: I can only touch this flesh,
these stones, this wood” (1991b, 37). I suspect his position would be that spontaneous
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judgement in the case of the real world involves self-location expressible as “this is there
in logical space”, which includes the very same act of ostensive reference that shows the
world is real rather than fictional: i.e., this refers to more than appearances (text). But
such a response would require justification in order to discharge the burden van Fraassen
carries, and in van Fraassen’s case it would have to come from the phenomenology of
experience.271
As hinted already van Fraassen’s characterization of spontaneous judgement in the
case of naturally and artificially produced public hallucinations works against any such
justification. When I look at a paramecium image my spontaneous judgement is not that
it is a representation, but that it is a real entity. Upon reflection I might convince myself
that as a thing a paramecium is a fictional entity I project onto reality, that the image is a
representation produced in the physical interaction of the water sample, slide and
microscope. Still, it cannot be said that my spontaneous judgement involves locating the
measured water sample and slide in logical space. The best that can be said is that it
involves locating appearances out of which I constructed a fictional entity. Because van
Fraassen claims public hallucinations of this very sort are pervasive in our use of
measuring instruments, the implication is that an act of ostensive reference to a real entity
is not a condition of use of logical space. To use logical space all I have to do is locate
appearances within it and construct an entity, fictional or real, out of them. Any act of
ostensive reference van Fraassen claims will show a difference between the real world
and a fictional world is added to our act of using logical space in immediate perception.

4.6.2 The Unity of Existence
Unlike Kant and Wittgenstein, van Fraassen wants the benefit of the idea of
logical space without any commitment to its existence:
[Observation reports] have as complete text an indexical assertion that locates the speaker,
on that occasion, in some definite part of his own general, “objective”, world picture. I
realize that I am leaving this somewhat metaphorical or analogical: it is not literally true
that we carry our “general” opinion with us in the form of a representation that encodes it,
like a picture or a map. But we can reasonably represent ourselves as doing that, for
present purposes. (van Fraassen 1992, 18)
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For the purposes of a pragmatic theory of observation, that is, we can account for our
immersion in theory-infected language if we conceive ourselves as cognizing the world
through a scientific image. The idea of logical space is supposed to serve the aspirant
conceptualist or nominalist with a theory of universals without invoking platonism in
relation to mathematical objects:
… I am a nominalist. Of course, one can be a nominalist only in the way Saint Paul held
one could only be a Christian, namely, in the sense of trying to be one. I do not really
believe in abstract entities, which includes mathematical ones. Yet I do not for a moment
think that science should eschew the use of mathematics, nor that logicians should, nor
philosophers of science. I have not worked out a nominalist philosophy of mathematics –
my trying has not carried me that far. Yet I am clear that it would have to be a fictionalist
account, legitimizing the use of mathematics and all its intratheoretic distinctions in the
course of that use, unaffected by disbelief in the entities mathematical statements purport to
be about. Within mathematics, the distinction between structure of different cardinalities
and the nonisomorphism of real number continuum and natural number series are objective.
I cannot spell this out further. But I feel sufficiently clear on what the antirealist strategy
must be to resist as irrelevant disputes within philosophy of mathematics while I cooperate
in the task of an account of science, of its content, its structure, or its methodology. (1985a,
303) 272

A unique challenge that van Fraassen faces in working out his fictionalism is to reconcile
the claim that mathematical language is not to be literally construed with his position that
scientific language describing describes real entities located within mathematical entities
is to be given a literal construal. There is another more obvious problem. It is evident
that over time the idea of logical space has come to do more philosophical work. What
started as a representation of our conceptual framework useful in formal semantics to
analyze the structure of scientific theories became the intentional correlate of the
conceptual framework guiding natural language and ended up as something into which
the self locates the reality of its immediate environment. I will now show that in this last
step (at least) van Fraassen has reified logical space as an existing thing.
Van Fraassen’s appeal to self-location in logical space in order to establish a link
between the models that a theory presents and reality is based on his claim of “a precise
and perfect analogy between theory, model and map”. More specifically, the inevitable
indexicality of application expressible as “this is there” is what is identical. If we reflect
upon the indexicality of application in relation to a map, we realize that the act of selflocation is a unification of three separate acts: ostensive reference to a real entity in the
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user’s environment, the content of which is expressible as “this”; ostensive reference to
the real map, the content of which expressible as “there”, and an act that connects the
two. Since all three acts underwrite van Fraassen’s elaboration of a pragmatic tautology,
then in principle pragmatic incoherence can result if the content of any one of these three
acts is opposed. If the analogy of self-location is indeed “a precise and perfect” one, the
same incoherence must arise if we replace the concrete map with an abstract logical
space.
Suppose (contrary to our misgivings last section) that spontaneous judgement
involved in the experience of reality involves more than locating appearances, that the
linguistic act of self-location in logical space involves ostensive reference to real entities.
Suppose further that upon observing a certain billiard ball I say that “The ball is red, but
the sentence ‘There is such a thing as the ball’ is not true for all I know or believe”. Since
van Fraassen equates “‘… exists’ with ‘There is such a thing as …’” (2004b, 454), this is
equivalent to saying “The ball is red, but the sentence “The ball exists” is not true for all I
know or believe”. As understood by me, both conjuncts of this sentence could be true
simultaneously: I can envision a logically possible world where the ball is not a material
thing but a hologram, i.e., a public hallucination. But in my world where the ball is not a
hologram, my act of denying that the ball exists opposes the content of my act of
ostensive reference to a real entity expressible as “this”. Following van Fraassen’s
reasoning I am pragmatically incoherent.
Now suppose like van Fraassen I am committed to the view that abstract entities
do not exist. And suppose further that apart from functioning for us as a representation,
abstract entities do not exist. The issue is whether, having bestowed a representational
role upon on an abstract entity, the idea of self-location in that entity gives rise to a
commitment to its existence. Upon observing the same billiard ball I could say instead
“The ball is red, but the sentence “There is such a thing as a part of the real line” is not
true for all I know or believe”. As understood by me both conjuncts of the sentence could
be true simultaneously. I can envision a logically possible world where no part of the real
line has been bestowed a representational role. In my world, however, parts of the real
line have been bestowed a representational role. So am I pragmatically incoherent? Well

213
if colour space were a concrete map – say a drawn line – and if I said “The ball is red, but
the sentence “There is such a thing as a drawn line” is not true for all I know or believe”,
I would be pragmatically incoherent, for my act of denying that the drawn line exists
opposes the content of my act of ostensive reference to a real entity expressible as
“there”. By virtue of the “perfect and precise analogy” it follows that the same pragmatic
incoherence arises if colour space is not a drawn line but a part of the real line.273 By
conceiving logical space as a completed space and accounting for its application to reality
by locating real entities in that space, van Fraassen crosses the threshold into platonism.

4.6.3 The Unity of Divine Consciousness
Van Fraassen’s appeal to self-location recovers Wittgenstein and Kant’s
conception of logical space as inextricably linked with the self. Whereas Wittgenstein
saw the self as the whole of logical space, van Fraassen understands it in a way closer to
Kant: “We conceive of ourselves as located and oriented in this [scientific] world-picture
in one precise, definite way. … But remember Kant’s Paralogisims: there is no argument
even from how we necessarily represent ourselves to what we are” (van Fraassen 2010a,
471).
Van Fraassen (2004b) provides the outline of his preliminary view of the self that
seems to be based upon two presuppositions similar to those of his common sense
realism. The first is that the self is the whole person I refer to when I say ‘I’. The second
is that “most things we ordinarily say about ourselves are true” (Ibid., 455). Accordingly,
I exist and it is true that I act, I bear properties such as thought, I am the terminus of
relations to what is mine and (contrary to Hume) “I am a continuant” (Ibid.). The latter
seems to be essential for van Fraassen’s view that time is a logical space, for if I were not
a continuant I might not construct the temporal order of events that happen to me by
successively locating them in the real number line.
And just like a real entity, I appear to others. I manifest in what is mine: “I
manifest myself in nature, through my body, my movements, my words…” (van Fraassen
2004b, 466). “You do encounter me directly in experience; but that encounter has certain

214
physical relations involving our bodies as a precondition” (Ibid., 471). Also “I manifest
… in the social world” through “[t]he relationships that define my social position” (Ibid.,
469). Although I am the enduring subject in which inhere physical events that manifest to
others as incompatible, events others can represent as a world line (cf. van Fraassen
1991b, 26), manifestation of the self is not the self: “any person’s appearance is to be
distinguished from that person” (van Fraassen 2008, 285).
“The self transcends all such appearances but that does not imply that the self is a
transcendent object” (van Fraassen 2004b, 456, n.8). “I am in this world, but not of this
world” (van Fraassen 2004b, 453) because I am not an entity: “‘entity’ is another
synonym for ‘object’ or ‘thing’, and I am not one” (Ibid., 471).

Yet the self “is not

nothing” (Ibid., 455). “I exist, but I am not a thing among things, I am neither a physical
object nor a mental substance or abstract entity, nor a combination thereof” (Ibid., 453).
Thus I am neither my physical body nor the abstract logical space in which I locate my
body when I observe it.
“Not being an object, when I wish to act I just do it” (Ibid., 468). The most
illuminating assertion van Fraassen makes is that persons “are what they will have been,
and what they will have been is still in the future, held jointly in their hands and the hands
of fate” (2004b, 470, n.28).

The import of time is characteristically Kantian; the

centrality of willing existence is arguably Wittgensteinian. Perhaps the best we can say at
this point in the development of van Fraassen’s view of the self is this: I am a willing
existent necessary for the possibility of constructing a temporal order of events that
happen and that I am aware by continuous projective acts of locating them in a logical
space chosen to represent these events.
Self-location is a condition for the possibility of a relation between the self and a
logical space:
The activity of representation is successful only if the recipients are able to receive that
information through their ‘viewing’ of that representation. But what are the conditions of
possibility for this reception? The recipient must be in some pertinent sense able to relate
him or herself, his or her current situation, to the representation. (van Fraassen 2008, 80)

On one side of this relation is a feature of logical space:

215
… as Hermann Weyl put it graphically, there will be, even in the most theoretical sciences,
an “ineliminable residue of the annihilation of the ego” to provide the conditions for
relating the theoretical models to specific empirical situations. All the revolutionary
developments in the theories of space and time as well as the upheavals in atomic physics
testify to that. The former brought frames of reference to the center stage, the latter
engendered what is in fact precisely called “the measurement problem” as fulcrum for
philosophical interpretation. (Ibid., 87-88)

On the other side of this relation is a feature of mine:
We will just have to admit a non-pejorative sense of “subjective”. It is true that this
solution [of self-location] gives a special role to consciousness in science. But it does so
only on the premise that there is applied science, i.e., there is conscious use of science. The
solution entails no more about consciousness than is contained in that premise. (van
Fraassen 1992, 10)

This passage expresses a worry. If time, space, and spacetime are logical spaces, then the
self-location is outside time, space and space-time. Obviously self-location along with
the consciousness it entails are outside science. In limiting himself to conscious use in
science, it seems van Fraassen does not want to speculate as to the nature of
consciousness. Indeed, it seems he wants to stop here and say “[t]here is a mystery of
consciousness. But it is not among the mysteries that the sciences confront, which they
so fortunately and habitually address and solve” (van Fraassen 2004b, 476).
Yet clearly his idea of self location entails much more about consciousness than is
contained in the premise that there is conscious use of science: what the idea of selflocation in completed logical space entails about consciousness is different than, say,
what the idea of self-projection of a potential logical space entails about consciousness.
The relation between consciousness and the “ineliminable residue of the annihilation of
the ego” forms a sort of interface where I meet up with a completed logical space. At this
interface I can shift my view of reality from within logical space to a view of reality from
above expressible in a law-like translation. With this shift perspectival consciousness
elevates itself to a mode of consciousness capable of making “God-like reflections” upon
phenomena. It should be noted that van Fraassen really has no choice but to make this
sort of claim.

His idea of logical space is that of an abstract entity bestowed a

representational role as a matter of convention, and thus a product of public imagination.
In ascribing my location in logical space, therefore, I must be able to transcend my
consciousness to a level of our consciousness.
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In the tradition of Haraway (1988), Okruhlik (2009) has expressed concern that
empiricist structuralism is another god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere. Indeed
to claim that there is more to meaning than “meets the eye”, that consciousness can
transcend situated understanding and imagine the empirical world invariant across
alternate perspectives, is to characterize consciousness as having the sort of unity
traditionally attributed to the mind of God. This unity is implicit in the idea of logical
space itself, which develops from the notion of a divine schema. Faced with the shadow
of divine consciousness, Kant conceived the transcendental self as a formal limit of
imagination. Wittgenstein was willing to simply admit a metaphysical notion of the self
as a godhead that can imaginatively embed the entire world or, alternatively, shrink to a
point in mystic union with it. In recovering the self against a conception of logical space
as conventional, van Fraassen is forced into the position that at a certain plane
consciousness is inter-subjective. As an empiricist who disavows metaphysics, he owes
us an account why this shadow of the divine in his the idea of logical space does not give
rise to a conception of the self as a transcendent entity that can grasp the completed
infinite whole of logical space.

4.7 Conclusion: A Call to Rethink Logical Space
Van Fraassen transports Wittgenstein’s conception of logical space into a
nominalist theory of meaning in order to solve a problem of interpretation without
recourse to modal realism. In doing so, he severs the idea from its transcendental and
metaphysical underpinnings without working through the consequences. It is perhaps no
surprise that he should encounter a problem of interpretation that goes to the very heart of
his novel conception.

But his reply of self-ascription of location triggers unities

traditionally implicit in the idea of logical space, unities that manifest as the spectres of
phenomenalism, platonism and a metaphysics of self.

To build van Fraassen’s

empiricism around the idea of logical space requires subtle rethinking of the idea itself.
As I will suggest in the conclusion to this dissertation, there are insights he might draw
from Kant, Hertz and Wittgenstein.
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Conclusion
This thesis has been about the origin, intellectual development and contemporary
use of a semantic variant of the idea of logical space. This is the idea of a logicomathematical framework of imaginative representation that delimits a form of all possible
worlds. It arises from a philosophical orientation that images or pictures relate to reality
through the self. In general four things have been demonstrated: 1) there are highly
influential and difficult philosophical systems in diverse traditions that unify around the
idea of logical space; 2) major differences among these systems spring from minor
variations in this idea; 3) these philosophical systems have an intellectual history that runs
through 19th century German philosophy of science; and 4) we can compare, evaluate and
perhaps even develop these philosophical systems in a straightforward way. I shall
conclude by explaining why illuminating the idea of logical space worked well to
dissolve difficult exegetical problems, and by providing an outline for a future research
project.
It should be clear that in relation to Kant and Wittgenstein, use of “mirror” is not
intended as a metaphor but as a structural analogy for a form of imaginative
representation that explains Kant’s theory of schemata and the underlying unity of
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. These explanations owe their strength to a method of inquiry
that went to the heart of Kant and Wittgenstein’s philosophical systems. What this
method reveals is that when a philosopher such as Kant or Wittgenstein makes a
significant appeal to images or pictures in an attempt to construct a unified and
comprehensive philosophical system, he has one in mind when he tries to communicate
that system to others. Asking that philosopher “What is an image or picture?” “How is it
organized?” and “How does it relate to reality?” brings to the fore content that provides a
glimpse of what this is. This is to say that as presented by Kant, Wittgenstein and even
van Fraassen, the idea of logical space reduces to a philosopher’s model of cognition.
This is no more evident than in the Tractatus where its propositions seem to be satisfied
by a picture of the self in shifting perspectives of the world. It is just as plain in Kant’s
infamous schematism where a line by line interpretation shows a description in highly
dense and complex prose of a simple structure of the imagination. And it is also apparent
in van Fraassen’s empiricist structuralism in the attempt to solve fundamental problems
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associated with his picturesque grasp of conceptual phenomenology. And yet it is more
than a philosopher’s model of cognition. It is the insight of a great mind into how we are
in the world.
In my estimation the problems identified with van Fraassen’s conception of
logical space arise from his fictionalism. There appears to be nothing in his stance
towards mathematical objects to constrain conceiving logical space as a completed space.
He thus naturally draws inspiration by analogy to a concrete map, invoking acts of selfascription of location in logical space to account for its non-trivial relation to reality. Yet
there are insights to be gathered from Kant, Hertz and Wittgenstein that can point van
Fraassen towards a more subtle way of thinking about the idea of logical space.
If the empiricist argument for the idea of logical space appeals to Kant’s
observations about conceptual phenomenology and then goes on to equate conceiving
with imagining, perhaps it ought also to respect Kant’s view that completed infinities are
never images for us. It might recognize, in other words, his implicit view that a logical
space is a potential space, that it is only a general schema from which images are
constructed and organized. Given the close affinity between their philosophical systems,
van Fraassen might take further inspiration from Hertz. A key insight Hertz presents is
that a schematic scientific representation is what is “identical in essence” as “contained in
almost all textbooks which deal with the whole of [a science] … and in almost all lectures
which cover the whole of this science” (1900/1956, 4). His implicit claim is that we are
(as van Fraassen would say) “conditioned” to project images through learning schematic
properties, that a scientific representation is just what is essential to this conditioning.
And van Fraassen might also follow Wittgenstein by characterizing the application of a
scientific representation to reality in terms of self-projection rather than self-location.
The advantage to thinking of a logical space of models as a schema rather than as
an image is that its application is no longer thought of as self-location in a scientific
representation, but as self-projection conditioned by a scientific representation. Rather
than locating real entities in a scientific representation and then projecting a perspectival
image back onto the world, application is understood more simply as the projection of a
perspectival image.

This seems to get around two of the problems identified.

By
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disassociating the scientific representation from the self, no issue of divine consciousness
arises. And because the content of the act of self-projection is expressible merely by the
indexical judgement “this”, platonic commitment to the existence of a logical space of
models brought about by pragmatic tautology is avoided.

However, the spectre of

phenomenalism remains in that it seems we spontaneously project images as real (one
“gets lost” in every meaningful story so to speak). Perhaps the idea of logical space
together with the claim that experience is literate requires admitting that it is only through
a non-spontaneous act of ostensive reference that we distinguish fictional entities.
This approach is a way to a different empiricist theory of scientific representation
in relation to the semantic view of theories. It implies, for example, a characterization of
representational adequacy as projected unity, one where a data model embeds within a
logical space of models by involving towards an essential focal point of our conditioning.
It also gives rise to a different way of thinking about how we are in the world, for now we
encounter reality, and each other, in situated understanding.
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Endnotes
1

Note inserted in Kant’s own first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason as indicated on p. 271 of the
translation by Guyer and Wood (1998).
2
The Philosophy of Time and Space (1970a, 102).
3
The term “logical space” is much abused and common usage has trivialized its meaning. By “semantic
variant” I intend to distinguish the epistemic variant of “logical space” known as the “space of reasons”
found in Sellars (1997), i.e., the idea of justification relative to a network of inferential relations. This is not
to say that the semantic and epistemic variants are unrelated. Friedman (2001) presents a synthesis of the
two he takes to be implicit within logical positivism.
4
The following conception of logical space comes from my understanding of the use of the term “logical
space” by early Wittgenstein (1921/1961), which also appears to be van Fraassen’s use of the term in
empiricist structuralism. The first chapter of this dissertation shows where in the Critique of Pure Reason
this conception is to be found.
5
Hyder (2002) attempts to connect Wittgenstein’s conception of logical space to Helmholtz’s perceptual
manifolds. This dissertation presents Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space very differently, and justifies the
interpretation by its ability to unify the Tractatus.
6
Throughout I will follow the standard practice of quoting the Critique of Pure Reason by citing pages
from the first and second original editions (A and B). Kant’s other writings will be referred to the
Akademie Ausgabe (indicated by Ak., with volume and page). Unless otherwise indicated, I use the
translation of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781-1787/1998) by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, the
translation of the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783/2004) (Ak. IV) by Gary Hatfield, the
translation of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786/2004) (Ak. IV) by Michael
Friedman, and the translation of the Critique of Judgment (1790-1793/1987) (Ak. V and XX) by Werner S.
Pluhar.
7
The following account of Kant’s pre-critical conception of schemata is indebted to Friedman (1992, 5-34).
8
Friedman (1992, 25-28) identifies three problems: 1) it is unclear how the properties of space (e.g.,
continuity) can be derived from the external relations of non-spatial substances; 2) even if it were clear, our
knowledge of these properties would not derive a priori, but from our empirical knowledge of the law of
universal gravitation; and 3) since material and immaterial substances are said to be co-present in a single
world, their distinction is undermined by their co-presence and interaction in space.
9
E.g., Allison (2004, 426).
10
“Idea properly means a rational concept, and ideal the representation of an individual being as adequate
to an idea” (Ak. V: 232).
11
As noted below, there are non-figurative pure sensible concepts. Claims in this chapter should be
understood as limited to pure sensible concepts pertaining to shapes in space.
12
“The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance” (B34/A20).
13
“[T]hat which is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical sense as a thing in
itself, which yet can appear different to every eye in regard to colour. The transcendental concept of
appearances in space, on the contrary, is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space
is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form that is proper to anything in itself, but rather that objects in
themselves are not known to us at all ….” (A29-30/B45).
14
The following typology is taken from a note inserted in Kant’s own copy of the first edition preceding the
table of the categories: “On a characteristic of concepts; of intellectual, empirical, and pure sensible
representations” (1998, 212n.).
15
An idea is a pure concept of reason “made of up notions, which goes beyond possible experience”
(A320/B377).
16
“[T]o construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it” (A713/B741).
17
“Now of all intuition none is given a priori except the mere form of appearances, space and time, and a
concept of these, as quanta [i.e., magnitudes (A717/B745)] can be exhibited a priori in pure intuition, i.e.,
constructed, together with either its quality (its shape) or else merely its quantity (the mere synthesis of the
homogeneous manifold) through number” (A720/B748).
18
An earlier version of this chapter provided an extensive reconstruction of the A-Deduction as a projection
of space-time onto time that also plainly showed the motivation for Kant’s schematism. Unfortunately,
considerations of length preclude its inclusion into the final version.
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19

Cf. Ak. XX: 198n.6. Friedman (1992) notes that this marks the fissure for Kant between mathematics and
logic: “the existential proposition corresponding to the construction – [e.g.,] that for any point and any line
there is a circle with the given point as center and the given line as radius – cannot be conceptually
expressed for Kant. In mere syllogistic logic this existential proposition cannot, strictly speaking, even be
stated” (126).
20
Kant is clear that the synthesis of apprehension is an act of the imagination: “There is thus an active
faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised
immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension. For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition
into an image; it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its activity, i.e., apprehend them”
(A120). Also, cf. A120n.
21
To fit Kant’s schematism within her particular interpretation of the Critique, Longuenesse (1998)
concludes Kant’s chronological presentation of comparison, reflection and abstraction is “implausible”.
She asserts that the rule of apprehension is generated in its entirety in the operation of comparison and,
though acknowledging that it pertains to properties of sensation, identifies this rule with a schema (116117). Aside from the incoherence such an interpretation makes of Kant’s claim that “the schema of sensible
concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination”
(italics added, A141-142/B181), on my interpretation Kant’s chronological presentation is spot-on.
22
Kant gives us the rule at A164-165/B204: If I say: “[w]ith three lines, two of which are taken are greater
than the third, a triangle can be drawn”, then I have here the mere function of the productive imagination,
which draws the lines greater or smaller, thus allowing them to abut at any arbitrary angle.”
23
The passage of the Aesthetic Kant is alluding to is probably the following:
I call all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing is to be encountered
that belongs to sensation. Accordingly, the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be
encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain
relations. This pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition. So if I separate from the
representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force,
divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness,
color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form.
These belong to pure intuition, which occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the senses
or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind. (A20-21/B34-35)
What Kant is clarifying in his footnote is that inasmuch as the “extension and form” that “belong to pure
intuition” determine a pure sensible concept, they are also determined by a pure sensible concept in a
synthesis.
24
Friedman (1992, xiv) also construes the schematism as essentially spatiotemporal.
25
Thus, I disagree with Bennett (1966, 141) when he says that the “nasty phrase ‘representation of a
[general] procedure” just means ‘rule’”. Following Longuenesse’s (1998, 50) account of a “rule of sensible
synthesis”, Allison (2004, 210) introduces a non-discursive “perceptual rule” as schemata of pure sensible
and empirical concepts that functions “to process the sensible data in a determinate way”. But there are
exegetical problems with this interpretation. Contra Allison (and Longuenesse), Kant does not “explicitly”
say a schema as representation is a rule, only that it “signifies” a rule, or is “related” to a concept “as a
rule”, which suggests merely that it presents the same rule as a concept does; conversely, Kant never says in
the Critique that a rule is a representation, only that a representation (e.g., a concept) “serves as” (A106) or
“expresses” (A142/B181) a rule. In the passage just quoted, Kant does not distinguish schemata. Yet
Allison does not adopt a view consistent with this, opting to recognize a categorical schema, not as a
perceptual rule, but as a formal intuition (215). Longuenesse’s elaborate and complex position is more
consistent in this respect. However, she does justice to the notion of the schema as a “product” of the
imagination only by claiming that it is “generated” in universal comparison guided by a pre-discursive
capacity to judge (115-122). This commits her to the view that “schemata are acquired before the concepts,
which reflect them” (116 n.29). Kant never says this, and the main difficulty with this interpretation is that
Kant’s account of non-transcendental schemata is only in relation to shapes, whereas the “perceptual rule”
that both she and Allison conceive to be a schema extends to sensation.
26
I thus depart from Friedman (1992) who argues this: schemata are “general procedures for constructing
each and every figure of a particular kind (lines, circles, triangles, and so on)” (41). I reject a similar
interpretation by Young (1984).
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27

Elsewhere Kant refers to a schema as a “monogram” (A142/B181) and states that a “schema contains the
outline (monogramma)” (A833/B862).
28
“[A]ll synthetic a priori propositions are related to [principles of the pure understanding] alone, indeed
their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation” (B294). Principles of the pure understanding are
“synthetic judgements that flow a priori from pure concepts of the understanding under [sensible]
conditions” (A136/B175). And since these sensible conditions are transcendental schemata, “[t]he
principles of the pure understanding … contain nothing but only the pure schema, as it were, for possible
experience” (A236-237/B296).
29
This point is made even more clearly in the case of the category substance: without more, the category
“shows me nothing at all about what determinations the thing that is to count as such a first subject is to
have” (A147/B187).
30
Kemp-Smith (2003, 334-342) dismisses Kant’s schematism as raising a pseudo-problem, Bennett (1966,
150) describes the problem it seeks to address as “hopelessly confused” and Warnock (1949, 80) suggests
the problem is a “silly question”.
31
Indeed, Kant makes a similar claim about the point of the schematism at B167.
32
In his introduction to the Critique, for example, Guyer states “Even if the transcendental deduction does
establish that the categories do apply to all possible data for experience, or (in Kant’s terms) all manifolds
of intuition, it does so only abstractly and collectively – that is, it does not specify how each category
applies necessarily to the objects given in experience or show that all of the categories must be applied to
those objects” (italics added, 9-11).
33
“The shape of a cone can be made intuitive without any empirical assistance…. I cannot exhibit the
concept of a cause in general in intuition in any way except in an example given to me by experience, etc.”
(A715/B743).
34
In Kant’s own words: the transcendental deduction shows that “pure concepts a priori, in addition to the
function of the understanding in the category, must also contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility
(namely of the inner sense) that contain the general condition under which alone the category can be
applied to any object” (A139-140/B178-179).
35
Krause makes a very similar point to my own when he says that a schema “specifies … the mark for the
application of [a] category” (185), but differs in his construal of the mark as purely temporal.
36
“Hence it is also requisite for one to make an abstract concept sensible, i.e., display the object that
corresponds to it in intuition, since without this the concept would remain (as one says) without sense, i.e.,
without significance” (A240/B299)
37
That a schema is a criterion of evidence is strongly suggested in the following comment: “But what must
be remembered about all synthetic principles … [is that they] … have their sole significance and validity
not as principles of the transcendental use of the understanding but merely as principles of empirical use,
hence they can be proven only as such; consequently the appearances must not be subsumed under the
categories per se, but only under their schemata” (italics added, A180-181/B223);
38
It is in the sense of schemata of sensibility that Kant remarks that “the senses do not supply pure concepts
of the understanding in concreto, but only the schema for their use, and that the object appropriate to this
schema is found only in experience (as the product of the understanding from materials of sensibility)” (Ak.
IV: 316).
39
Like mathematics, “the peculiar thing about transcendental philosophy is this: that in addition to the rule
(or rather the general condition for rules), which is given in the pure concept of the understanding, it can at
the same time indicate a priori the case to which the rules ought to be applied” (A135/B174-175).
40
See Chipman (1972) and Walsh (1957/1958) for criticism along these lines.
41
I am sympathetic to Chipman’s (1972) general claim that transcendental schemata are to be “understood
derivatively” (42) from other schemata and that the mechanism of subsumption is “essentially
“constructive” in character” (43).
42
I thus agree with Allison (2004, 212) that the homogeneity in this case is between pure and empirical
intuition, not between a class concept and a member of that class.
43
Its first mention is found Kant’s notes (2005) at R5552 (1778-79, 18:218-21): “That we must underlie all
of our pure concepts of understanding with a schema, a [crossed out: relation] way of establishing
composition in the manifold in space and time. That this schema is merely in the sensible representation of
the subject ….”. Its late introduction speaks to its import in unifying the Critique.
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44

“Even space and time, as pure as these concepts are from everything empirical and as certain as it is that
they are represented in the mind completely a priori, would still be without objective validity and without
sense and significance if their necessary use on the objects of experience were not shown; indeed, their
representation is a mere schema, which is always related to the reproductive imagination that calls forth the
objects of experience, without which they would have no significance; and thus it is with all concepts
without distinction” (A156/B195).
45
Cf. A670/B698: “[T]he concept of a highest intelligence … is only a schema …, which serves only to
preserve the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason, in that one derives the object of
experience, as it were, from the imagined object of this idea as its ground or cause.”
46
I have yet to come across an interpretation of this passage that deviates from this tradition. But then
making sense of Kant without distorting his claims seems to be impossible. Through a painstaking analysis
of this example Bennett (1966, 150) ends up dismissing the chapter as incoherent. Guyer (1987, 159) ends
up collapsing Kant’s distinction between an empirical concept and a schema. Maintaining the distinction,
Allison (2004) attributes to Kant the mistake of using “concept of dog” instead of “schema of dog” and,
following Longuenesse (1998), finds himself forced to appeal to a “perceptual rule” (208-210) that extends
what Kant is saying only about form to matter.
47
Kemp-Smith (2003, 337) takes Kant to be making some sort of mistake here.
48
It occurs in the following passage: “concepts certainly permit of division into sensible and intellectual
ones; for one cannot determine any object for the latter, and therefore also cannot pass them off as
objectively valid” (A255/B311).
49
Thus, I depart from Guyer’s view in his introduction to the Critique that each category is associated with
a “temporal schema” (10) and from Franswa’s (1978) claim that developments in the second edition
suggest Kant’s temporal schemata ought to be supplemented with spatial schemata. Rather, I agree with
Friedman’s recognition that “schematization in general necessarily involves what we now call space-time”
(161n.) and that Kant had some sense of this notion.
50
Another argument that transcendental schemata are essentially spatiotemporal arises in the following
way: “All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception” (B275), and that “in order
to give something that persists in intuition … we need an intuition in space (of matter), since space alone
persistently determines, while time, however, and thus everything that is in inner sense, constantly flows”
(B291). (As we will see later, space persistently determines because its parts are simultaneous.) Since the
schema of the category substance is “the persistence of the real in time” (A144/B183), it follows that it is
essentially spatiotemporal.
51
That a transcendental schema is constituted by contributions of the understanding and sensibility
illuminates Kant’s characterization of the necessary agreement of experience with the categories as “a
system of the epigenesis of pure reason” (B167), an allusion to the biological theory where an embryo is
understood to be a new product constituted by germ cells of two parents (as noted in the translation by
Guyer and Wood (1998), p. 727n.).
52
As noted in the translation by Guyer and Wood, p. 271.
53
Paton (1936) is right that “[e]very object must exhibit all the transcendental schemata, and must fall, as
regards to their different aspects, under all the categories. We must not be misled into supposing that Kant
describes a whole series of synthesis which take place at different times” (44).
54
Allison (2004, 215-216) simply equates a transcendental schema with a time-determination in the sense
of a formal intuition of time. I depart from his view on two points. I reject his claim that a timedetermination is a formal intuition of time, for Kant is only saying that a formal intuition of time arises from
the collective effect of the categories. I also depart from his view that a time-determination is a product of a
figurative synthesis; the product of a figurative synthesis is the perception of a time-determination.
55
That the property is spatiotemporal is evident from the following passage: “Establishing that our
concepts have reality always requires intuitions. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called
examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called schemata” (Ak: …, 351).
If examples are spatiotemporal images, then schemata too must be spatiotemporal.
56
I intend only to make out the plausibility of this interpretation. A future project would involve correlating
the relation of this conception of transcendental schemata to the logical functions of the categories, on the
one hand, and the principles of the understanding on the other.
57
Although the property of continuity is evident in the “intensive” magnitudes of sensation, Kant is clear
that the property is identical to that of the “extensive” magnitudes of space and time: “The property of
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magnitudes on account of which no part of them is the smallest (no part is simple) is called their continuity.
… All appearances whatsoever are accordingly continuous magnitudes, either in their intuition, as extensive
magnitudes, or in their mere perception (sensation and thus reality), as intensive ones” (A169-170/B211212).
58
For example, the property of unity of point and succession of points is evident in the construction the
pure sensible concept five (cf. A140/B179). As to continuity, Kant does state that “mathematics also
occupies itself … with the continuity of extension as a quality of [spaces]” (A715/B743). Friedman, noting
that the Euclidean conception of continuity is not distinct from denseness or infinity, outlines an iterable
construction that captures Euclid’s conception of continuity:
… Euclid generates the necessary points [otherwise formally secured for constructions by an
axiom of continuity] by a definite process of construction: the procedure of construction with a
straight-edge and compass. We start with three basic operations: (i) drawing a line segment
connecting any two given points (to avoid complete triviality we assume two distinct points to
begin with), (ii) extending a line segment by any given line segment, (iii) drawing a circle with any
given point as center and any given line segment as radius. We are then allowed to iterate
operations (i), (ii), and (iii) any finite number of times. Euclid’s Postulates 1-3 give the rules for
this iterative procedure, and the points in our “model” are just the points that can be so
constructed. In particular, then, the infinity of this set of points is guaranteed by the infinite
iterability of our process of construction. (61)
59
Kant is explicit here: “we must order the determinations of inner sense as appearances in time in just the
same way as we order those of outer sense in space” (B156).
60
The link between causality and transitivity is well known. On this interpretation, transitivity is at the core
of Kant’s theory of causality.
61
Not limited by monadic logic, the modern polyadic theory of order includes two additional axioms:
˅b˅a (a < b) (no endpoints) and ˅a˅b˅c (a < b  (a < c < b)) (denseness) (Friedman 1992, 62).
62
In general, I agree with Walsh (1957/1958) that realizing the categories means “giving them reference to
features of concrete experience” (101).
63
“Appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories,
are called phaenomena” (A248/249).
64
I understand Kant’s assertion that “a transcendental time determination … rests on a rule a priori” to be a
claim that a time-determination is an inference from a spatiotemporal representation that presents a rule.
65
This is implied from Kant’s statement that “pure intuition (with regard to it as representation, time, the
form of inner intuition) grounds the totality of perception a priori” (A115).
66
In the context of first passage “empirical intuition” does not mean intuition from constructing a concept
by drawing an image, for the image that results is not “immediately represented as real in space and time”.
67
“[T]hat which follows from the general conditions of the construction must hold generally of the object of
the constructed concept” (A716/B744).
68
There is no distinction in reasoning either to mathematical or dynamical principles (A724/B752). But
why should derivation of mathematical principles necessitate an empirical synthesis, for properties of the
transcendental schemata number and continuity are clearly evident in the constructions of pure sensible
concepts? The answer is that schematic properties have a different character in an empirical synthesis (e.g.,
continuity of a line vs. continuity of sensation), and only in this context do they pertain to experience in
general (rather than to merely figurative experience).
69
Hence synthetic a priori principles are inferred from spatiotemporal properties. In this case “in order …
to make even inner alterations thinkable, we must be able to grasp time, as the form of inner sense,
figuratively through a line, and grasp the inner alteration through the drawing of this line (motion)” (B292).
70
Here Kant appears to contradict Longuenesse (1995) who argues that reflective judgment is inseparable
from determinative judgement.
71
“All of our cognitions, however, lie in the entirety of all possible experience, and transcendental truth,
which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible, consists in the general relation to this”
(A146/B185).
72
“For from the concept signifying a genus it can no more be seen how far its division will go than it can be
seen from space how far division will go in the matter that fills it” (A655/B683); “there are no species or
subspecies that are proximate (in the concept of reason), but intervening species are always possible, whose
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difference form the first and the second species is smaller than their difference from each other”
(A659/B687).
73
In characterizing this space of classification as organized under the regulative idea God I have drawn
inspiration from Wood’s (1978) identification of an “ontological space” (33, 50-55) in the Critique
organizing individual things under the same idea. However, there are at least three differences between the
two spaces. As we shall see, Kant’s space of classification is a potential infinity, whereas Wood’s
ontological space is conceived (like the form of space) to be infinite. Because of this Wood is forced to
view his ontological space as a “metaphor” (33 n. 16). On the other hand, I take Kant’s potential space to
be a product of the non-spatiotemporal imagination under the guidance of reason. Significantly, Wood’s
ontological space is structured only with predicates of sensation, whereas Kant’s space of classification
includes intuitive predicates.
74
The idea God “is only a schema, ordered in accordance with the conditions of the greatest unity of reason,
for the concept of a thing in general, which serves only to preserve the greatest systematic unity in the
empirical use of our reason, in that one derives the object of experience, as it were, from the imagined
object of this idea as its ground or cause” (A670/B698).
75
Kant is clear that although closely related to the original image, “the object of reason’s ideal”, ens
realissimum, is the focus imaginarius of the space of reason: “[i]t is self-evident that with this aim –
namely, solely that of representing the necessary thoroughgoing determination of things – reason does not
presuppose the existence of a being conforming to the ideal, but only the idea of such a being, in order to
derive from an unconditioned totality of thoroughgoing determination the conditioned totality, i.e., that of
the limited” (A577-578/B605-606).
76
“Every concept, in regard to what is not contained in it, is indeterminate, and stands under the principle of
determinability: that of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to it, which rests
on the principle of contradiction and hence is a merely logical principle, which abstracts from every content
of cognition, and has in view nothing but the logical form of cognition” (A571/B599).
77
“For reason the ideal is … the original image (protoypon) of all things, which all together, as defective
copies (ectypa), take from it the matter for their possibility, and yet although they approach more or less
nearly to it, they always fall infinitely short of reaching it” (A578/B606).
78
“[T]he logical principle asserting indeterminacy of the logical sphere in regard to possible division would
give no occasion” to “demand an actual infinity in regard to the varieties of things that can become our
objects” (A656/B684).
79
“[S]pecies in nature are really partitioned and therefore in themselves have to constitute quantum
discretum, and if the graduated progress in their affinity were continuous, they would also have to contain a
true infinity of intermediate members between any two given species, which is impossible” (A661/B689).
80
The following passage is found in the Appendix:
If among the appearances offering themselves to us there were such a great variety – I will not say
of form (for they might be similar to one another in that) [emphasis added] but of content, i.e.,
regarding the manifoldness of existing beings – then even the most acute human understanding,
through comparison of one with another, could not detect the least similarity (a case which can at
least be thought), then the logical law of genera would not obtain at all, no concept of a genus, nor
any other universal concept, indeed no understanding at all would obtain, since it is the
understanding that has to do with such concepts. The logical principle of genera therefore
presupposes a transcendental one if it is to be applied to nature (by which I here understand only
objects that are given to us). According to that principle, sameness of kind is necessarily
presupposed in the manifold of a possible experience (even though we cannot determine its degree
a priori), because without it no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible.
(A653-654/B681/682)
The first sentence tells us that a transcendental presupposition is unnecessary if the principle of
homogeneity is taken to concern only the form of appearances. The implication is that only because the
principle of homogeneity extends to the content, i.e., the matter, of appearances that reason is free to admit
(“can at least be thought”) that appearances are not divided into (non-spatiotemporal) kinds.
81
The illustration on the left is taken from Clayton, D. (2010), “The Way of Beauty”, Thomas Moore
College of Liberal Arts (http://thewayofbeauty.org/2010/10/is-there-a-place-for-celtic-art-today/) and that
on the right is from from Bourke, P. (2002) “Conic Sections” (http://paulbourke.net/geometry/conic/).
82
A moment of gravity is weight, and weight is an empirical concept (A173/B215).
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83

In the third Critique Kant is concerned to explain the discovery and purposive systematization of
particular empirical laws through reflective judgment that finds a universal for a given particular. Although
empirical laws prior to investigation “are nonetheless contingent as far as we can see (i.e. we cannot
cognize them a priori)” (183), no where does Kant explicitly deny that in its discovery we might come to
know an a priori basis for a law in a pure sensible concept. This is not to say, of course, that all empirical
laws will have an a priori basis in pure sensible concepts.
84
This is consistent with Kant’s account of the relation between empirical laws and principles of the pure
understanding:
Although we learn many laws through experience, these are only particular determinations of yet
higher laws, the highest of which (under which all others stand) come out of the understanding
itself a priori, and are not borrowed from experience, but rather must provide the appearances with
their lawfulness and by that very means make experience possible. (A126)
The pure faculty of understanding does not suffice, however, to prescribe to the appearances
through mere categories a priori laws beyond those on which rests a nature in general, as
lawfulness of appearances in space and time. Particular laws, because they concern empirically
determined appearances, cannot be completely derived from the categories, although they stand
under them. Experience must be added in order to come to know particular laws at all; but about
experience in general, and about what can be cognized as an object of experience, only those a
priori laws offer instruction. (B165)
85
Friedman (1996) points this out at pp. 191-192, noting that this is “a purely mathematical result
concerning the kinematics of relative motion and does not depend, in particular, on the Newtonian laws of
motion”.
86
This point is made by Friedman (1992, 177).
87
It is called a “moment” because “the degree [of reality] designates only that magnitude of the
apprehension of which is not successive but instantaneous” (A168-169/B210).
88
Friedman (1996) notes that Kant is referring to Proposition 35 of Book III of Euclid: “if two straight
lines intersect one another within a circle at point E, and meet the circle at A, C, and B, D respectively, then
AE x EC = BE x ED” (186).
89
Contra. Friedman (1992, Ch. 5).
90
Hence, Kant tells us that rather than a nature a circle has an “essence” or “the first inner principle of all
that belongs to the possibility of a thing” (Ak. IV: 467n).
91
Friedman (1996) notes, “This property of conic sections is the natural generalization of Propositions 3536 of Book III of Euclid …: suppose that the members of two given pairs of straight lines intersect one
another at E, E’ respectively and meet the conic at A, C, and B, D and at A’C’ and B’, D’ respectively; then
if the lines AC, A’C’ and BD, B’D’ are respectively parallel to one another, (AE x EC)/(BE x ED) = (A’E’
x E’C’)/(B’E’ x E’D’)” (191).
92
“Moving forward and moving backward in the number series are not equivalent to each other; on the
contrary, like the sequence of perceptions in time, they are actually quite different procedures” (Helmholtz
1887/1971, 441).
93
“As all our means of sense perception extend only to space of three dimensions, and a fourth is not
merely a modification of what we have but something perfectly new, we find ourselves by reason of our
bodily organization unable to represent a fourth dimension” (Helmholtz 1870/1971, 262).
94
“In earlier essays I have tried to establish that the axioms of geometry are not propositions given a priori,
but propositions that must be confirmed or refuted by experience. I emphasize here once more that I do not
reject Kant’s conception of space as a transcendental form of intuition. … Since the empirical theory, which
I have advocated, interprets axioms of geometry not only as not undemonstrable but indeed as requiring
justification, it must clearly take the same position concerning the origin of the axioms of arithmetic, which
are related to the form of intuition of time in the same way that the axioms of geometry are related to the
form of intuition of space” (Helmholtz 1887/1971, 437).
95
I am following Carrier’s (1994) interpretation of Helmholtz. For an alternative and interesting claim that
Helmholtz regards free mobility as part of his form of intuition, see Friedman (1997).
96
Because they are effects, Leroux (2001, 192) suggests Helmholtz’s sensations are really “signals”.
97
My use of the term “graven image” comes from van Fraassen (2008, 104).
98
“What we unquestionably can find as a fact, without any hypothetical element whatsoever, is the lawful
regularity of phenomena. From the very first, in the case where we perceive stationary objects distributed
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before us in space, this perception involves the recognition of a uniform or lawlike connection between our
movements and the sensations which result from them. Thus even the most elementary ideas contain a
mental element and occur in accordance with the laws of thought. Everything that is added in intuition to
the raw materials of sensation may be considered mental ….” (Helmholtz 1878/1971, 386).
99
“It would obviously be false, however, to try to maintain that we have no knowledge other than that
which is developed from sense perception by logical or conceptual thought (Helmholtz 1894/1971b, 506).
100
We now know from Newman’s (1928) objection to Russell that this claim of adequacy is trivially
satisfied: because the number of signs is taken to be equal to the number of causes, it is just a point of logic
that the structure of causes is the same as the structure of signs.
101
In accord with Friedman’s (1997, 21) translation of Abbildung in the passage, I have replaced Kahl’s
“we can discover” with “picturing”. This brings it closer to Cahan’s translation of “imaging” found in
Helmholtz (1995, 348).
102
Contra Hatfield (1990, 215-216), I fail to see the “tension” in Helmholtz’s view for failing “truly to
attribute objective validity to the causal law”. Hatfield assumes that a transcendental law must be
established by transcendental deduction in order to have objective validity. But in the Critique Kant tells us
regulative principles “also have objective validity in regard to this object [i.e., the object of experience], yet
not so as to determine something in it, but only to indicate the procedure in accordance with which the
empirical and determinate use of the understanding in experience can be brought into thoroughgoing
agreement with itself, by bringing it as far as possible into connection with the principle of thoroughgoing
unity; and from that it is derived” (A666/B694).
103
E.g., Schiemann (1998, 27).
104
This appeal to Mill should not engender confusion. Even though Mill opposed Kant, Helmholtz and
Hertz synthesize elements of empiricism with elements of transcendental idealism. Kantian overtones are
also present in van Fraassen who says, “I have much sympathy for the transcendentalist tradition and will
admit to flirting with it” (2010a, 463). He flirts with it through the idea of logical space.
105
We must not forget that Helmholtz still lives in the world of logic prior to Frege and Russell: “Logic, or
the study of scientific thought, after it had been developed by Aristotle, was handed down through
scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages. For the most part it has remained unchanged down to our own
time” (Helmholtz 1894/1971a, 516).
106
With this account of concept formation Helmholtz in hand, was in a position to challenge Kant’s view
that it was impossible to conceive spatial relations that contradict the axioms of Euclidean geometry on the
basis of what is possible to imagine. Recognizing “‘to conceive’ means ‘to form concepts’” (Helmholtz
1878/1971, 386) from pre-conceptual images, Helmholtz writes:
In his assertion that it is impossible to conceive spatial relations which contradict the axioms of
geometry, as well as in his general interpretation of intuition as simple, irreducible mental process,
Kant was influenced by the mathematics and the physiology of the senses at this time.
In order to try to conceive something which has never been seen before, it is necessary to
know how to imagine in detail the series of sense impressions which, in accordance with wellknown laws, would be experienced if the thing in question – and any changes in it – were actually
perceived by any of the sense organs from all possible positions. Further, these impressions must
be such that all possible interpretations of them except one can be eliminated. If these series of
sense impressions can be specified completely and uniquely in this way, then in my opinion on
must admit that the object is clearly conceivable. (Ibid., 378-379)
107
“We must make use of the law [of causality] in order to arrive at the ideas of force and cause in the first
place” (Helmholtz 1894/1971a, 526).
108
Boltzmann (1905/1960, 245, 247, 251-252).
109
Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this section are to the Principles (1900/1956).
110
Hyder’s (2003) attempt to link the Principles to Kant’s schematism is a source of inspiration for the first
two chapters of this thesis. However, I found myself disagreeing with Hyder’s conception of a schema as
an “operational rule” and began to think that his attempt to link the Principles directly with Kant’s
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (2004a) was not all that promising (cf. Lutzen 2005, ch.10).
Christiansen (2006) builds upon Hyder’s suggestion of connecting Hertz to Kant’s schematism. As this
chapter shows, the connection to Kant is not through schemata of the understanding, but through regulative
schemata.

228

111

Hertz’s qualification has led to charges of inconsistency (e.g., Schiemann (1998, 12)). However, Hertz
probably had Helmholtz in mind here (cf. Helmholtz 1870/1971, 263). As I see it, Hertz’s point is that the
issue of whether axioms of Euclidean geometry are intuitively synthetic or conceptually analytic a priori
propositions is moot for his purposes, which is to evaluate competing scientific representations. Scientific
representations arise from fundamental ideas, and fundamental ideas arise from laws of transformation in
relation to internal intuitions or a priori definitions.
112
“We determine the duration of time by means of a chronometer, from the number of beats of its
pendulum. The unit of duration is settled by arbitrary convention” (§298); “We determine space-relations
according to methods of practical geometry by means of a scale. The unit of length is settled by arbitrary
convention. A given point in space is specified by its relative position with regard to a system of
coordinates fixed with reference to the fixed stars and determined by convention” (§299). The conventional
aspect of these rules is emphasized in §304.
113
Commentators often overlook the generality of Hertz’s claim, i.e., that images of objects can arise from
passive observation (e.g., Heidelberger 1998, 21). A notable exception is Schiemann (1998, 31).
114
E.g., Heidelberger (1998, 21) and Lutzen (2005, 86).
115
E.g., Lutzen (2005, 85-86) and Christiansen (2006, 5).
116
This shift in logic is noted by Schiemann (1998, 30).
117
Hertz’s reference to “images or symbols” is a source of interpretive issues. For example, Graβhoff
(1997, 101) takes this as a cue to interpret Hertz’s images along the lines of Wittgenstein as containing
symbols representing objects.
118
Given the import of this point, it is worth quoting the relevant section in full:
The three foregoing rules are not new definitions of the quantities time, space, and mass, which
have been completely defined previously. They represent the laws of transformation by means of
which we translate external experience, i.e., concrete sensations and perceptions, into the symbolic
language of the images of them which we form (vide Introduction), and by which conversely the
necessary consequents of this image are again referred to the domain of possible sensible
perceptions. Thus, only through these three rules can the symbols time, space, and mass, become
parts of our images of external objects. Again, only by these three rules are they subjected to
further demands than are necessitated by our thought. (§302)
119
E.g., Schiemann (1998, 33) and Lutzen (2005, 87).
120
A notable exception is Lutzen (1994) and (2005), although he fails to distinguish between a model and
an image.
121
Although the systems considered in the Principles consist of finitely many material points, no upper limit
was assigned to their number and no lower limit to their mass (§7). Presumably this was in anticipation of
the book’s extension to the ether, which Hertz conceived as a continuum (Lutzen 2005-77).
122
Somewhat misleadingly, Lutzen (2005, 83) identifies a distinction between a “local” and a “global”
image.
123
“Our representation of mechanics bears towards the customary one somewhat the same relation that the
systematic grammar of a language bears to a grammar devised for the purpose of enabling learners to
become acquainted as quickly as possible with what they will require in daily life. The requirements of the
two are very different, and they must differ widely in their arrangement if each is to be properly adapted to
its purpose” (40). It does not “prevent us from understanding that mechanics could and must have been
developed in the manner in which it actually has developed” (§735).
124
The philosophical activity of reconstructing a scientific representation is characteristic of “mature
knowledge”:
Mature knowledge regards logical clearness as of prime importance; only logically clear images
does it test as to correctness; only correct images does it compare as to appropriateness. By
pressure of circumstances the process is often reversed. Images are found to be suitable for a
certain purpose; are next tested as to their correctness; and only in the last place purged of implied
contradictions. (10)
125
As Schiemann (1998) puts it, “[t]he certainty that those sequences of thought at a remove from the world
can be in contact with nature at all may be called the Platonic element of Hertz’s conception of science”
(32).
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126

Boltzmann (1905/1960) suggests that a less sophisticated version of Hertz’s idea is found in the
Euclidean method where “certain pictures were deduced from … axioms only with the help of the laws of
thought” (248).
127
“[W]ithout ambiguity we can decide whether an image is correct or not; but only according to the state
of our present experience, and permitting an appeal to later and riper experience” (3).
128
See section 2.35 below.
129
Lutzen (2005, ch. 12) argues that Hertz’s definition of mass was motivated by his intention to deduce a
multi-dimensional geometry of material points from Euclidean geometry.
130
This point is made by Graβhoff (1997, 105).
131
Although Hertz worked mostly with material points, the distinction between material points and material
particles appears to have been introduced out of considerations of fluid and continuum mechanics (Lutzen
2005, 140).
132
“The mass of bodies that we can handle is determined by weighing. The unity of mass is the mass of
some body settled by arbitrary convention” (§300).
133
This is implicit in §306 and explicit in §427 where Hertz refers to natural material systems in terms of
masses that “exist in nature”.
134
“The law condenses into one single statement the usual law of inertia and Gauss’s Principle of Least
Constraint” (27-28). Lutzen (2005) points out: “1. Newton’s first law of inertia [states] that in a system
consisting of free points (with no connections) the points will move uniformly in straight lines …, and 2.
Gauss’s principle of least constraint [states] that the natural motion of a connected system will minimize the
constraint among all motions that have the same position and velocity” (199). Given Hertz’s notion of
“uniform motion” and “straightest path” one can reformulate the law as follows: “A free system moves
with a constant speed along a path that is a straight as it can be without breaking the connections of the
system” (198).
135
In the second last paragraph to his introduction to the Hertz’s Principles, Helmholtz claims to depart
from Hertz on just this point:
English physicists – e.g. Lord Kelvin, in his theory of vortex-atoms, and Maxwell, in his
hypothesis of systems of cells with rotating contents, on which he basis his attempt at a mechanical
explanation of electromagnetic processes – have evidently derived a fuller satisfaction from such
explanations than from the simple representation of physical facts and laws in the most general
form, as given in systems of differential equations. For my own part, I must admit that I have
adhered to the latter mode of representation and have felt safer in so doing; yet I have no essential
objections to raise against a method which has been adopted by three physicists of such eminence.
136
According to Nolte (2010), development of phase space has been traced to papers written by Liouville in
1838, Jacobi in 1842, and Boltzmann in 1871, but its mature form makes its debut in a reprint of a paper
published by Poincare in 1889 and appears only to take hold in published articles by 1913. Even though
Boltzmann never held the full concept of phase space before his death in 1906, a similar analogy between
the mathematics of mechanical systems and geometry can be found in his Lectures of 1896 (1905/1960)
where he acknowledges the influence of the Principles.
137
In order for the model to make predictions, the equations of condition must be derived from given
equations of condition of the system that capture the fixed connections of bodies and the equations
expressing the fundamental law:
When equations result from the given equations of condition of a system and the fundamental law,
which have strictly the form of equations of condition, then for the determination of the motion of
the system it is indifferent whether we consider the original equations alone, or instead of them the
derived equations, as a representation of the connections of the system. (§327)
138
Myrvold (1990, 42).
139
It is an idealization in that the “fixed connections of bodies” we imagine “are represented
mathematically by equations of conditions” (11) as part of the “analytical representation” (§124, §131).
140
“425. Corollary 1. In order to determine beforehand the course of the natural motion of a material
system, it is sufficient to have a model of that system. The model may be much simpler than the system
whose motion it represents.”
141
Boltzmann (1905/1960) correctly understood Hertz to be saying that equations of a theory are interpreted
through a thought schema, i.e., a basic and general “thought-picture”(250) from which specific thought
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pictures are constructed, but offered his own logico-mathematical schema as part of a description of the
scientific method:
In my book entitled Lectures on the Principles of Mechanics, I have also attempted a purely
deductive representation of the fundamental principles of mechanics, but in quite a different way
and much more closely tied to the usual treatment of mechanics. Like Hertz, I begin with pure
thought-objects: exact material points. I relate their position to a rectangular coordinate system
that is also thought and I imagine a mental picture of the motion which, at first is constructed in the
following way: Every time that two material points are at a distance, r, from each other, each of
them is to experience an acceleration in the direction of r, which is a function f(r) of this distance.
Later, this function can be disposed of at will. Furthermore, the accelerations of both points are to
have a numerical relationship that remains unchanged at all times and which defines the relation of
the masses of the two material points. How we are to imagine the motion of all material points is
then unambiguously determined by the indication that the actual acceleration of each point is the
vector sum of all accelerations found for it by means of the previous rule. This sum is then also
added, as vector quantities are added, to the velocity of the point which is already given. Where
these accelerations come from and just why I give the instruction that the picture should be
constructed in this way is not further discussed. It suffices that the picture is a perfectly clear one
which, by means of calculations, can be worked out in detail for a sufficient number of cases. It
finds its justification only in the fact that the function f(r) can in all cases be determined, such that
the thought motion of the imagined material point becomes a faithful copy of actual appearances.
By means of this mode of treatment which we have called the purely deductive one, we
have of course not solved the question of the nature of matter, mass, and force. However, we have
avoided these questions by making their initial posing completely superfluous. In our thought
schema these concepts are fully determinate numbers and directions for geometric constructions.
We know how we are to think and execute them, so that we may obtain a useful picture of the
world of appearance. (251-252)
With the exception of its relevance to the development of the modern notion of phase space and its
approach to physical analysis discussed in Chapter 3, I have not thought it necessary to elaborate upon
Boltzmann’s system in this dissertation. Boltzmann thought philosophy was metaphysics and saw his
Bildtheorie as descriptive of the methodology of science (Blackmore 1995, 69). What he took from the
Principles was a presentation of the method of “purely deductive representation”. On this method a
conventional logical and mathematical thought schema encounters experience in a test for its predictive
accuracy; it is not constitutive of our images of external objects. Indeed, Boltzmann explicitly rejects
Hertz’s notion of a priori laws of thought (i.e., laws of internal intuition and logical forms), taking them to
be subject to development and modification through experience (1905/1960, 246).
142
Unless otherwise indicated all references to the Tractatus are to this translation by Pears and
McGuinness. But for page numbers of the preface, I will follow the standard practice of citing proposition
numbers.
143
Wittgenstein later wrote “I believe that I have never invented a new line of thought” (McGuiness (1988,
84).
144
Weiner (1992) suggests (perhaps uncharitably) that Wittgenstein suffered from “the anxiety of
influence” and “projected the misleading image of a supergenius whose philosophy emerged ex nihilo”
(15).
145
E.g., Coffa (1991, ch. 8).
146
In Notes of Logic (1961a)Wittgenstein wrote:
In philosophy there are no deductions; it is purely descriptive. The word ‘philosophy’ ought
always to designate something over or under, but not beside, the natural sciences. Philosophy
gives no pictures of reality, and can neither confirm no confute scientific investigation. It consists
of logic and metaphysics, the former its basis. (93)
147
The first commentator to do so appears to have been Griffin (1964), and Janik and Toulmin (1993)
created the current surge of interest. There is an obvious connection in their critical projects that is
frequently commented upon: “When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature
of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate
questions” (Hertz 1900/1956, 8); “If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it”
(Wittgenstein 1961b, 6.5).
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148

As translated in Wittgenstein (1921/1961, 159).
This was said by Wittgenstein to a prospective publisher as quoted in Weiner (1992, 109).
150
“The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs” (2.04). This is also explained by
Wittgenstein in a letter to Russell (1914-1916/1961, 129).
151
Wittgenstein made this clear in a letter to Ogden commenting on his translation of the Tractatus:
2.03: Here instead of ‘hang on one another’ it should be ‘hang one in another’ as the links of a
chain do! The meaning is that there isn’t anything third that connects the links but that the links
themselves make connexions with one another. ((1973, 23), as quoted by Graβhoff (1997, 114))
152
Wittgenstein (1964, 72) as quoted in Coffa (1991, 393, n.8). This is also suggested in the Tractatus: “In
logic nothing is accidental …. It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would
fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own” (2.012f).
153
Unlike Helmholtz and Hertz, Wittgenstein has no general theory of representation. As we shall see, this
similarity of form is accounted for by the prior the coordination of the self with reality.
154
“A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in a negative sense, like a solid body that restricts the freedom of
movement of others, and, in a positive sense, like a space bounded by solid substance in which there is
room for a body” (4.463).
155
Bell and Demopoulos (1996) characterize Wittgenstein’s elementary propositions meta-mathematically
through the notion of a free generator.
156
This was conveyed to Waismann (1979, 75-80) in a meeting January 2, 1930.
157
Coffa puts it this way: “The requirement that a symbolic system and a corresponding reality have the
same multiplicity demands that the symbolic system and its objective correlate have exactly the same
numbers of elements and that these are capable of exactly the same the same structural arrangements”
(Coffa 1991, 156). This is not quite right, since it is not the number of elements per se, but the number of
different kinds of elements that is pertinent to what is “distinguishable”. Elements that do not differ in their
internal properties are not “distinguishable parts”.
158
I am not the first to point out that pictorial elements are coordinate values in logical space. It is made by
Griffin (1964, 103-104) and implied by Waismann (1979) in his “Thesis” (that Wittgenstein apparently
read):
“Let us imagine a white sheet of paper covered with a network of lines. I can describe every mesh
of the network by specifying two point-numbers. The elements in a state of affairs correspond to
the point-numbers and the states of affairs themselves to the meshes of the network. If a state of
affairs then exists in reality, we imagine the corresponding mesh filled in black. The distribution
of black patches on the white sheet of paper then is a picture of reality in logical space. (261)
159
(Wittgenstein 1964, 72) as noted by Coffa (1991, 393, n.8).
160
I will discuss Wittgenstein’s notion of self below.
161
Wittgenstein studied engineering only because his plan to study with Boltzmann in Vienna was thwarted
by Boltzmann’s suicide in 1906 (Glock 1996, 13). It is likely he was led to Hertz through Boltzmann’s own
writings which show influence by the Principles (see Boltzmann 1905/1960).
162
“If I say ‘I have got stomach-ache,’ then this presupposes the possibility of a state of stomach-ache. My
present state and the state of stomach-ache are in the same logical space as it were” (December 25, 1929, as
recorded in Waismann (1979, 67)).
163
As discussed in a footnote to the conclusion of last chapter, Boltzmann (1905/1960) was concerned with
the “deductive method of representation” in science: from a thought schema pictures are constructed to test
the schema against appearances. On a sufficiently broad construal of “appearances” it is inconsequential to
this approach whether appearances arise through instrumentation. As we will see in chapter 4, after
adopting Wittgenstein’s idea of logical space van Fraassen only develops a theory of measurement
involving instrumentation some 40 years later.
164
One might also cite “[t]he propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they
represent it” (6.124).
165
Friedman (1992, 85, n.51) makes a similar point.
166
Glock (1996, 270) also makes this claim.
167
Consider the following proposition:
6.3751 … the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is
impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.
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If elementary pictures are the independent yardsticks by which reality is measured, there is nothing from the
logical structure of colour to preclude the possibility that two elementary colours can arise at the same place
at the same time. By 1930 Wittgenstein was forced to concede that the yardstick was not the picture but its
logical space:
It is not the individual graduating lines that are laid against it, but the entire scale. If I know that
the object extends to graduating line 10, I also know immediately that it does not extend to
graduating lines 11, 12, and so forth. The statements describing for me the length of an object
form a system, a system of propositions. Now it is such an entire system of propositions that is
compared with reality, not a single proposition. If I say, for example, that this or that point in the
visual field is blue, then I know not merely that, but also that this point is not green, nor red, nor
yellow, etc. I have laid the entire colour-scale against it at one go. This is also the reason why a
point cannot have different colours at the same time. For when I lay a system of propositions
against reality, this means that in each case there is only one state of affairs that can exist, not
several – just as in the spatial case. All this I did not yet know when I was writing my work: at
that time I thought that all inference was based on tautological form. At that time I had not yet
seen that an inference can also have the form: This man is 2m tall, therefore he is not 3m tall.
This is connected with the fact that I believed that elementary propositions must be independent of
one another, that you could not infer the non-existence of one state of affairs from the existence of
another. But if my present conception of a system of propositions is correct, it will actually be the
rule that from the existence of one state of affairs the non-existence of all the other states of affairs
described by this system of propositions can be inferred. (Recorded December 30, 1929 by
Waismann, 63)
168
Wittgenstein says later that any question about the number of objects “is without sense” (December 22,
1929, as recorded in Waismann (1979, 43).
169
“A proposition reaches through the whole of logical space. Otherwise negation would be unintelligible”
(January 5, 1930, as recorded in Waismann (1979, 91).
170
(December 22, 1929, as recorded by Waismann (1979, 43))
171
This has been pointed out by Weiner (1992, 42-43).
172
However, Weiner may be accused at various times of going too far and overstating Schopenhauer’s
influence.
173
Corresponding to four forms of the principle are four different types of necessity: logical, mathematical,
physical and moral (Schopenhauer 1974, 226-227).
174
E.g., pp. 79-80.
175
Wiener (1992) makes a persuasive case at pp. 68-72.
176
Without rule-governed reproduction there are no images for Kant, only “unruly heaps” of representations
(1781-1787/1998, A121).
177
“Tautologies and contradictions lack sense” in that “[a] tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is
unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition” (4.461).
178
Here I depart from both the translations of Pears and McGuinness (“of that language which alone I
understand”) and Ogden (Wittgenstein 1922) (“the language which I understand”) and follow
Wittgenstein’s own correction to a copy of the first edition of the Tractatus (as quoted in Weiner (1992,
65).
179
“6.374
Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour granted by
fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connexion between the will and the world, which would guarantee
it, and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely not something that we could will.”
180
“5.631 … If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body,
and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc. this being a
method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it
alone could not be mentioned in that book.”
181
It is interesting to note that in the Notebooks Wittgenstein writes:
This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism
singles me alone out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of the world, and so on the one
side nothing is left over, and on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to
realism if it is strictly thought out. (1961a, 15.10.16; 85)
Yet the Tractatus does not consider idealism as an option:
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4.0412 For the same reason the idealist’s appeal to ‘spatial spectacles’ is inadequate to explain
the seeing of spatial relations, because it cannot explain the multiplicity of these relations.
By contrast, both solipsism and pure realism explain multiplicity as a shared limit between the metaphysical
self and the world prior to experience.
182
Wittgenstein’s idea of the eternal present is likely taken from Schopenhauer (Weiner 1992, ch.3).
183
“That is why what happens, whether it comes from a stone or from my body is neither good nor bad”
(Wittgenstein 1961a, 12.10.16; 84).
184
Again, the influence is probably Schopenhauer for whom aesthetic consciousness “stops the wheel of
time” (Schopenhauer 1966, vol I. 185).
185
E.g., Glock (1996, 365).
186
In the Prototractatus Wittgenstein wrote “My work consists of two parts: the one represented here plus
all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one” ((1971, 15) as
quoted in Coffa (1991, 142)).
187
Van Fraassen distinguishes science from myth by its primary commitment to a method of thinking “with
its ideal of constant revaluation and self-critique” (1994b, 132) and distinguishes logical spaces of science
from those of myth in that they develop from the introduction of new measurement procedures (2008, 165166).
188
Elgin (2010) puts van Fraassen’s conception this way: “A logical space is a multidimensional array of
possibilities open to the items that occupy the space. To represent an item in a logical space is to represent
it has having a particular position in the array of possibilities the space marks out” (443).
189
For use of the term “model” in relation to time and space see van Fraassen (1970a, 191-193); in relation
to space-time and colour space see his (1985a, 276).
190
A clear sense of this use of “model” is found in van Fraassen’s (2008, 310).
191
This account of the phenomenology of experience obviously carries through van Fraassen’s later (2002a)
rejection of the factual thesis associated with traditional empiricism that experience is the sole source of
information.
192
Van Fraassen introduces the idea of logical space to explicate the temporal order of events as we
conceive them, or “time”, but acknowledges (2010a, 463) that the basic structure of this argument is
general, and does not depend on any special feature of the philosophical problems of time or space. I have
taken the liberty of generalizing his initial approach.
193
More specifically, “the extant sciences provide a kind of ‘given’ for philosophy: for a philosopher, the
conceptual framework of the science of his day provides a subject more appropriate for analysis than for
criticism. Other philosophical systems, of course, are fair game” (1970a, 52).
194
“Phenomenal reality need not be fragmentary in itself, but its chaotic nature vis-à-vis human
understanding forces us to treat it, conceive of it, as fragmentary” (van Fraassen 1985a, 276).
195
Van Fraassen acknowledges his formulation of scientific realism is different from other formulations,
such as that of Psillos (2010b, 547-548).
196
In (Monton and van Fraassen 2003), van Fraassen acknowledges that although agnosticism is a “natural
epistemic attitude” to have (420), “as far as logical consistency goes” (408) a particular constructive
empiricist need not be agnostic about unobservable entities or about real non-actual possibility. If
agnosticism is adopted, a person “would never say that ‘we do not know about electrons merely because
they are unobservable’” (420). Rather, “she would say she is agnostic about the very existence of
electrons” (Ibid.). A doctrine of aim only imputes belief about existence in theory acceptance in order to
make sense of the intentional activity of scientists – it says nothing about whether such belief is warranted
or justified. Constructive empiricism tells us scientists act as if accepted theories inform them that the
empirical world is uniform. Van Fraassen (1989) develops a liberal epistemology where it is rational to
believe whatever one is not compelled to disbelieve, which allows him to say that belief in theory
acceptance that goes beyond the strict deliverances of experience is rational.
197
As an answer to “What is Science”, constructive empiricism is a view that is “somewhat speculative in
the interpretation it puts on what happens” that tries to describe “what is really going on” (1991a, 1-2). It is
said to be slightly different than Cartwright’s “more phenomenological description of scientific activity”
(1991, 13). My claim that it is a reconstruction of scientific activity capture’s this difference in a way
consistent with van Fraassen’s claim that acceptance as successfully achieving the aim of scientific activity
is in the ideal: it is “unqualified acceptance; in practice, acceptance will come with restrictions and
qualifications, and belief will come in degrees” (2008, 345, fn.3).
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198

See van Fraassen (1994a, 191).
Giere recognizes the point: “Van Fraassen’s arguments for [constructive empiricism] are acknowledged
to be independent of his commitment to the semantic view of scientific theories” (2000, 521).
200
A theory is true if “there is an exact correspondence between reality and one of its models”; a “theory is
empirically adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical
substructures of that model” (van Fraassen 1980, 197, 64). In his (2008) van Fraassen clarifies that
“appearances” in this context means “data models” (391, n.24).
201
“Given that the aim of science is to provide empirically adequate theories about what the world is like,
we should conclude that wherever the representation does trade on likeness, the general rule of selectivity
targets the observable phenomena. A model often contains much that does not correspond to any
observable feature in the domain. Then, from an empiricist point of view, the model’s structure must be
taken to reveal structure in the observable phenomena, while the rest of the model must be serving that
purpose indirectly” (van Fraassen 2008, 87).
202
Although at this point he occasionally uses the term “real structure” ((1970a, 104); (1985b, 205)), later
van Fraassen prefers the less problematic notion of “concrete structure” (2010a).
203
Van Fraassen (1970a, 35-44) provides the following historical summary. Having perceived that the
analysis of temporal order underlies that of temporal magnitude, Leibniz proposed that “[t]ime is the order
of non-contemporaneous things”. This order was said to be constituted by qualitatively incompatible events
related to each other as an “antecedent” that “contains the ground for” a “consequent”. Basic relations
among states of affairs were those of contrariety, qualification and causality, which defined the basic
temporal relation of before, and which in turn could be used to define the relations of temporally between
and simultaneity.
204
“My earlier state of existence contains the ground for the existence of the later. And since, because the
connection of all things, the earlier state in me also contains the earlier state of the other thing, it also
contains the ground of the later state of the other thing, and is thereby prior to it” ((Leibniz 1951), as quoted
in (van Fraassen 1970a, 38).
205
“…“X is causally connected with Y” is used as equivalent to “Either X and Y belong to the history of
one and the same object, or belong to the history of one and the same signal, or are coincident with some
pair of events thus connected.”” (van Fraassen 1970a, 194). The term “causal” is due to Reichenbach: “A
light signal … is a causal chain, because in Rechenbach’s terminology the emission of such a signal is one
of the causes of its eventual reflections and final abosorption; each reflection is also one of the causes of
later reflections and final absorption” (Ibid., 172).
206
“[I]t is purely contingent whether there are any actual signal and genidentity connections in any given
part of the universe. One might postulate that there are enough such connections to define temporal order
for all events (given, one must assume, some other relations). And this postulate might be made plausible
by accepted physical theory. In a philosophical account, however, one prefers to make as few empirical
assumptions as possible” (van Fraassen 1970a, 195-196).
207
Van Fraassen sees his use of the term “logical space” to be “fully in accordance with the use of that term
by Wittgenstein” and conjectures that its historical origin “is the use of vector spaces in physics (“phase
space”, “configuration space”)” (1967, 172, n.). But he also views the idea quite generally as that of “the
general form of any possible world” (1970a, 100) tracing it back to Kant. In particular, it is the form made
necessary by the principles of the understanding in the Critique (1998) and also the essential form
characterized in the principle of possible interactions found earlier in the Dissertation (1929). As noted in
the first chapter of my dissertation, the latter principle expresses the divine schema. It should be evident by
now, however, that there is a closer connection to Wittgenstein and a less general relation to Kant. As we
saw last chapter, Wittgenstein views time to be the form of a kind of simple object displayed in the
imaginative expression of a one-dimensional logical space, and this relates directly to Kant’s critical claim
that “the schema of time a line”. There is no need, therefore, for van Fraassen to “to objectify … [Kant’s
temporal] … form of our intuition and to describe it as a form, as opposed to a condition of sensible
perception” (1970a, 101).
208
This is clearly evident in the following passage:
But what is logical space? Wittgenstein gives the example of the color spectrum: the logical
space of colored things. But what exactly is the colored spectrum? It is merely a strip or line
segment with markings, whether drawn on paper, merely imagined, or produced on a scale on the
wall by means of a light source and prism. What it does is to give a picture, to a desired degree of
199

235

accuracy, of the part of our conceptual scheme that concerns colors. (“Why can’t a thing be red
and green all over?” “Because ‘red’ and ‘green’ are tags of different parts of the spectrum, and an
evenly colored surface has a unique location on the spectrum.”) To put it more generally: The
color spectrum is a segment of the real line being used to represent the meaning relations among
color words. (van Fraassen 1970a, 101)
209
The relation between logical space and language will be discussed in more detail next section.
210
In saying that it “is purely and entirely an objective question of empirical fact” whether the real structure
of actual events embeds within a mathematical structure, van Fraassen’s takes embedding to be a condition
of representation that bestows meaning independent of us. But it is because this embedding can occur
within a number of abstract structures that choice of structure is also a condition of representation that
bestows upon an embedding structure the status of a “cultural object” (van Fraassen 1970a, 106). As
became apparent some years later, however, the notion of an objective embedding relation is trivial, and so
the condition of representation easily met. As we will see below, van Fraassen’s response will be to
emphasize our use of logical space, drawing in pragmatic conditions of representation and retrenching
meaning bestowal in acts of self-location necessary for use. He will then reconceive the Scotist synthesis in
slightly different terms:
A scientific, technical, or artistic representation is an artifact. As such, it is both an object or event
in nature, that we can regard purely through the physicist’s or chemist’s or mathematician’s eyes.
But it is at the same time something constituted as a cultural object, through which its role or
function, bestowed upon it in practice. Just what the representation is, or what is represented and
how, is not determined entirely – and often enough, hardly at all – either by what is ‘in’ the natural
object or by its physical or structural relations to other things. (2008, 30)
While it is still the case that apart from meaning there is nothing in a representation (Ibid., 25), in our use of
it we bestow meaning on a representation by relating it to real entities and by bringing into play a host of
pragmatic factors.
211
“I believe the constitution of time in our construction of the real world is not different in essential
character from the constitution of time by the reader in his construction of the narrated world as he reads the
text” (van Fraassen 1991b, 24).
212
Cf. van Fraassen (1970a, 132).
213
Cf. van Fraassen (1989, 277-228).
214
Cf. van Fraassen (1991a, 6).
215
Cf. van Fraassen (1987, 105).
216
This is evident at (van Fraassen 1970b, 326).
217
These are contrasted with “contensive” meaning relations among predicates definable in terms of each
other (van Fraassen 1967, 163).
218
“The impact of Suppes’ innovation [re: the semantic view of theories] is lost if models are defined, as in
many standard logic texts, to be partially linguistic entities, each yoked to a particular syntax. Here models
are mathematical structures, called models of a given theory only in virtue of belonging to the class defined
to be the models of that theory” (van Fraassen 1987, 122 n.2).
219
“A topological feature is one that is preserved by a one-to-one continuous transformation”, e.g.,
dimensionality (van Fraassen 1970a, 134). Topological structure of a representative logical space includes
not only the structure of the space itself, but also the structure of models that are mapped within it.
220
Depending on whether the state of the physical system changes with time, the satisfaction function is or
is not time-dependent (if the former the satisfaction function is not time-dependent; if the latter the
satisfaction function is time-dependent) (van Fraassen 1970b, 329).
221
In this paper van Fraassen does not refer to a “physical system” but to individual X in the case of
monadic predicates and set D in the general case of n-ary predicates. Neither does he refer to “satisfaction
function” in the preceding sentence. I am anticipating the formal semantics of scientific language as
presented in his (1970b).
222
Note that for Carnap (1956b) meaning relations are made explicit through a set of “meaning postulates”
laid down alongside axioms of a scientific theory, presupposing a distinction between meaning and
empirical postulates. Van Fraassen’s semantic approach obliterates this distinction: in certain cases laws
can be incorporated into the definition of logical space so all points of the space represent physically
possible points, and none represent merely logically possible points. For him the difference between
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empirical and meaning postulates is only the historical difference between laws made explicit by the
scientist and principles implicit in the language game (1970b, 328, 331).
223
In Science, Perception and Reality (1963, ch.10) Sellars proposes a view of analyticity construed
broadly as truth ex vi terminorum, arguing that the analytic propositions that constitute our conceptual
framework include logically true and logically contingent propositions. Van Fraassen’s connection to
Sellars runs fairly deep, I think. Although it is beyond the scope of this present chapter, it would be useful
to explore the influence Sellars had upon van Fraassen’s early ideas since many carry through his later
empiricism.
224
“In some easily recognizable way, our concepts of time and space have become ever more abstract. …
May it not be possible to fashion a concept of space-time from which all the variable features, differing
from model to model, have been abstracted? … Perhaps the adequate new conception has not yet been born,
perhaps in retrospect these discussions in the second half of the twentieth century will be seen as
contributing to its creation, and perhaps it will at the level of the most basic philosophical questions, be
relevantly like earlier conceptions” (van Fraassen 1985b, 210-211).
225
Van Fraassen is not settled on an official definition of what a theory is, but emphasizes that “it must be
the sort of thing that can be believed, disbelieved, doubted and so forth” (2008, 310).
226
Notice the tension in the notion of “appearances” when one compares a reconstructive logical space with
a representational one. In the former, an appearance is a physical system mapped to a region of logical
space; in the latter it is a mathematical structure isomorphic to part of a model. As van Fraassen would
later admit, he used “appearance” at the time to mean both phenomena and data models (van Fraassen 2008,
391, n.24). He now uses the term “appearance” to mean perspectival information content, distinguishing it
from both phenomena and data models.
227
A useful project in philosophy of language would be to critically evaluate this theory. Arntzenius (1991)
has taken first steps by raising questions for van Fraassen’s approach to meaning relations.
228
“Whether the apple is red depends on the meanings of “apple” and “red” in one sense, but not in the
sense that makes us unrealistic. The dependence is just this: If the meanings of these words were different
then so would be the truth conditions for the sentence “the apple is red”. But the relevant independence is
this: If the apple is red, then it would still have been red if the meanings of these words had been different”
(van Fraassen 2006a, 151).
229
According to fictionalism, “discourse is to be interpreted literally or “at face value”; so our theories are
true only if the problematic objects exist. We skirt commitment to those objects simply by denying that the
theories are true” (Rosen 1994, 168). Literally construed, van Fraassen claims “theoretical [unobservable]
entities are fictions” (1976, 335).
230
“Suppose T entails that statement [“B is not observable by humans”]. Then T has no model in which B
occurs among the empirical substructures. Hence, if B is real and observable, not all observable phenomena
fit into the model of T in the right way, and then T is not empirically adequate. So, if I believe T to be
empirically adequate, then I also believe that B is unobservable if it is real” (van Fraassen 1985a, 256).
231
“A graphic, if some what inaccurate way to put this would be: causal and modal discourse describes
features of our models, not features of the world” (van Fraassen 1987, 122). Following Collingwood, van
Fraassen sees causal discourse in science generally as “a metaphorical and analogical extension of the
discourse of applied science and everyday life, i.e., human agency” involving intentional action, goals and
choices (1993, 442).
232
I am referring to Sellars’ (1948). In his (1976) van Fraassen appears to accept its basic idea, citing its
connection with Duhem.
233
Van Fraassen invokes the idea of colour-space to illustrate the language-governing feature of logical
space:
Let us close with an example of how the logical structure of a language can be determined
by an accepted theory: Wittgenstein’s familiar example of the colour spectrum as a ‘logical
space’. A person uses a language in which he asserts such sentences as
1. X is green, X is not red, Y is red, …
2. Nothing that is green is red
3. There is no possible object which is both green and red.
Sentences of type 1 he has been trained or conditioned to assert under certain experiential
conditions. Sentences of type 2 still express assertions which are merely about what is actually the
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case. But 3 goes well beyond that; it says something like: “there could not be something which is
both red and green.
The explanation is that this person is guided by the idea of a simple abstract structure, the
colour spectrum. We can think of this as a line segment, or an interval of real numbers (the wave
lengths). He associates with each colour predicate, such as ‘green’, a part of that spectrum; he
associates disjoint parts with ‘red’ and ‘green’; and when he says that an object is green or red, he
is classifying it, that is, assigning it a location in that spectrum. So sentence 2 amounts to: no
occupied location belongs at once to the parts associated with ‘red’ and with ‘green’, while 3 says
that no point of the spectrum at all belongs to both parts. (Every model structure of this simple
language consists of that spectrum plus a domain of entities and a function that assigns a location
in the spectrum to each of those entities.) It will be clear how the logical connections among
sentences in this language are determined by the structure of the colour spectrum. Blatantly modal
sentences (such as 3) do occur; but this person evaluates them as true or false by reflection on the
structure of the spectrum that guides all his uses of colour terms. His linguistic commitments can
be summed up by referring to his use of this spectrum; his theory of colour consists in the family
of models each of which is a classification of objects through location in this spectrum. (1980,
200-201)
234
It is warranted (inter alia) as follows: 1) interpreting what one is experiencing is part of experience (e.g.,
the experience of meeting a saint involves realizing that one is meeting a saint); and 2) self-attribution is
also part of experience (e.g. the experience of winning the lottery requires self-attributing the named
winner) (van Fraassen 2002a, 134-136); and 3) the fact we make mistakes interpreting experience (e.g.,
seeing a yellow candy wrapper and taking it to be a flower) (van Fraassen 2006a, 126).
235
The former is extensional (1992, 19) while it would be fair to say the latter is intensional in that it is
propositional.
236
Cf. van Fraassen (2000).
237
Van Fraassen (1992) uses this Sellarsian language.
238
The justification for van Fraassen’s realism seems to be that presupposition-less discourse is “a view
from nowhere”, and a presupposition of common sense realism is the basis of discourse in philosophy of
science (2009, 479).
239
Similarly “‘Electrons are negatively charged’ is true if and only if electrons are negatively charged” (van
Fraassen 2006b, 545 n.)
240
Cf. van Fraassen (1985a).
241
Van Fraassen (2010b, 553) denies that a predicative statement is a representation.
242
“The reports issued by institutions convey the data already reduced, summarized and corrected by
statistical methods. But those summary reports are based on individual reports by trained observers – and
those are the paradigm for observation reports” (van Fraassen 1992, 16).
243
It seems van Fraassen’s critics have not noticed that he does not offer a criterion of success for the
construction of a data model in the practice of science. Surely there is such a criterion in the reproducibility
of results. But if he were to offer such a criterion, I suggest, it would erode his ability to defend empirical
adequacy as the criterion of success for theory production against more modest characterizations such as
manifest adequacy (cf. Monton and van Fraassen 2003 ) or merely “saving the appearances”. It would go
beyond the scope of this dissertation to elaborate on this point any further.
244
Ladyman (2009) puts it this way: “according to the extensional characterisation of relations defined on a
domain of individuals, every relation is identified with some set of subsets of the domain. The power set
axiom entails the existence of every such subset and hence every such relation”.
245
See van Fraassen (2008, 371, n.3).
246
Elaborating upon Duhem’s (1962) view that a theory provides us with a taxonomy to organize its
empirical generalizations, The Scientific Image claims “[e]verything in the world has a proper classification
within the conceptual framework of modern science. And it is this conceptual framework which we bring
to bear when we describe any event, including an observation” (van Fraassen 1980, 58). It also claims that
classifying an actual and observed phenomenon involves “assigning it a location” (Ibid., 201) in a logical
space. One gets the sense van Fraassen sees himself as having fallen prey to the problem of coordination
through the strategy employed in constructive empiricism of attempting to tackle scientific realism on its
own terms (cf. (van Fraassen 2006a, 153) and (van Fraassen 2009, 470)).
247
Cf. van Fraassen’s (1967) and (1969).
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“There is nothing in the idea of universality that should make philosophical hackles rise, nor would there
be in the idea of law if a law stated merely what happens always and everywhere” (van Fraassen 1989, 26);
“everything that can be said about the world, can be said in purely general statements, without modalities”
(van Fraassen 1978, 14).
249
“But on the other hand, general scientific theories, in their ‘official’ formulation, are not perspectival
descriptions, and their models – if we consider the entire range of models for a given theory – are not
generally perspectival representations” (van Fraassen 2008, 86).
250
That there are invariances across perspectives in the content of perspectival measurement outcomes is
illustrated in the case of cross-ratios read-off drawings or photos (van Fraassen 2008, 75).
251
Cf. van Fraassen (1989, 227-228).
252
Van Fraassen understands his account of the scientific image to be an “updated version of Bildtheorie,
the ‘picture theory’ of science” (2010c, 514) originating with Hertz, and sees an affinity between empirical
adequacy as a symmetry requirement to be satisfied by a structural representation and Hertz’s fundamental
requirement (2008, 196, 306).
253
The example extends generally to quantitative predication:
In models, the terms ‘temperature’, ‘mass’, ‘force’, etc. do have denotations: they denote
functions that assign numbers, vectors,… to other elements of the model. But in describing the
bodies measured or represented, they provide a convenient facon de parler for predication:
The patient has a high temperature
The patient is hot
The patient’s temperature is 37.3˚C
The patient is 37.3˚C-hot
The predicate ‘37.3˚C-hot’ is related to ‘hot’ as ‘scarlet’ is to ‘red’. (van Fraassen 2010b, 553)
254
“[O]bservation reports are indexical, acts of self-location” (van Fraassen 1992, 16).
255
“[A]n observation report is only symptomatic of its own truth, and symptoms don’t guarantee more than
high probability” (van Fraassen 2004a, 3).
256
“The subtended angle is always 42 degrees, with that location (of eye or camera) between sun and
cloud” (van Fraassen 2008, 103).
257
Van Fraassen’s (2008, 101-105) account of rainbows does not distinguish between a rainbow as a
“naturally produced phenomena” and as the image type he calls a “public hallucination”.
258
In this case, the observation set-up also lacks the invariance of a real object since different positions of
observation will locate the coloured arch in a different place. However, as we shall see next this is not
essential to its status as a “public hallucination”.
259
Lenses such as in binoculars or telescopes have a mimetic function, producing phenomena taken to
represent observable entities (van Fraassen 2008, 97). The “rough guide” in this context is “X is observable
if there are circumstances which are such that, if X is present to us under those circumstances, then we
observe it” (van Fraassen 1980, 16).
260
“[T]he appearances of objects are the contents of outcomes of measurements performed on those objects.
But on what objects are those measurements by means of microscopes made? On observable objects.
Leeuwenhoek inspected samples of pond water, others inspect specially prepared slides with samples of
tissue. The microscope images are how these observable objects appear in those measurement set-ups.
And these appearances are informative about those observable objects, not in and by themselves, but
relative to the (presumed) empirical adequate theories that accommodate them” (van Fraassen 2011a, 411).
261
Though not compelled, van Fraassen chooses to remain agnostic about unobservable entities in
accordance with the commitments and values of his empirical stance. Citing quantum mechanics, he claims
science rejects as a criterion of completeness that a theory must explain how appearances are produced from
a theoretically postulated reality behind the phenomena (cf. 2008, ch.13).
262
Here is the full passage:
Measurements occur in experimental procedure, under artificially designed conditions for
empirical investigation. Under these conditions, measurement procedures produce representations
– images – with complex, theory mediated relations to the entities on which the measurements are
made. The content of the measurement outcomes [e.g., the end-state of the measuring instrument]
– that is, the appearance of the measured object in the measurement set-up – locates the object in a
theory-provided logical space.
263
See also van Fraassen (1980, 82).
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“Our entire discussion of self-locating self-ascriptions was a fortiori a discussion of observation reports.
They have as complete text an indexical assertion that locates the speaker, on that occasion, in some
definite part of his own general, “objective”, world picture” (van Fraassen 1992, 18).
265
“That is, the phenomenon, what it is like taken by itself, does not determine which structures are data
models for it – that depends on our selective attention to the phenomenon, and our decisions in attending to
certain aspects, to represent them in certain ways and to a certain extent” (van Fraassen 2008, 254).
266
Pragmatic tautologies are not limited to observable entities: e.g., ““The sentence ‘Electrons are
negatively charged’ is true if and only if electrons are negatively charged” is a pragmatic tautology” (van
Fraassen 2006b, 545, n.10).
267
By small “p” platonism I have in mind Shapiro’s (2000, 28) characterization of a realist in ontology of
mathematical objects who “defends something like a Platonic ontology for mathematics, without Platonic
epistemology” that involves an appeal to mathematical intuition.
268
Compare this to early Wittgenstein position that such a shift in the perspective of a picture amounts to
seeing “two different facts” (1961b, 5.5423).
269
Presumably, reproducibility of appearances would reduce the ambiguity in the second case, for the
calibration of judgements would make accurate classification, i.e., correct location of the real entity in
logical space, more probable. But even in science this ambiguity cannot be eliminated altogether.
Following his distinction between the epistemology and semantics of experience, van Fraassen
distinguishes a theory’s relation to appearances from its relation to reality, claiming that “the data we have
may not be true. The relation between theory and data is independent of the truth of the data” (1981, 664).
His epistemology of science defends the traditional view that “what we take as evidence itself is not
indubitable, and we may later come to regard it as having been false”; yet, we do not “think ourselves
irrational for engaging in this cognitive enterprise” (1984, 236).
270
“We have an ideal frame – we conceive of the events as in some definite order – but no rigid frame of
reference. The locational function of each clue in the narrative, whether it refers to other parts of the
narrated episodes or to episodes such as the World War in the readers’ presumed common history, must
thus remain fragile, equivocal, and undermined by the rights of future narration. Therefore, the
construction of the narrative time is always essentially internal to the text, even when the text gives every
sign of wanting to be related to extratextual reality” (van Fraassen 1991b, 23).
271
A previous note points out that van Fraassen’s argument experience is literate is supported by appeal to
the phenomenology of experience. It goes without saying we are talking about the phenomenology of
experience in relation to our spontaneous judgement, for if logical space is to function for us as an
imaginative guide then its conditions of use must pertain to immediate non-discursive thought.
272
Rosen (1994, 164-169) argues that the notion of theory acceptance and empirical adequacy in the context
of the semantic view of theories commits van Fraassen to the existence of abstract entities. Monton and van
Fraassen (2003) say that the attribution of tension between constructive empiricism and nominalist
mathematics “presupposes that the practice and use of mathematics is intelligible only given realism or
platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. That is in effect the supposition that mathematics is
intelligible only if we can view it as a true story about certain kinds of things – not, for example, a
supposition shared by intuitionism. Without offering a rival philosophy of mathematics, we may proceed in
philosophy of science in the conviction that any satisfactory philosophical account of mathematics must
imply that the sorts of applications of mathematics needed in philosophy of science are acceptable, correct,
and intelligible” (412, n.).
273
Lately, van Fraassen is willing to countenance that “mathematically speaking” mathematical objects
“exist” (2008, 310). But he offers no philosophy of mathematics to shore up what that means, and at the
very least it must mean something different than real existence.
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